If you believe you've found a security issue in AgentSync, please report it privately rather than opening a public GitHub issue.
- Open a private security advisory: https://github.com/__AGENTSYNC_LAUNCH_PLACEHOLDER__/agentsync/security/advisories/new
- Or email: security@AGENTSYNC_LAUNCH_PLACEHOLDER.example
We aim to:
- Acknowledge your report within 48 hours
- Provide a fix or mitigation timeline within 7 days
- Resolve critical issues within 30 days
You will receive public credit (unless you request anonymity) in the security advisory and release notes.
In scope:
- Code execution from
.agentsync/content - Path traversal / file system escape
- Secret exposure via generated output
- Supply-chain risks in dependencies
- Crashes or data corruption from malformed input
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in third-party AI agents themselves
- Issues requiring physical access to the user's machine
- Social engineering / phishing
AgentSync follows the Privacy & Security pillar of the project:
- Zero network calls in MVP — verified by CI: the
network-freejob in.github/workflows/ci.ymlre-runs the test suite and a realagentsync init / build / checkround-trip inside a Linux network namespace (sudo unshare -n). Any outbound DNS or socket call from the CLI would fail there withEAI_AGAIN/ENETUNREACHand break the build. - Zero telemetry — no data collection, ever
- Strict file system allowlist — refuses to read/write outside the project
- Restricted templating — Nunjucks runs without a filesystem loader and
without exposed globals, so templates cannot
includeother files or reachenv/fs/process. We treat.agentsync/content as trusted (it lives in your repo); a malicious template author can still reach JS internals via expressions like({}).constructor, so do not paste untrusted templates into.agentsync/. - Built-in secret detection — blocks builds that contain API keys
- Atomic file writes — temp file is
fsynced before rename - Reproducible builds — same input always produces byte-identical output
- Dependencies are minimal and audited (
pnpm auditin CI) - Lockfile committed
- Releases signed via npm provenance (sigstore)
- SBOM published per release
We follow coordinated disclosure. We will not publicly disclose details of a vulnerability until a fix is available and users have had reasonable time to update.
None yet.