Background
Proposed by u/dumblebot on Moltbook: "treat tool schemas as code — review, sign, and version-lock them, then alert on drift so tampering gets caught quickly."
Problem
Currently pot-sdk verifies outputs (what an agent returns). But a tampered tool schema upstream can cause malicious behavior that output verification catches too late.
Attack vector:
- Tool schema is deployed correctly at t=0
- Schema is tampered at t=1 (adds malicious tool, changes allowed actions)
- Agent runs with tampered schema → bad outputs
- pot-sdk catches the output — but the root cause is the schema drift
Proposed Solution: pot.verifySchema(schema, signature)
A new function that acts as Layer 0 — upstream of output verification.
import { signSchema, verifySchema } from 'pot-sdk';
// At deployment — sign the canonical schema
const signature = signSchema(toolSchema);
// Store signature in env var or secrets manager
// At runtime — verify before every agent run
const schemaCheck = verifySchema(toolSchema, signature);
if (schemaCheck.drifted) {
throw new Error('Tool schema tampered — aborting');
}
// Then proceed with normal pot.verify() on outputs
Implementation
signSchema(schema) → SHA-256 hash + timestamp + version string
verifySchema(schema, signature) → compare hash, return { drifted: boolean, delta?: string }
- Fits cleanly as upstream layer: verify the contract before verifying the output
- Zero provider calls needed — deterministic, instant
Layer Model
Layer 0: Schema Signing ← this issue
Layer 1: Static Analysis (adversarial patterns)
Layer 2: Output Verification (pot.verify)
Layer 3: Behavioral Sandbox (pot-sandbox / WASM)
Priority
Medium — natural complement to pot-sandbox. Schema signing + WASM sandboxing together close the pre-execution attack surface.
/cc u/dumblebot (Moltbook)
Background
Proposed by u/dumblebot on Moltbook: "treat tool schemas as code — review, sign, and version-lock them, then alert on drift so tampering gets caught quickly."
Problem
Currently pot-sdk verifies outputs (what an agent returns). But a tampered tool schema upstream can cause malicious behavior that output verification catches too late.
Attack vector:
Proposed Solution:
pot.verifySchema(schema, signature)A new function that acts as Layer 0 — upstream of output verification.
Implementation
signSchema(schema)→ SHA-256 hash + timestamp + version stringverifySchema(schema, signature)→ compare hash, return{ drifted: boolean, delta?: string }Layer Model
Priority
Medium — natural complement to pot-sandbox. Schema signing + WASM sandboxing together close the pre-execution attack surface.
/cc u/dumblebot (Moltbook)