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%% This BibTeX bibliography file was created using BibDesk.
%% http://bibdesk.sourceforge.net/
%% Created for Alejandro Perez Carballo at 2010-08-06 09:31:42 -0400
%% Saved with string encoding Unicode (UTF-8)
@incollection{field2000,
Abstract = {Hartry Field argues that meaning-based approaches to explaining the apriority of certain propositions fail to succeed in their endeavour. He suggests that adopting what one calls a 'non-factualist' view of justification itself removes the mystery of the apriority of such propositions, and sketches what such a view of justification involves.},
Address = {Oxford},
Author = {Field, Hartry},
Booktitle = {New Essays on the A Priori},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {2130854},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00006},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:05:58 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:30:10 -0400},
Editor = {Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke},
Keywords = {epistemic\_norms, epistemology, expressivism, nonfactualism, relativism},
Month = {October},
Pages = {117--150},
Posted-Date = {2010-08-06 13:59:45},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Title = {Apriority as an Evaluative Notion},
Url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00006},
Year = {2000},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00006}}
@article{field2009,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on '' ground level'' epistemology.},
Author = {Field, Hartry},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {3981124},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/yn3114432727751q},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:43 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1},
Issn = {0031-8116},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Keywords = {epistemic\_norms, epistemology, expressivism, nonfactualism, relativism},
Month = {March},
Number = {2},
Pages = {249--290},
Posted-Date = {2010-08-06 13:59:04},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Epistemology without metaphysics},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1},
Volume = {143},
Year = {2009},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1}}
@article{chierchia1985,
Author = {Chierchia, Gennaro},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7206902},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4178443},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4178443},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:37 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Doi = {10.2307/4178443},
Issn = {00243892},
Journal = {Linguistic Inquiry},
Keywords = {formal\_semantics},
Number = {3},
Pages = {417--443},
Posted-Date = {2010-05-22 21:51:35},
Priority = {4},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Title = {Formal Semantics and the Grammar of Predication},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4178443},
Volume = {16},
Year = {1985},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4178443}}
@article{brandom2007,
Address = {University of Pittsburgh},
Author = {Brandom, Robert},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7206905},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118493503/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:36 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x},
Issn = {1933-1592},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Keywords = {content, inferentialism, pragmatism, semantics},
Number = {3},
Pages = {651--676},
Posted-Date = {2010-05-22 22:02:50},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Inferentialism and Some of Its Challenges},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x},
Volume = {74},
Year = {2007},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x}}
@article{fodorlepore2007,
Address = {Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science},
Author = {Fodor, Jerry and Lepore, Ernie},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7206904},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118493504/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:35 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x},
Issn = {1933-1592},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Keywords = {content, inferentialism, pragmatism, semantics},
Number = {3},
Pages = {677--691},
Posted-Date = {2010-05-22 22:02:55},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Brandom Beleaguered},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x},
Volume = {74},
Year = {2007},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x}}
@article{horwich2008,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ This paper offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good theory must (1) explain relations of entailment, (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions derive from the meanings of their parts, and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms. It then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch of an alternative conception---one that is argued to be more in tune with the empirical objectives of linguistics and the clarificatory aims of philosophy. Finally, the paper proposes and defends a specific theoretical approach---use based rather than truth based---that is suggested by that alternative conception.},
Author = {Horwich, Paul},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {3623256},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-008-9036-z},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/e181r79g35h38367},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:34 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/s10988-008-9036-z},
Issn = {0165-0157},
Journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
Keywords = {content, deflationism, intentionality, pragmatism, truth},
Month = {November},
Number = {3},
Pages = {309--322},
Posted-Date = {2010-05-22 22:03:23},
Priority = {2},
Title = {What's truth got to do with it?},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-008-9036-z},
