Troubleshooting help

[vysecurity]

Hello, trying out hound and got this error:

Error: Failed after 3 attempts: 10 validation errors for PlanBatch
investigations.0.goal
  Field required 
    For further information visit https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.11/v/missing

Upon running the agent audit.

models:
  # Graph building model - needs large context
  graph:
    # GPT-4.1 WORKS WELL HERE BUT IS VERY EXPENSIVE!
    # provider: openai
    # model: gpt-4.1 
    # max_context: 1000000

    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    max_context: 1000000
    thinking_enabled: true
    thinking_budget: -1
    
  # Scout/agent model for exploration
  scout:
    provider: anthropic
    model: claude-3-7-sonnet-latest
    max_context: 256000
    # reasoning_effort: low
  
  # Strategic thinking model
  # For planning and reasoning about security issues
  strategist:
    provider: anthropic
    model: claude-3-7-sonnet-latest
    max_context: 256000
    plan_reasoning_effort: medium
    hypothesize_reasoning_effort: high
  
  # QA model
  finalize:
    provider: anthropic
    model: claude-sonnet-4-20250514
    reasoning_effort: high
    # No max_context specified - will use global default
    # reasoning_effort: medium  # Options: low, medium, high (GPT-5 models only)
  
  # Reporting model
  reporting:
    provider: anthropic
    model: claude-sonnet-4-20250514
    # No max_context specified - will use global default

[muellerberndt]

Hey, thanks for the report! Please run hound with the --debug flag and attach the result to this issue.

hound audit <project-name> --debug

[chrisyy2003]

@muellerberndt I got the same error, and I'm always stuck at 30%.
config file

models:
  # Graph building model - needs large context
  graph:
    # GPT-4.1 WORKS WELL HERE BUT IS VERY EXPENSIVE!
    # provider: openai
    # model: gpt-4.1 
    # max_context: 1000000

    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    max_context: 1000000
    thinking_enabled: true
    thinking_budget: -1
    
  # Scout/agent model for exploration
  scout:
    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    max_context: 256000
    # reasoning_effort: low
  
  # Strategic thinking model
  # For planning and reasoning about security issues
  strategist:
    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    max_context: 256000
    plan_reasoning_effort: medium
    hypothesize_reasoning_effort: high
  
  # Lightweight utility model for quick, low-cost tasks (e.g., dedup)
  lightweight:
    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    # No large context or special reasoning required
  
  # QA model
  finalize:
    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    reasoning_effort: high
    # No max_context specified - will use global default
    # reasoning_effort: medium  # Options: low, medium, high (GPT-5 models only)
  
  # Reporting model
  reporting:
    provider: gemini
    model: gemini-2.5-pro
    # No max_context specified - will use global default

debug log file

================================================================================
HOUND DEBUG LOG
Session ID: sess_agent_20251027_010713
Started: 2025-10-27 02:35:15
================================================================================


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERACTION #1
Time: 2025-10-27 02:37:07
Duration: 112.23s

SYSTEM PROMPT:
You are a senior security auditor in INTUITION MODE (Phase 2).
Your goal: Use intuition to find HIGH-IMPACT vulnerabilities.

OPERATING CONSTRAINTS:
- Static analysis only - no runtime execution
- All actions must be CODE-ONLY: reading files, mapping flows, static reasoning

INTUITION MODE STRATEGY:
- Follow your instincts about what feels most vulnerable
- Deep-dive into the most promising, impactful areas
- PRIORITIZE MONETARY IMPACT above all else
- Look for CONTRADICTIONS between assumptions and observations
- Target suspicious cross-component interactions
- Focus on invariant violations and high-confidence bugs
- Output primarily SUSPICION items (specific vulnerabilities)
- Flexible granularity - zoom into specific functions or patterns

KEY INTUITION TARGETS:
1. VALUE AT RISK: Where can money be stolen or locked?
2. CONTRADICTIONS: What doesn't match between docs and code?
3. AUTH BYPASSES: Where might permission checks fail?
4. STATE CORRUPTION: What could break critical invariants?

