[Coverage Report] Test Coverage Report — 2026-06-14

[github-actions[bot]]

📊 Overall Coverage

Metric	Coverage	Covered / Total
Statements	96.77%	4,923 / 5,087
Branches	91.27%	2,730 / 2,991
Functions	98.81%	583 / 590
Lines	96.90%	4,766 / 4,918

Test suite: 114 test files across 125 production modules. All passing.

---

🔴 Critical Gaps (< 50% statement coverage)

None. All 140 tracked files are above 50% statement coverage.

---

🟡 Low Coverage (50–79% statement coverage)

File	Stmt%	Branch%	Func%	Notes
src/commands/validators/network-options.ts	66.66%	50.00%	100%	Only file below 80% — highest priority

---

🛡️ Security-Critical Path Status

host-iptables.ts (barrel)          → 100% / 100% / 100%  ✅
host-iptables-rules.ts             → high coverage; 3 branch gaps (see below)
host-iptables-shared.ts            → high coverage; silent sysctl-failure risk
squid-config.ts (barrel)           → 100% / 100% / 100%  ✅
squid/policy-manifest.ts           → 87.50% stmt / 70.00% func  ⚠️
domain-patterns.ts                 → 98.18% stmt / 94.52% branch  ✅
cli.ts                             → 85.71% stmt / 50.00% branch  ✅ (2 branches total)

Notable branch gaps (branch% < 70%):

File	Branch%	Covered / Total	Why It Matters
src/commands/validators/network-options.ts	50.00%	5 / 10	ARC/DinD docker-socket validation paths untested
src/services/agent-volumes/etc-mounts.ts	67.85%	19 / 28	/etc selective-mount logic
src/logs/log-parser.ts	68.57%	48 / 70	Largest absolute gap: 22 uncovered branches
src/services/agent-environment/environment-builder.ts	66.66%	4 / 6	Env var injection paths

---

📋 Coverage Summary — Files Below 95%

Expand full table (files < 95% stmt coverage)

File	Stmt%	Branch%	Func%
commands/validators/network-options.ts	66.66%	50.00%	100%
squid-log-reader.ts	82.22%	80.00%	100%
services/agent-volumes/etc-mounts.ts	82.45%	67.85%	100%
logs/audit-enricher.ts	83.60%	74.13%	100%
cli.ts	85.71%	50.00%	100%
config-writer.ts	85.71%	80.55%	100%
logs/log-parser.ts	86.90%	68.57%	100%
squid/policy-manifest.ts	87.50%	~80%	70.00%
services/agent-volumes/docker-host-staging.ts	87.75%	72.41%	100%
commands/logs-command-helpers.ts	88.52%	83.33%	100%

---

🔍 Notable Findings

1. host-iptables-shared.ts — Silent IPv6 Bypass Risk

disableIpv6ViaSysctl() catches failures with a warning-only path. If sysctl is unavailable or returns an error, IPv6 traffic remains unfiltered with no exception raised. This is the highest-impact silent-failure path in the security stack. The fix path in enableIpv6ViaSysctl shares the same risk: it's guarded by a module-level boolean that could be wrong after a crash-recovery scenario.

2. network-options.ts — Lowest Coverage, Security-Relevant Branching

This is the only file below 80% statement coverage (66.66%) and the lowest branch coverage at 50% (5/10). The 5 uncovered branches handle ARC/DinD scenarios: "external Docker host detected + no path prefix", and "DinD hint present + no path prefix". These are the exact paths where a misconfigured Docker socket could expose the host daemon without a hard error.

3. logs/log-parser.ts — 22 Uncovered Branches

The largest absolute branch gap. Uncovered paths include: IPv6 destination-address parsing ([2001:db8::1]:443 CONNECT format), legacy ts-field JSON timestamp handling, Date.parse → NaN fallback, and CONNECT URLs with no colon. Incorrect parsing causes allowed traffic to be misclassified as denied (or vice versa) in audit reports — a silent audit integrity issue.

4. squid/policy-manifest.ts — 70% Function Coverage

Three of ~10 functions are never exercised. The uncovered paths include: apiProxyIp-conditional rules (allow-api-proxy-ip, allow-from-api-proxy), enableDlp conditional (deny-dlp), and wildcard-blocked-domain regex rules. Since this manifest drives the log enricher's audit trail, missing rules produce silent misattribution of allow/deny decisions.

---

📈 Recommendations

1. High — commands/validators/network-options.ts: Add tests for the ARC/DinD compound condition branches: !dockerHostCheck.valid && !dockerHostPathPrefix and dindHint && !dockerHostPathPrefix. These paths warn without throwing, making a broken DinD setup silently continue.

2. High — host-iptables-shared.ts: Add a test that simulates sysctl failure (mock execa to throw) inside disableIpv6ViaSysctl() and assert that the call site either throws or is considered a hard security failure rather than a warn-and-continue. This is the most security-critical uncovered path in the codebase.

3. Medium — logs/log-parser.ts: Add unit tests for: (a) CONNECT URL with no colon, (b) IPv6 bracketed destination parsing, (c) legacy JSONL with ts field, (d) Date.parse → NaN timestamp fallback. These are all pure-function branches that are straightforward to unit-test.

4. Low — squid/policy-manifest.ts: Extend generatePolicyManifest tests to pass a config with apiProxyIp set and enableDlp: true. The manifest output is deterministic — these branches require only 2–3 new test cases.

---

Generated by test-coverage-reporter workflow. Trigger: push

Generated by Test Coverage Reporter · ◷

• expires on Jun 21, 2026, 8:12 PM UTC

[github-actions[bot]]

This discussion was automatically closed because it expired on 2026-06-21T20:12:20.620Z.

Closed by Workflow