Volume = {31},
Year = {2008},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-008-9036-z}}
@article{fraassen1969,
Author = {van Fraassen, Bas C.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7461084},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216262},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216262},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:32 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Doi = {10.2307/2216262},
Issn = {00294624},
Journal = {No\^{u}s},
Keywords = {concepts, content, logical\_space},
Number = {2},
Pages = {155--167},
Posted-Date = {2010-07-12 00:54:46},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishing},
Title = {Meaning Relations and Modalities},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216262},
Volume = {3},
Year = {1969},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216262}}
@article{fraassen1967,
Author = {van Fraassen, Bas C.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7461082},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214583},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214583},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:30 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Doi = {10.2307/2214583},
Issn = {00294624},
Journal = {No\^{u}s},
Keywords = {concepts, content, logical\_space},
Number = {2},
Pages = {161--179},
Posted-Date = {2010-07-12 00:55:20},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishing},
Title = {Meaning Relations among Predicates},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214583},
Volume = {1},
Year = {1967},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214583}}
@article{arntzenius1991,
Abstract = {It has often been suggested that the meaning of terms is theory dependent. Bas van Fraassen has proposed a particular way of inferring which sentences are true in virtue of meaning, given a theory in so-called '' state-space format''. I examine his claims by means of simple examples.},
Author = {Arntzenius, Frank},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7465954},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00136021},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/m40866085111j4x7},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:29 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00136021},
Issn = {0167-7411},
Journal = {Topoi},
Keywords = {concepts, content, meaning, van\_fraassen},
Month = {March},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35--42},
Posted-Date = {2010-07-12 15:27:19},
Priority = {2},
Title = {State-spaces and meaning relations among predicates},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00136021},
Volume = {10},
Year = {1991},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00136021}}
@article{harper1976,
Author = {Harper, William L.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7537452},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/192397},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/192397},
Date-Added = {2010-08-06 09:00:28 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-08-06 09:06:28 -0400},
Doi = {10.2307/192397},
Issn = {02708647},
Journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association},
Keywords = {bayesianism, belief\_change, conceptual\_change, conditional\_probabilities, conditional\_probability, counterfactuals},
Pages = {462--494},
Posted-Date = {2010-07-24 21:53:20},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association},
Title = {Rational Conceptual Change},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/192397},
Volume = {1976},
Year = {1976},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/192397}}
@unpublished{stalnaker1977,
Author = {Robert Stalnaker},
Date-Added = {2010-07-29 11:10:54 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-07-29 11:14:53 -0400},
Note = {Unpublished ms., MIT},
Title = {Comments on "Resiliency, Propensities and Causal Necessity"},
Year = {1977},
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@article{putnam1967,
Author = {Putnam, Hilary},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7339535},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2024603},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024603},
Date-Added = {2010-07-27 12:12:50 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-07-27 12:13:15 -0400},
Doi = {10.2307/2024603},
Issn = {0022362X},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Keywords = {foundations\_of\_mathematics, mathematics, modality},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5--22},
Posted-Date = {2010-07-27 17:12:27},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
Title = {Mathematics without Foundations},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2024603},
Volume = {64},
Year = {1967},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2024603}}
@book{evans1982,
Address = {Oxford},
Author = {Gareth Evans},
Date-Added = {2010-07-12 11:59:41 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-07-27 12:11:56 -0400},
Editor = {John McDowell},
Publisher = {Clarendon Press},
Title = {The Varieties of Reference},
Year = {1982}}
@inproceedings{field1990,
Address = {Oxford},
Annote = {Field argues that certain `narrow' intentional notions are needed in order to get IT-approaches to content off the ground. These include relations of sameness of content, incompatibility of contents, etc. (p. 105)
The argument is roughly this. Assignments of truth-conditions to belief states are cheap. So it is always possible to find an assignment of truth-conditions that makes the agent more reliable than the `natural' assignment. Field thinks the solution to this is to impose a `systematicity' constraint on assignments of content. And to cash out this notion of systematicity, we need to have independently explicable relations of consistency and implication among states of the agent.
He further thinks that these relations must be cashed out in computational terms, but I don't see why that needs to be so.