FOR EACH ITEM include WHY NOW and EXIT CRITERIA in 'reasoning'.
Category should be 'suspicion' for bugs, 'aspect' for deep dives.


USER PROMPT:
ALL GRAPHS WITH ANNOTATIONS:

=== SYSTEMARCHITECTURE GRAPH ===
32 nodes, 69 edges
• [user] User (Exte)
• [liquidator] Liquidator (Exte)
• [router] Router (Cont) [obs:no internal user ledger; aggregates user positions; calls PositionManager with own address | asm:stateless proxy; no user position tracking; all user positions consolidated]
• [vault] Vault (Cont) [obs:receives collateral deposits; processes withdrawals; dual config paths: admin & gov | asm:authorized callers only; central collateral pool; admin path bypasses timelock]
• [position_manager] PositionManager (Cont) [obs:no price deviation check | asm:unfiltered oracle prices; no tx.origin check]
• [oracle] Oracle (Orac)
• [fee_collector] FeeCollector (FeeC)
• [router_increase_position] Router.increasePosition (Func) [obs:aggregates user positions; forwards call to PositionManager; no user-specific logic | asm:vulnerable to MEV; PositionManager sees router; relies on PM for all checks]
• [router_decrease_position] Router.decreasePosition (Func) [obs:doesn't pass user address; no user solvency check; doesn't pass user address | asm:vulnerable to MEV]
• [router_deposit_collateral] Router.depositCollateral (Func) [obs:forwards call to vault; no user state tracking | asm:credits router in vault]
• [router_withdraw_collateral] Router.withdrawCollateral (Func) [obs:no position health check; direct call to vault | asm:user solvency not verified]
• [pm_increase_position] PositionManager.increasePosition (Func) [obs:notional value uses oracle; checks vault for msg.sender; no user-specific check | asm:all positions owned by router; trusts router msg.sender; msg.sender is Router]
• [pm_decrease_position] PositionManager.decreasePosition (Func) [obs:no fee floor check; unchecked fee subtraction; triggers fee payment | asm:Trusts router for withdrawal amount; No per-user sub-accounting; fee based on PnL]
• [pm_liquidate_position] PositionManager.liquidatePosition (Func) [obs:deletes position struct; calls vault to seize collateral; operates on aggregate position | asm:requires LIQUIDATOR_ROLE; liquidates router's aggregate account]
• [vault_deposit] Vault.deposit (Func) [obs:no pre/post balance check; no reentrancy guard; credits msg.sender balance | asm:vulnerable to reentrancy; credits msg.sender; no user-specific accounting]
• [vault_withdraw] Vault.withdraw (Func) [obs:no reentrancy guard; no pre/post balance check; unaware of trading PnL | asm:vulnerable to fee-on-transfer; assumes transfer amount sent; reads token config for fees]
• [position_state] PositionState (Posi)
• [collateral_token] Collateral Token (Toke)
• [liquidator_role] LIQUIDATOR_ROLE (Role)
• [event_position_opened] PositionOpened (Even)
• [event_position_closed] PositionClosed (Even)
• [event_position_updated] PositionMarginUpdated (Even)
• [event_position_liquidated] PositionLiquidated (Even)
• [event_deposit] CollateralDeposited (Even)
• [event_withdraw] CollateralWithdrawn (Even)
• [pm_positions_storage] PositionManager.positions (Stor) [obs:mapping of position structs; keyed by account and market; no aggregate PnL value]
• [admin] Admin (Exte)
• [admin_role] ADMIN_ROLE (Role)
• [pm_set_liquidator] PositionManager.setLiquidator (Func) [obs:allows contract as liquidator | asm:no extcodesize check]
• [fee_collector_claim] FeeCollector.claimFees (Func) [asm:onlyRole(admin_role)]
• [vault_set_config] Vault.setConfig (Func) [obs:no timelock; no negative fee check; no reentrancy guard | asm:sets arbitrary oracle; also sets fee parameters; no validation on fee values]

