[Coverage Report] 📊 Test Coverage Report — 2026-06-13

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Overall Coverage

Metric	Coverage	Covered / Total
Statements	96.51%	4,880 / 5,056
Branches	91.21%	2,722 / 2,984
Functions	98.80%	577 / 584
Lines	96.64%	4,723 / 4,887

138 source files tracked in src/. Coverage thresholds (min): 38% stmt / 30% branch / 35% func — all comfortably exceeded.

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🔴 Critical Gaps (< 50% statement coverage)

None — every file exceeds 50% statement coverage.

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🟡 Low Coverage (50–79% statement coverage)

File	Stmt%	Branch%	Func%
src/commands/validators/network-options.ts	66.7%	50.0%	100%

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🛡️ Security-Critical Path Status

File	Stmt%	Branch%	Func%	Status
src/host-iptables.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/host-iptables-rules.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/host-iptables-shared.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/host-iptables-cleanup.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/host-iptables-network.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/squid-config.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/squid/acl-generator.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/squid/access-rules.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/squid/validation.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/domain-patterns.ts	97.7%	95.4%	100%	✅
src/docker-manager.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅
src/cli.ts	85.7%	50.0%	100%	⚠️

src/cli.ts has only 2 branches; 1 is uncovered. Likely the require.main === module guard or an environment-detection check. Low risk but worth documenting.

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📋 Full Coverage Table

All files with statement coverage < 100% (39 files, sorted ascending)

File	Stmt%	Branch%	Func%
src/commands/validators/network-options.ts	66.7	50.0	100
src/squid-log-reader.ts	82.2	80.0	100
src/services/agent-volumes/etc-mounts.ts	82.5	67.9	100
src/logs/audit-enricher.ts	83.6	74.1	100
src/config-writer.ts	85.3	80.6	100
src/artifact-preservation.ts	85.4	95.3	100
src/cli.ts	85.7	50.0	100
src/logs/log-parser.ts	86.9	68.6	100
src/squid/policy-manifest.ts	87.5	88.2	70
src/services/agent-volumes/docker-host-staging.ts	87.8	72.4	100
src/commands/logs-command-helpers.ts	88.5	83.3	100
src/services/doh-proxy-service.ts	90.0	75.0	100
src/commands/validators/log-and-limits.ts	90.3	77.6	100
src/services/host-path-prefix.ts	90.3	81.6	100
src/services/api-proxy-service.ts	91.7	50.0	100
src/services/agent-volumes/docker-socket.ts	91.7	93.3	100
src/logs/log-streamer.ts	92.2	77.8	88.9
src/services/agent-volumes/system-mounts.ts	92.3	75.0	100
src/diagnostic-collector.ts	92.5	100	100
src/commands/build-config.ts	92.9	92.9	100
src/commands/validators/agent-options.ts	93.0	88.6	100
src/services/agent-volumes/hosts-file.ts	93.2	90.3	100
src/services/agent-environment/environment-builder.ts	93.5	66.7	100
src/squid/ssl-bump.ts	93.8	91.7	100
src/ssl-bump.ts	94.0	84.6	100
src/host-env.ts	94.1	80.0	100
src/workdir-setup.ts	94.4	79.6	100
src/logs/log-aggregator.ts	94.7	87.5	100
src/commands/main-action.ts	94.8	89.2	100
src/upstream-proxy.ts	94.9	94.7	100
src/services/agent-volumes/workspace-mounts.ts	96.3	75.0	100
src/parsers/env-parsers.ts	96.6	85.0	100
src/option-parsers.ts	97.3	93.8	100
src/domain-patterns.ts	97.7	95.4	100
src/config-file.ts	98.1	97.3	87.5
src/commands/validators/config-assembly.ts	98.1	92.2	100
src/rules.ts	98.2	91.9	100
src/compose-generator.ts	98.4	92.5	100
src/pid-tracker.ts	98.8	80.8	100

Bold values indicate branch coverage < 70%.

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🔍 Notable Findings

1. src/commands/validators/network-options.ts (66.7% stmt, 50% branch — 14/21 statements, 5/10 branches covered): Network option validation is the most under-tested file. Uncovered paths likely include error handling for invalid upstream proxy URLs, out-of-range port numbers, and malformed DNS server IPs. A misconfigured validator could silently accept invalid settings and pass them through to the firewall.

2. src/logs/log-parser.ts (86.9% stmt, 68.6% branch — 22/70 branches uncovered): Squid log parsing covers most common paths but leaves many conditionals untested. Edge cases for malformed log entries, missing Host headers, non-standard HTTP status codes, and truncated lines may cause silent parse failures — meaning security events could go unrecorded in audit logs.

3. src/services/agent-volumes/etc-mounts.ts (82.5% stmt, 67.9% branch — 9/28 branches uncovered): Controls which host /etc files are bind-mounted into the agent container — a key isolation boundary. Uncovered branches likely include fallback behavior when expected host files are absent, plus conditional platform-specific logic that could expose unintended paths.

4. src/services/agent-environment/environment-builder.ts (93.5% stmt, 66.7% branch — 2/6 branches uncovered): Assembles the environment variables injected into the sandboxed agent. The 2 uncovered branches may govern conditional API-proxy credential injection; untested combinations could lead to credentials being silently omitted or, conversely, leaking into the agent environment.

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📈 Recommendations

1. High: Add tests for src/commands/validators/network-options.ts — test invalid upstream proxy URLs, out-of-range port numbers, conflicting --dns-servers + --enable-doh flags, and empty string edge cases. Goal: ≥ 80% branch coverage on this security-relevant network validator.

2. Medium: Expand src/logs/log-parser.ts with adversarial inputs — malformed Squid log lines, entries missing the Host field, boundary Unix timestamps, and TCP_DENIED vs TCP_TUNNEL variations. Target: push branch coverage from 68.6% → 85%.

3. Medium: Cover src/services/agent-volumes/etc-mounts.ts branches — specifically test behavior when /etc/passwd, /etc/group, SSL cert bundles, or nsswitch.conf are absent on the host. This directly affects what an agent can see inside its isolation boundary.

4. Low: Address src/squid/policy-manifest.ts function coverage (70% — 3/10 functions untested). These functions generate Squid policy configuration; gaps here can mask misconfiguration bugs that would only surface at runtime.

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Generated by test-coverage-reporter workflow. Trigger: push · 2026-06-13

Generated by Test Coverage Reporter · ◷

• expires on Jun 20, 2026, 9:54 PM UTC

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This discussion was automatically closed because it expired on 2026-06-20T21:54:33.231Z.

Closed by Workflow