[Note: I wonder whether this problem arises for more `realist' approached to content. E.g. if we follow Dretske, are we also forced into this sort of indeterminacy?] },
Author = {Hartry Field},
Booktitle = {Information, Semantics and Epistemology},
Date-Added = {2010-05-16 16:15:01 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-06-08 10:28:04 -0400},
Editor = {Enrique Villanueva},
Pages = {102--116},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Title = {`Narrow' Aspects of Intentionality and the Information-Theoretic approach to Content},
Year = {1990}}
@article{schroeder2008a,
Abstract = {Expressivism's central idea is that normative sentences bear the same relation to non-cognitive attitudes that ordinary descriptive sentences bear to beliefs: the expression relation. Allan Gibbard tells us that "that words express judgments will be accepted by almost everyone"2013 the distinctive contribution of expressivism, his claim goes, is only a view about what kind of judgments words express. But not every account of the expression relation is equally suitable for the expressivist's purposes. In fact, what I argue in this paper, considering four possible accounts of expression, is that how suitable each account is for the expressivist's purpose varies in proportion to how controversial it is. So Gibbard is wrong 2013 if expression is to get expressivism off the ground, then it will be enormously controversial whether words do express judgments. And thus expressivism is committed to strong claims about the semantics of non-normative language.},
Address = {University of Southern California},
Author = {Schroeder, Mark},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {7159824},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/119395179/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-05-12 10:46:09 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-05-12 10:46:17 -0400},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x},
Issn = {1933-1592},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Keywords = {content, expression, expressivism, gibbard, language, meaning, metaethics, nonfactualism},
Number = {1},
Pages = {86--116},
Posted-Date = {2010-05-12 15:34:54},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Expression for Expressivists},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x},
Volume = {76},
Year = {2008},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x}}
@incollection{joyce2009a,
Address = {Dordrecht},
Author = {Joyce, James M.},
Booktitle = {Degrees of Belief},
Chapter = {11},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6982538},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/w35888684x740665},
Date-Added = {2010-05-12 10:46:08 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-05-12 10:46:17 -0400},
Doi = {10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11},
Editor = {Huber, Franz and Schmidt-Petri, Christoph},
Isbn = {978-1-4020-9197-1},
Keywords = {accuracy, bayesianism, epistemic\_norms, epistemic\_value, probabilism, scoring\_rules},
Pages = {263--297},
Posted-Date = {2010-04-08 23:36:09},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
Title = {Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11},
Volume = {342},
Year = {2009},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11}}
@article{macbride2004,
Abstract = {10.1093/analys/64.4.309},
Author = {MacBride, Fraser},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6867442},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.4.309},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/64/4/309},
Date-Added = {2010-03-17 16:22:28 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-17 16:22:37 -0400},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/64.4.309},
Journal = {Analysis},
Keywords = {access\_problem, benacerraf\_problem, mathematics, structuralism},
Month = {October},
Number = {4},
Pages = {309--317},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-17 20:20:52},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Can structuralism solve the 'access' problem?},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.4.309},
Volume = {64},
Year = {2004},
Bdsk-File-1 = {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},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.4.309}}
@article{lombrozo2006,
Abstract = { Generating and evaluating explanations is spontaneous, ubiquitous and fundamental to our sense of understanding. Recent evidence suggests that in the course of an individual's reasoning, engaging in explanation can have profound effects on the probability assigned to causal claims, on how properties are generalized and on learning. These effects follow from two properties of the structure of explanations: explanations accommodate novel information in the context of prior beliefs, and do so in a way that fosters generalization. The study of explanation thus promises to shed light on core cognitive issues, such as learning, induction and conceptual representation. Moreover, the influence of explanation on learning and inference presents a challenge to theories that neglect the roles of prior knowledge and explanation-based reasoning. },
Author = {Lombrozo, T.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {873596},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.004},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661306002117},
Citeulike-Linkout-2 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16942895},
Citeulike-Linkout-3 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=16942895},
Citeulike-Linkout-4 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VH9-4KSD8CP-1/2/075f01ac15ff0a0d73da12e74b6e495c},
Date-Added = {2010-03-17 16:22:27 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-17 16:22:37 -0400},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.004},
Issn = {13646613},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Keywords = {causal\_reasoning, cog\_sci, explanation, learning},
Month = {October},
Number = {10},
Pages = {464--470},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-16 23:43:34},
Priority = {2},
Title = {The structure and function of explanations},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.004},
Volume = {10},
Year = {2006},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.004}}
@article{lombrozocarey2006,
