Hi @zakirkun,
I performed a comprehensive security audit of Deep Eye v1.3.0 and found several issues. Rather than just reporting them, I've submitted 5 pull requests with working fixes:
| PR |
Finding |
Severity |
| #28 |
XSS/XXE payloads use hardcoded attacker.com as OOB callback — leaks target data to unknown third party |
HIGH |
| #29 |
Notification webhooks send raw vulnerability evidence (tokens, cookies) to Slack/Discord without sanitization |
HIGH |
| #30 |
Path traversal via unsanitized session_id in collaborative scanner |
MEDIUM |
| #31 |
Deprecated asyncio PyPI backport in requirements (supply chain risk) |
MEDIUM |
| #32 |
Added SECURITY.md with responsible disclosure process and safe usage guidelines |
DOCS |
Additional recommendations (no PR needed):
- Plugin system (
core/plugin_manager.py): exec_module() without sandboxing is architecturally risky. Consider subprocess isolation for future versions. Currently mitigated by being disabled by default.
- Dependency pinning: All 35+ deps use
>= without upper bounds. Consider generating a requirements.lock with pip-compile.
- SSL config:
verify_ssl: false disables TLS globally including for AI API key transport. Consider separating scan HTTP client from AI provider HTTP client.
Great project — the codebase is well-structured and the AI integration is solid. These are refinements, not fundamental issues.
Best,
Cristian Cedeno
Audit performed with Claude Code — 6 specialized security agents analyzing ~40 files in parallel
Hi @zakirkun,
I performed a comprehensive security audit of Deep Eye v1.3.0 and found several issues. Rather than just reporting them, I've submitted 5 pull requests with working fixes:
attacker.comas OOB callback — leaks target data to unknown third partysession_idin collaborative scannerasyncioPyPI backport in requirements (supply chain risk)SECURITY.mdwith responsible disclosure process and safe usage guidelinesAdditional recommendations (no PR needed):
core/plugin_manager.py):exec_module()without sandboxing is architecturally risky. Consider subprocess isolation for future versions. Currently mitigated by being disabled by default.>=without upper bounds. Consider generating arequirements.lockwithpip-compile.verify_ssl: falsedisables TLS globally including for AI API key transport. Consider separating scan HTTP client from AI provider HTTP client.Great project — the codebase is well-structured and the AI integration is solid. These are refinements, not fundamental issues.
Best,
Cristian Cedeno
Audit performed with Claude Code — 6 specialized security agents analyzing ~40 files in parallel