From e775741c673e7ea6ffd2c5e15c64374f47865780 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: samuel2926i39-art <308312945+samuel2926i39-art@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2026 06:03:40 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Document admin auth scheme and add auth coverage for
 analytics routes

Verifies all /api/admin/* routes (including the four analytics endpoints
the dashboard calls) already enforce adminAuthMiddleware via router.use(),
returning 401 for missing/invalid bearer tokens. Adds a docs page covering
token configuration, scope, expiration, and rotation, and a test suite
that exercises every admin route's auth boundary without requiring a live
database.
---
 docs/admin-authentication.md        | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 indexer/test/api/admin-auth.test.js | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/admin-authentication.md
 create mode 100644 indexer/test/api/admin-auth.test.js

diff --git a/docs/admin-authentication.md b/docs/admin-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e09f81f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/admin-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Admin Endpoint Authentication
+
+This document describes the authentication scheme protecting all `/api/admin/*`
+routes, including the admin analytics endpoints consumed by the frontend
+dashboard (`/api/admin/analytics/rate-limit-hits`, `/top-users`,
+`/violation-heatmap`, `/upgrade-recommendations`), the API key management
+routes, and the audit log routes.
+
+## Scheme
+
+Admin routes use a single static bearer token, not per-user tokens or JWTs.
+
+- **Configuration**: set the `ADMIN_SECRET` environment variable (see
+  `indexer/.env.example`). It is optional at the schema level
+  (`indexer/src/config.js`), but if it is unset, `adminAuthMiddleware`
+  rejects **every** request to `/api/admin/*` with `401`.
+- **Request format**: clients send `Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_SECRET>`.
+- **Scope**: the token is all-or-nothing — it grants access to every route
+  under `/api/admin/*`. There are no per-route or per-action scopes.
+- **Comparison**: the middleware (`indexer/src/admin/adminAuth.js`) compares
+  the supplied token to `ADMIN_SECRET` with `crypto.timingSafeEqual` to avoid
+  timing side-channels, after normalizing buffer length.
+
+## Expiration and rotation
+
+`ADMIN_SECRET` is a long-lived static secret — it does not expire on its own.
+
+To rotate it:
+
+1. Generate a new secret value.
+2. Update `ADMIN_SECRET` in the deployment environment.
+3. Restart the indexer process (the middleware reads `process.env.ADMIN_SECRET`
+   per request, so no code change is needed, but the running process must pick
+   up the new environment variable).
+4. Update any clients (e.g. the admin dashboard) with the new value.
+
+There is no dual-secret grace period today — rotation is a hard cutover.
+Treat `ADMIN_SECRET` the same as any other production credential: store it in
+your secrets manager, not in source control or `.env` files committed to git.
+
+## Enforcement
+
+Every route under `/api/admin/*` is mounted on an Express `Router` that
+applies `adminAuthMiddleware` via `router.use(adminAuthMiddleware)`
+(`indexer/src/routes/admin.js`), so new routes added to that router are
+protected automatically — there is no per-route opt-in.
+
+- Missing or malformed `Authorization` header → `401 { "error": "Unauthorized" }`
+- Present but incorrect token → `401 { "error": "Unauthorized" }`
+- `ADMIN_SECRET` not configured on the server → `401` for all requests
+- Valid token → request proceeds
+
+The middleware does not return `403` today: there is no notion of an
+authenticated-but-insufficiently-privileged admin caller, since the token is
+all-or-nothing.
+
+## Logging
+
+The admin token is never logged: there is no request logger in
+`indexer/src/api.js` that dumps request headers, and `adminAuth.js` does not
+log the `Authorization` header or the configured secret. Keep it that way —
+avoid adding wholesale header/body logging (e.g. `morgan('combined')`) to
+routes under `/api/admin/*` without redacting `Authorization`.
+
+## Test coverage
+
+`indexer/test/api/admin-auth.test.js` asserts:
+
+- `401` for every `/api/admin/*` route (including all four analytics routes)
+  when the `Authorization` header is missing
+- `401` when the header carries a well-formed but incorrect bearer token
+- `200` for a representative admin analytics route when the token is valid
diff --git a/indexer/test/api/admin-auth.test.js b/indexer/test/api/admin-auth.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..065788b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/indexer/test/api/admin-auth.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+import request from "supertest";
+import express from "express";
+import { jest } from "@jest/globals";
+
+// Issue #22: verify every /api/admin/* route (including the four analytics
+// routes consumed by the dashboard) enforces authentication, returns the
+// correct status codes, and that a valid token still reaches the handler.
+//
+// The db pool is mocked so this suite runs without a live Postgres instance,
+// unlike the other test/api/*.test.js files which exercise a real database.
+
+process.env.ADMIN_SECRET = "test-admin-secret";
+
+const queryMock = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ rows: [] });
+
+jest.unstable_mockModule("../../src/db.js", () => ({
+  db: {},
+  pool: { query: queryMock },
+}));
+
+const { default: registerAdminRoutes } = await import("../../src/routes/admin.js");
+
+function buildApp() {
+  const app = express();
+  app.use(express.json());
+  registerAdminRoutes(app);
+  return app;
+}
+
+const ADMIN_ROUTES = [
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/api-keys" },
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/audit-log" },
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/audit-log/export" },
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/analytics/rate-limit-hits" },
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/analytics/top-users" },
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/analytics/violation-heatmap" },
+  { method: "get", path: "/api/admin/analytics/upgrade-recommendations" },
+];
+
+describe("/api/admin/* authentication (issue #22)", () => {
+  const app = buildApp();
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    queryMock.mockClear();
+  });
+
+  it.each(ADMIN_ROUTES)("returns 401 for $path with no Authorization header", async ({ method, path }) => {
+    const res = await request(app)[method](path);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: "Unauthorized" });
+    expect(queryMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it.each(ADMIN_ROUTES)("returns 401 for $path with an invalid bearer token", async ({ method, path }) => {
+    const res = await request(app)[method](path).set("Authorization", "Bearer wrong-token");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: "Unauthorized" });
+    expect(queryMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("returns 200 for an admin analytics route with a valid bearer token", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get("/api/admin/analytics/rate-limit-hits")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${process.env.ADMIN_SECRET}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(queryMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});