Abstract = {Teleological explanations (TEs) account for the existence or properties of an entity in terms of a function: we have hearts because they pump blood, and telephones for communication. While many teleological explanations seem appropriate, others are clearly not warranted---for example, that rain exists for plants to grow. Five experiments explore the theoretical commitments that underlie teleological explanations. With the analysis of [Wright, L. (1976). Teleological Explanations . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press] from philosophy as a point of departure, we examine in Experiment 1 whether teleological explanations are interpreted causally, and confirm that TEs are only accepted when the function invoked in the explanation played a causal role in bringing about what is being explained. However, we also find that playing a causal role is not sufficient for all participants to accept TEs. Experiment 2 shows that this is not because participants fail to appreciate the causal structure of the scenarios used as stimuli. In Experiments 3--5 we show that the additional requirement for TE acceptance is that the process by which the function played a causal role must be general in the sense of conforming to a predictable pattern. These findings motivate a proposal, Explanation for Export, which suggests that a psychological function of explanation is to highlight information likely to subserve future prediction and intervention. We relate our proposal to normative accounts of explanation from philosophy of science, as well as to claims from psychology and artificial intelligence.},
Author = {Lombrozo, T. and Carey, S.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {3064890},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.009},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027705000466},
Citeulike-Linkout-2 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6T24-4GBD6VF-1/1/481c70645e5fa66fa120920f918edbf3},
Date-Added = {2010-03-17 16:22:25 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-17 16:22:37 -0400},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.009},
Issn = {00100277},
Journal = {Cognition},
Keywords = {causal\_explanation, causal\_reasoning, cog\_sci, explanation},
Month = {March},
Number = {2},
Pages = {167--204},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-16 23:42:32},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Functional explanation and the function of explanation},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.009},
Volume = {99},
Year = {2006},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.009}}
@article{zabell1992,
Abstract = {A major difficulty for currently existing theories of inductive inference involves the question of what to do when novel, unknown, or previously unsuspected phenomena occur. In this paper one particular instance of this difficulty is considered, the so-called sampling of species problem.},
Author = {Zabell, S. L.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6781584},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00485351},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/ru8062770336v322},
Date-Added = {2010-03-09 16:50:01 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-05-16 16:14:55 -0400},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00485351},
Journal = {Synthese},
Keywords = {bayesianism, new\_theories},
Month = {February},
Number = {2},
Pages = {205--232},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-09 16:25:34},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Predicting the unpredictable},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00485351},
Volume = {90},
Year = {1992},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00485351}}
@article{good1980,
Abstract = {Summary\ \ A standard technique in subjective '' Bayesian'' methodology is for a subject ( '' you'') to make judgements of the probabilities that a physical probability lies in various intervals. In the hierarchical Bayesian technique you make probability judgements (of a higher type, order, level, or stage) concerning the judgements of lower type. The paper will outlinesome of the history of this hierarchical technique with emphasis on the contributions by I. J. Good because I have read every word written by him.},
Author = {Good, I.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6777540},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02888365},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/kj3257384375n455},
Date-Added = {2010-03-09 16:49:59 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-09 16:50:09 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02888365},
Issn = {0041-0241},
Journal = {Trabajos de Estad\'{\i}stica y de Investigaci\'{o}n Operativa},
Keywords = {bayesianism, hierarchical\_bayesian\_models, higher\_order\_probabilities, probability},
Month = {February},
Number = {1},
Pages = {489--519},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-08 15:44:35},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Some history of the hierarchical Bayesian methodology},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02888365},
Volume = {31},
Year = {1980},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02888365}}
@article{kemptenenbaum2010,
Abstract = {Concept learning is challenging in part because the meanings of many concepts depend on their relationships to other concepts. Learning these concepts in isolation can be difficult, but we present a model that discovers entire systems of related concepts. These systems can be viewed as simple theories that specify the concepts that exist in a domain, and the laws or principles that relate these concepts. We apply our model to several real-world problems, including learning the structure of kinship systems and learning ontologies. We also compare its predictions to data collected in two behavioral experiments. Experiment 1 shows that our model helps to explain how simple theories are acquired and used for inductive inference. Experiment 2 suggests that our model provides a better account of theory discovery than a more traditional alternative that focuses on features rather than relations.},
Author = {Kemp, Charles and Tenenbaum, Joshua B. and Niyogi, Sourabh and Griffiths, Thomas L.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6212252},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.09.003},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027709002169},
Date-Added = {2010-03-09 16:49:58 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-09 16:50:09 -0500},
Day = {04},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.09.003},
Issn = {00100277},
Journal = {Cognition},
Keywords = {bayesianism, hierarchical\_bayesian\_models, induction, inference, theory\_formation},
Month = {February},
Number = {2},
Pages = {165--196},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-07 21:49:35},
Priority = {2},
Title = {A probabilistic model of theory formation},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.09.003},
Volume = {114},
Year = {2010},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.09.003}}
@article{kemptenenbaum2008,