CURRENT HYPOTHESES (vulnerabilities found):
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Access Control
ROOT CAUSE: A single ExternalActor, 'AdminAddress', holds the ADM (severity: critical, confidence: 0.9)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Access Control
ROOT CAUSE: The GOVERNANCE role, controlled by the 'GovernanceMul (severity: critical, confidence: 0.9)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Economic Attack
ROOT CAUSE: The GOVERNANCE role has unilateral control over crit (severity: high, confidence: 0.9)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Logic Error
ROOT CAUSE: The 'Vault.liquidatePosition' function is guarded by the (severity: high, confidence: 0.6)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Denial of Service
ROOT CAUSE: The graph shows that the 'KeeperBot' actor can cal (severity: medium, confidence: 0.9)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Economic Attack
ROOT CAUSE: Insufficient validation of oracle price feeds.
ATTAC (severity: critical, confidence: 0.9)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Economic Attack
ROOT CAUSE: Lack of safeguards against sudden, extreme price mov (severity: critical, confidence: 0.9)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Logic Error
ROOT CAUSE: An incorrect calculation within the `_checkSolvency` fun (severity: high, confidence: 0.6)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Race Condition
ROOT CAUSE: Lack of protection against a user modifying their pos (severity: medium, confidence: 0.6)
• [proposed] VULNERABILITY TYPE: Logic Error
ROOT CAUSE: A flawed implementation of the funding rate calculation  (severity: medium, confidence: 0.4)
... and 203 more hypotheses

COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS (with results):
- Investigate if a user can withdraw collateral belonging to other users by exploiting the stateless Router and the aggregated collateral pool in the Vault. (10 iterations, 198 hypotheses)
- Determine if a single user's large losing position can trigger the liquidation of the entire protocol's user base due to the aggregate position management. (10 iterations, 200 hypotheses)
- Verify if an attacker can drain the Vault by manipulating the oracle price, opening a position, and closing it for a guaranteed artificial profit. (7 iterations, 201 hypotheses)
- Investigate if the lack of user-specific accounting allows one user to maliciously close or alter another user's profitable position for their own gain. (3 iterations, 201 hypotheses)
- Assess the risk of an instant rug pull by a compromised admin key using the `Vault.setConfig` function, bypassing any timelock. (13 iterations, 204 hypotheses)
- Investigate if a user can socialize their trading losses by withdrawing their initial collateral before their underwater position is liquidated. (7 iterations, 205 hypotheses)
- Determine if a malicious admin can drain the Vault by setting a large negative fee on position closures. (17 iterations, 209 hypotheses)
- Investigate if the Vault is vulnerable to reentrancy attacks during collateral deposits or withdrawals, potentially allowing balance inflation and theft. (3 iterations, 209 hypotheses)
- Investigate if a malicious liquidator contract can be used to grief the protocol or selectively avoid liquidations to benefit colluding traders. (9 iterations, 213 hypotheses)

