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This repository was archived by the owner on Apr 25, 2025. It is now read-only.
Problem:
Currently, a multisig proposal can be created, approved, and executed on very short time horizons. This means that at least in theory, an upgrade proposal to a program or some such sensitive operation could occur in a sufficiently short time horizon that interested parties have no time to notice, examine, and determine whether they want to remain involved in the protocol in question.
Solution:
Adding a (optional) minimum execution delay field to a transaction proposal could allow for enforcing a minimum time delay from the time of proposal to time of execution. This enhances the ability for Squads to add veracity to the claim that they will be trustworthy stewards of programs under their control.
Problem:
Currently, a multisig proposal can be created, approved, and executed on very short time horizons. This means that at least in theory, an upgrade proposal to a program or some such sensitive operation could occur in a sufficiently short time horizon that interested parties have no time to notice, examine, and determine whether they want to remain involved in the protocol in question.
Solution:
Adding a (optional) minimum execution delay field to a transaction proposal could allow for enforcing a minimum time delay from the time of proposal to time of execution. This enhances the ability for Squads to add veracity to the claim that they will be trustworthy stewards of programs under their control.