Abstract = {10.1073/pnas.0802631105 Algorithms for finding structure in data have become increasingly important both as tools for scientific data analysis and as models of human learning, yet they suffer from a critical limitation. Scientists discover qualitatively new forms of structure in observed data: For instance, Linnaeus recognized the hierarchical organization of biological species, and Mendeleev recognized the periodic structure of the chemical elements. Analogous insights play a pivotal role in cognitive development: Children discover that object category labels can be organized into hierarchies, friendship networks are organized into cliques, and comparative relations (e.g., '' bigger than'' or '' better than'') respect a transitive order. Standard algorithms, however, can only learn structures of a single form that must be specified in advance: For instance, algorithms for hierarchical clustering create tree structures, whereas algorithms for dimensionality-reduction create low-dimensional spaces. Here, we present a computational model that learns structures of many different forms and that discovers which form is best for a given dataset. The model makes probabilistic inferences over a space of graph grammars representing trees, linear orders, multidimensional spaces, rings, dominance hierarchies, cliques, and other forms and successfully discovers the underlying structure of a variety of physical, biological, and social domains. Our approach brings structure learning methods closer to human abilities and may lead to a deeper computational understanding of cognitive development.},
Address = {Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213.},
Author = {Kemp, Charles and Tenenbaum, Joshua B.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {3080763},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0802631105},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.pnas.org/content/105/31/10687.abstract},
Citeulike-Linkout-2 = {http://www.pnas.org/content/105/31/10687.full.pdf},
Citeulike-Linkout-3 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18669663},
Citeulike-Linkout-4 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=18669663},
Date-Added = {2010-03-09 16:49:57 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-09 16:50:09 -0500},
Day = {5},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0802631105},
Issn = {1091-6490},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
Keywords = {bayesianism, cog\_sci, concepts, hierarchical\_bayesian\_models},
Month = {August},
Number = {31},
Pages = {10687--10692},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-07 21:48:00},
Priority = {2},
Title = {The discovery of structural form},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0802631105},
Volume = {105},
Year = {2008},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0802631105}}
@article{schupbach2005,
Abstract = {doi: 10.1086/505186 In three recent papers, Wayne Myrvold (1996, 2003) and Timothy McGrew (2003) have developed Bayesian accounts of the virtue of unification. In his account, McGrew demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, a hypothesis that unifies its evidence will have a higher posterior probability than a hypothesis that does not. Myrvold, on the other hand, offers a specific measure of unification that can be applied to individual hypotheses. He argues that one must account for this measure in order to calculate correctly the degree of confirmation that a hypothesis receives from its evidence. Using the probability calculus, I prove that the two accounts of unification require the same underlying inequality; thus, McGrew and Myrvold have accounted for unification in fundamentally identical probabilistic terms. I then evaluate five putative counterexamples to this account and show that these examples, far from disqualifying it, serve to clarify our notion of unification by disentangling it from a host of other concepts.},
Author = {Schupbach, Jonah N.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6765643},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/505186},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/505186},
Date-Added = {2010-03-09 16:49:56 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-09 16:50:09 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1086/505186},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {bayesianism, explanation, science, unification},
Month = {October},
Number = {4},
Pages = {594--607},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-04 23:49:05},
Priority = {2},
Title = {On a Bayesian Analysis of the Virtue of Unification},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/505186},
Volume = {72},
Year = {2005},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/505186}}
@article{eganelga2005,
Address = {Australian National UniversityUniversity of Michigan; Princeton University},
Author = {Egan, Andy and Elga, Adam},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {1816244},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00054.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00054.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-2 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118716068/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-03-04 16:57:11 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-09 16:49:13 -0500},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00054.x},
Issn = {1520-8583},
Journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
Keywords = {bayesianism, coherence, moore\_coherence, rationality, self\_respect},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77--93},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-04 21:55:44},
Priority = {2},
Title = {I Can't Believe I'm Stupid},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00054.x},
Volume = {19},
Year = {2005},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00054.x}}
@article{strevens2004a,
Abstract = {Two major modern accounts of explanation are the causal and the unification accounts. My aim in this paper is to provide a kind of unification of the two, by using the central technical apparatus of the unification account to solve a central problem faced by the causal account, namely, the problem of determining which parts of a causal network are explanatorily relevant to the occurrence of an explanandum. The result is a causal account of explanation that has many of the advantages of the unification account.},
Address = {Stanford University},
Author = {Strevens, Michael},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6722040},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118760381/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-03-04 16:52:52 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-04 16:53:34 -0500},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x},
Issn = {1468-0068},
Journal = {Nous},
Keywords = {causal\_explanation, explanation, science, unification},
Number = {1},
Pages = {154--176},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 14:58:17},
Priority = {2},
Title = {The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified---Causally},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x},
Volume = {38},
Year = {2004},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x}}