COVERAGE STATUS:
Nodes visited: 49/139 (35.3%)
Cards analyzed: 0/0 (0.0%)
Visited nodes: contract_liquidation_engine@LiquidationMechanics, vault_withdraw@SystemArchitecture, pm_set_liquidator@SystemArchitecture, Function:Vault.setRiskParameters@AuthorizationAndRoles, pm_increase_position@SystemArchitecture, position_manager@SystemArchitecture, Function:AccessControlManager.grantRole@AuthorizationAndRoles, pm_positions_storage@SystemArchitecture, storage_liquidation_penalty@LiquidationMechanics, Contract:AccessControlManager@AuthorizationAndRoles ... and 39 more
Unvisited nodes: 90 (sample: Component:InsuranceFund@PositionStateAndOracleDependency, Contract:PerpetualProtocol@CollateralAndAssetFlow, Contract:Perpetuals@PositionStateAndOracleDependency, Contract:Vault@AuthorizationAndRoles, Event:Deposit@CollateralAndAssetFlow, Event:FundingPaid@CollateralAndAssetFlow, Event:MarginUpdated@PositionStateAndOracleDependency, Event:PositionClosed@PositionStateAndOracleDependency, Event:PositionLiquidated@PositionStateAndOracleDependency, Event:PositionOpened@PositionStateAndOracleDependency, ...)
Unvisited components: 6 (sample: user@SystemArchitecture, liquidator@SystemArchitecture, oracle@SystemArchitecture, liquidator_role@SystemArchitecture, admin@SystemArchitecture, admin_role@SystemArchitecture)
CANDIDATE COMPONENTS (unvisited):
- User (user)
- Liquidator (liquidator)
- Oracle (oracle)
- LIQUIDATOR_ROLE (liquidator_role)
- Admin (admin)
- ADMIN_ROLE (admin_role)

AUDIT PROGRESS:
- Planning iteration: 2
- Investigations completed: 9

CURRENT MODE: INTUITION (Phase 2 - Deep exploration)

Plan the top 5 NEW investigations using INTUITION to find high-impact bugs.

USE YOUR INTUITION TO PRIORITIZE:
  1. MONETARY FLOWS: Areas where funds can be stolen, locked, or misdirected
  2. CONTRADICTIONS: Salient mismatches between assumptions and observations
  3. HIGH-IMPACT AUTH: Critical authentication/authorization vulnerabilities
  4. STATE CORRUPTION: Manipulation affecting critical invariants

TARGET THESE AREAS:
  • Value transfer mechanisms and payment flows
  • Clear contradictions in the annotated graphs
  • Suspicious permission check patterns
  • Complex cross-component value interactions
  • Areas that "feel" vulnerable based on patterns

GOAL EXAMPLES:
  - "Investigate potential theft in [payment flow]"
  - "Analyze contradiction: [assumption X] vs [observation Y]"
  - "Deep dive: authorization bypass in [critical function]"

Category: Primarily 'suspicion' for specific high-impact bugs
Priority: Assign 1-10 (10 = highest) based on anticipated impact
Approach: Follow your intuition about what feels most vulnerable

For each investigation, include WHY NOW and EXIT CRITERIA in 'reasoning'.

RESPONSE:
ERROR: Gemini call failed after 3 attempts: 1 validation error for PlanBatch
  Input should be a valid dictionary or instance of PlanBatch [type=model_type, input_value=[{'goal': 'Investigate if...pected_impact': 'high'}], input_type=list]
    For further information visit https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.12/v/model_type

console log

✓ Investigation Completed: Investigate if a malicious liquidator contract can be used to grief the protocol or
selectively avoid liquidations to benefit colluding traders.
Coverage: Nodes 49/139 (35.3%) | Cards 0/0 (0.0%)

═══ Planning Batch 3 ═══

═══ PHASE 2: INTUITION ═══
This phase uses graph-level reasoning to find complex, high-impact vulnerabilities.
Focus: Contradictions, invariant violations, cross-component interactions.
Leveraging annotations from Phase 1 to guide targeted investigation.

Coverage: Nodes 49/139 (35.3%) | Cards 0/0 (0.0%)

Error: Gemini call failed after 3 attempts: 1 validation error for PlanBatch
  Input should be a valid dictionary or instance of PlanBatch [type=model_type, input_value=[{'goal': 'Investigate
if...pected_impact': 'high'}], input_type=list]
    For further information visit https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.12/v/model_type
Error: Gemini call failed after 3 attempts: 1 validation error for PlanBatch
  Input should be a valid dictionary or instance of PlanBatch [type=model_type, input_value=[{'goal': 'Investigate
if...pected_impact': 'high'}], input_type=list]
    For further information visit https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.12/v/model_type