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Cross-tenant data-isolation audit #4797
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maintainer-onlyOwner-only work — yields no Gittensor points.Owner-only work — yields no Gittensor points.roadmapOn the Wave-2 agent-layer roadmap board (project 9)On the Wave-2 agent-layer roadmap board (project 9)
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maintainer-onlyOwner-only work — yields no Gittensor points.Owner-only work — yields no Gittensor points.roadmapOn the Wave-2 agent-layer roadmap board (project 9)On the Wave-2 agent-layer roadmap board (project 9)
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Problem: Before launch, the storage/schema layer needs an explicit confirmation that no tenant can query or see another tenant's data — this shouldn't be assumed from the application-layer isolation alone.
Area: Platform / Security
Proposal: Audit every table/store touched by the rental product for tenant-scoping, confirming every query is scoped by tenant at the data-access layer, not only in application logic.
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Part of #4778.
Reconciliation decision (#5669, resolved 2026-07-15): #5218 and #5219 are already closed -- read their findings first, don't redo that discovery work. This issue is a narrower audit scoped to the rental product's own stores specifically (query-layer tenant-scoping for what Rent-a-Loop itself touches), building on what #5218/#5219 already found for AMS's broader global-singleton/telemetry surfaces. #4939 (tenant-scoping columns) remains this milestone's own deliverable and is already natively blocked-by this issue, #4793, and #4783.