@article{lange2002,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions --- a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus qualification and are actually associated with exceptionless regularities. Ceteris-paribus generalizations of an'inexact science' qualify as laws of that science in virtue of their distinctive relation to counterfactuals: they form a set that is stable for the purposes of that field. (Though an accident may possess tremendous resilience under counterfactual suppositions, the laws are sharply distinguished from the accidents in that the laws are collectively as resilient as they could logically possibly be.) The stability of an inexact science's laws may involve their remaining reliable even under certain counterfactual suppositions violating fundamental laws of physics. The ceteris-paribus laws of an inexact science may thus possess a kind of necessity lacking in the fundamental laws of physics. A nomological explanation supplied by an inexact science would then be irreducible to an explanation of the same phenomenon at the level of fundamental physics. Island biogeography is used to illustrate how a special science could be autonomous in this manner.},
Author = {Lange, Marc},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6743881},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021546731582},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/q125u83283k0725w},
Date-Added = {2010-03-04 16:52:48 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-04 16:53:32 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1021546731582},
Issn = {01650106},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Keywords = {accidents, ceteris\_paribus, explanation, generalizations, laws, resiliency, special\_science},
Month = {November},
Number = {3},
Pages = {407--423},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-28 21:50:29},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021546731582},
Volume = {57},
Year = {2002},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021546731582}}
@article{forstersober1994,
Abstract = {Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a bacgkround theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism.},
Author = {Forster, Malcolm and Sober, Elliott},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {90021},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/687960},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/687960},
Date-Added = {2010-03-04 16:52:46 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-04 16:53:31 -0500},
Doi = {10.2307/687960},
Issn = {00070882},
Journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {akaike, bayesianism, curve\_fitting, empiricism, explanation, simplicity},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1--35},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-03 21:24:16},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science},
Title = {How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/687960},
Volume = {45},
Year = {1994},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/687960}}
@article{christensen2007,
Abstract = {Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one's own beliefs are biased or distorted. On the other hand, certain sorts of epistemic self-doubts (such as 'I believe it's raining, but it's not') seem paradoxical. And some have put forth epistemic principles requiring rational agents to regard their own credences as so-called 'expert functions'. This paper examines the question of whether rationality requires agents to respect their own credences in a way in which they need not respect the credences of others.},
Address = {Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Gerard House, 54 College Street, Providence, RI 02912, USA},
Author = {Christensen, David},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6763654},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/117997656/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-03-04 16:52:44 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-04 16:53:27 -0500},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x},
Issn = {1467-9264},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)},
Keywords = {bayesianism, coherence, moore\_coherence, rationality, self\_respect},
Number = {1pt3},
Pages = {319--337},
Posted-Date = {2010-03-04 21:51:52},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Epistemic Self-Respect},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x},
Volume = {107},
Year = {2007},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x}}
@article{kitchersalmon1987,
Author = {Kitcher, Philip and Salmon, Wesley},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {1885190},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026782},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026782},
Date-Added = {2010-02-25 17:08:20 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-25 17:09:16 -0500},
Doi = {10.2307/2026782},
Issn = {0022362X},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Keywords = {explanation, pragmatism, science, van\_fraassen},
Number = {6},
Pages = {315--330},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-25 21:37:12},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
Title = {Van Fraassen on Explanation},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026782},
Volume = {84},
Year = {1987},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026782}}
@article{sober1993,
Author = {Sober, Elliott},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {4099426},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185652},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185652},
Date-Added = {2010-02-25 17:08:18 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-25 17:09:16 -0500},
Doi = {10.2307/2185652},
Issn = {00318108},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Keywords = {explanation, indispensability, mathematical\_explanation, mathematics, nominalism, platonism, realism},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35--57},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 20:40:30},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review},
Title = {Mathematics and Indispensability},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185652},
Volume = {102},
Year = {1993},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185652}}
@article{forster1999,
Abstract = {Recent solutions to the curve-fitting problem, described in Forster and Sober ([1995]), trade off the simplicity and fit of hypotheses by defining simplicity as the paucity of adjustable parameters. Scott De Vito ([1997]) charges that these solutions are 'conventional' because he thinks that the number of adjustable parameters may change when the hypotheses are described differently. This he believes is exactly what is illustrated in Goodman's new riddle of induction, otherwise known as the grue problem. However, the 'number of adjustable parameters' is actually a loose way of referring to a quantity that is not language dependent. The quantity arises out of Akaike's theorem in a way that ensures its language invariance. 10.1093/bjps/50.1.83},
Author = {Forster, M. R.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6724395},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.1.83},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/50/1/83},
Date-Added = {2010-02-25 17:08:17 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-25 17:09:12 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/50.1.83},
Journal = {Br J Philos Sci},
Keywords = {akaike, curve\_fitting, goodman, information, language\_invariance, model\_selection, science, simplicity},
Month = {March},
Number = {1},
Pages = {83--102},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 21:43:21},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Model selection in science: the problem of language variance},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.1.83},
Volume = {50},
Year = {1999},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.1.83}}
@article{sober1998,
Abstract = {An empirical procedure is suggested for testing a model that postulates variables that intervene between observed causes and observed effects against a model that includes no such postulate. The procedure is applied to two experiments in psychology. One involves a conditioning regimen that leads to response generalization; the other concerns the question of whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind.},
Author = {Sober, Elliott},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6724260},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/688085},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/688085},
Date-Added = {2010-02-24 14:49:48 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-24 14:50:45 -0500},
Doi = {10.2307/688085},
Issn = {00070882},
Journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {explanation, intervening\_variables, mind, partitions, variable\_postulation},
Number = {3},
Pages = {469--498},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 19:48:24},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science},
Title = {Black Box Inference: When Should Intervening Variables Be Postulated?},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/688085},
Volume = {49},
Year = {1998},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/688085}}
@article{halpernpearl2005,
Author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {431252},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi147},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2005/00000056/00000004/art00843},
Date-Added = {2010-02-24 11:52:50 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-24 11:54:15 -0500},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axi147},
Issn = {0007-0882},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {causal\_explanation, causal\_models, causal\_reasoning, causation, explanation, partitions},
Month = {December},
Number = {4},
Pages = {843--887},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 16:52:10},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Title = {Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi147},
Volume = {56},
Year = {2005},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi147}}
@article{halpernpearl2005a,
Abstract = {We propose new definitions of (causal) explanation, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. The definition is based on the notion of actual cause, as defined and motivated in a companion article. Essentially, an explanation is a fact that is not known for certain but, if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of the fact to be explained, regardless of the agent's initial uncertainty. We show that the definition handles well a number of problematic examples from the literature. Introduction Causal models and the definition of actual causality: a review 2.1 Causal models 2.2 Syntax and semantics 2.3 The definition of cause Explanation: the basic definition Partial explanations and explanatory power The general definition Discussion Appendix: the formal definition of causality 10.1093/bjps/axi148},
Author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {431251},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi148},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/4/889},
Citeulike-Linkout-2 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2005/00000056/00000004/art00889},
Date-Added = {2010-02-24 11:52:48 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-24 11:54:11 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axi148},
Issn = {0007-0882},
Journal = {Br J Philos Sci},
Keywords = {causal\_explanation, causal\_models, causal\_reasoning, causation, explanation, partitions},
Month = {December},
Number = {4},
Pages = {889--911},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 16:50:56},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Title = {Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part II: Explanations},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi148},
Volume = {56},
Year = {2005},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi148}}
@article{arntzenius1995,
Abstract = {One of our more fundamental beliefs is that causal chains are continuous in time: we believe that every influence from the past upon the future runs through the present. I argue that this tenet, given certain data, can force conceptual changes upon us. I attempt to formulate a heuristic for discovery, based as explicitly as possible upon this tenet, and illustrate it by means of several examples, one of which is Mendel's discovery of genes.},
Author = {Arntzenius, Frank},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6722601},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/188492},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/188492},
Date-Added = {2010-02-24 11:47:35 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-03-07 11:37:06 -0500},
Doi = {10.2307/188492},
Issn = {00318248},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {conceptual\_change, genes, heuristic, partitions},
Number = {3},
Pages = {357--369},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 16:46:50},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association},
Title = {A Heuristic for Conceptual Change},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/188492},
Volume = {62},
Year = {1995},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/188492}}
@article{strevens2004,
Abstract = {Two major modern accounts of explanation are the causal and the unification accounts. My aim in this paper is to provide a kind of unification of the two, by using the central technical apparatus of the unification account to solve a central problem faced by the causal account, namely, the problem of determining which parts of a causal network are explanatorily relevant to the occurrence of an explanandum. The result is a causal account of explanation that has many of the advantages of the unification account.},
Address = {Stanford University},
Author = {Strevens, Michael},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6722040},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118760381/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-02-24 09:59:37 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-24 10:00:48 -0500},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x},
Issn = {1468-0068},
Journal = {Nous},
Keywords = {causal\_explanation, explanation, science, unification},
Number = {1},
Pages = {154--176},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-24 14:58:17},
Priority = {2},
Title = {The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified---Causally},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x},
Volume = {38},
Year = {2004},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x}}
@article{grimm2008a,
Address = {Fordham University},
Author = {Grimm, Stephen R.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6651743},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00217.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/121477750/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-02-10 16:42:55 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-10 16:43:24 -0500},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00217.x},
Issn = {1933-1592},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Keywords = {epistemic\_value, epistemology, truth},
Number = {3},
Pages = {725--744},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-10 21:40:39},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00217.x},
Volume = {77},
Year = {2008},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00217.x}}
@article{kolodny2007,
Abstract = {Recently, much attention has been paid to 'rational requirements' and, especially, to what I call 'rational requirements of formal coherence as such'. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements.},
Address = {Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-2390, USA. [email protected]},
Author = {Kolodny, Niko},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6651052},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00220.x},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/117997652/ABSTRACT},
Date-Added = {2010-02-10 11:57:38 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-10 11:58:56 -0500},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00220.x},
Issn = {1467-9264},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)},
Keywords = {coherence, epistemic\_norms, epistemology},
Number = {1pt3},
Pages = {229--263},
Posted-Date = {2010-02-10 16:56:47},
Priority = {2},
Title = {How Does Coherence Matter?},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00220.x},
Volume = {107},
Year = {2007},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00220.x}}
@article{mongin1995,
Abstract = {We investigate the aggregation of first nonatomic probabilities and second Savagean orderings, subject to the following consistency constraints: (i) the aggregate is a subjective probability or a Savagean ordering, respectively; and (ii) it satisfies the Pareto principle. Aggregation is viewed here as a single-profile exercise. We show that affine rules are the only solutions to the problem of aggregating nonatomic probabilities. Assuming weak Pareto conditions and technical restrictions, we show that dictatorial rules are the only solutions to the problem of aggregating Savagean orderings. No solution exists when strong Pareto replaces weaker conditions. Without technical restrictions of affine independence, nontrivial solutions may exist. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D81, C11.},
Author = {Mongin, P.},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6559721},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1044},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022-0531(85)71044-7},
Date-Added = {2010-02-10 11:53:50 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-10 11:58:56 -0500},
Doi = {10.1006/jeth.1995.1044},
Issn = {00220531},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Keywords = {aggregation, interaction, pareto\_principle, probabilism, probabilities},
Month = {August},
Number = {2},
Pages = {313--351},
Posted-Date = {2010-01-18 23:41:14},
Priority = {2},
Title = {Consistent Bayesian Aggregation},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1044},
Volume = {66},
Year = {1995},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1044}}
@article{skyrms2010,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.},
Author = {Skyrms, Brian},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {5894513},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9452-0},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/m5x6q72n8723061r},
Date-Added = {2010-02-10 11:53:48 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-10 11:58:56 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-009-9452-0},
Issn = {0031-8116},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Keywords = {game\_theory, information, interaction, signaling\_games, signals},
Month = {January},
Number = {1},
Pages = {155--165},
Posted-Date = {2010-01-30 23:30:48},
Priority = {2},
Title = {The flow of information in signaling games},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9452-0},
Volume = {147},
Year = {2010},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9452-0}}
@article{huttegger2007,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics of our models will be proved.},
Author = {Huttegger, Simon},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {1357138},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2007/00000066/00000003/00009022},
Citeulike-Linkout-2 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/p703150574872576},
Date-Added = {2010-02-10 11:53:46 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-10 11:58:56 -0500},
Day = {18},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1},
Issn = {0165-0106},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Keywords = {evolutionary\_dynamics, game\_theory, games, imperatives, interaction, signals},
Month = {May},
Number = {3},
Pages = {409--436},
Posted-Date = {2010-01-30 23:31:30},
Priority = {2},
Publisher = {Springer},
Title = {Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1},
Volume = {66},
Year = {2007},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1}}
@article{barrett2009,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, '' Signals'' Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis's original sender--receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax---the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning.},
Author = {Barrett, Jeffrey},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {6607592},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9064-0},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/mw21n3h118204g4x},
Date-Added = {2010-02-10 11:53:43 -0500},
Date-Modified = {2010-02-10 11:58:56 -0500},
Day = {1},
Doi = {10.1007/s11238-007-9064-0},
Issn = {0040-5833},
Journal = {Theory and Decision},
Keywords = {evolutionary\_dynamics, game\_theory, information, signaling\_games, signals},
Month = {August},
Number = {2},
Pages = {223--237},
Posted-Date = {2010-01-30 23:33:30},
Priority = {4},
Title = {The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9064-0},
Volume = {67},
Year = {2009},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9064-0}}
@article{hutteggerskyrms2010,
Abstract = {Abstract\ \ Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.},
Author = {Huttegger, Simon and Skyrms, Brian and Smead, Rory and Zollman, Kevin},
Citeulike-Article-Id = {4152116},
Citeulike-Linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9477-0},
Citeulike-Linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/xk5v231h5u82028m},