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A report came in showing a 3rd party app could overlay a button on the phone settings causing unwanted behavior. In order to prevent this, a new system flag has been added that only allows system overlays.

bug: 246933785
Test: manual
Change-Id: I427b65bc6c1acf06676e1753a34a7a38e21bbae0 Merged-In: I427b65bc6c1acf06676e1753a34a7a38e21bbae0 (cherry picked from commit e827d8f13c1c92622474fa2bf9e41a1f4ce21e2c) Merged-In: I427b65bc6c1acf06676e1753a34a7a38e21bbae0

Thomas Stuart and others added 3 commits May 19, 2023 22:33
A report came in showing a 3rd party app could overlay a button
on the phone settings causing unwanted behavior.  In order to prevent
this, a new system flag has been added that only allows system overlays.

bug: 246933785
Test: manual
Change-Id: I427b65bc6c1acf06676e1753a34a7a38e21bbae0
Merged-In: I427b65bc6c1acf06676e1753a34a7a38e21bbae0
(cherry picked from commit e827d8f13c1c92622474fa2bf9e41a1f4ce21e2c)
Merged-In: I427b65bc6c1acf06676e1753a34a7a38e21bbae0
…ccess.

TelephonyManager#hasCarrierPrivileges internally uses
SubscriptionManager#canManageSubscription to decide whether to grant
carrier privilege status to an app or not.
SubscriptionManager#canManageSubscription returns true if caller APK's
certificate matches with one of the mNativeAccessRules or
mCarrierConfigAccessRules. This over-grants carrier privilege status
to apps that only has mNativeAccessRules.
Carrier privilege status should
be granted to the caller APK only if it's certificate matches with one
of mCarrierConfigAccessRules.
Replaced SubscriptionManager#canManageSubscription with
PhoneInterfaceManager#hasCarrierConfigAccess which returns true only if
caller APK certificates matches with one of mCarrierConfigAccessRules of
the given subscription.

Bug: 226593252
Test: Manual Testing as explained in b/226593252#comment51
      atest CtsTelephonyTestCases
      Flashed build on raven-userdebug and performed basic funtionality
      tests
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:213aba7e18ddadf800be981b802d8e242c61e0ad)
Merged-In: I6899de902e6e3ffda47b48d0ae806ac9c17ee2a6
Change-Id: I6899de902e6e3ffda47b48d0ae806ac9c17ee2a6
Fixed leak of cross user data in multiple settings.

  - Any app is allowed to receive GET_CONTENT intent. Using this, an user puts back in the intent an uri with data of another user.
  - Telephony service has INTERACT_ACROSS_USER permission. Using this, it reads and shows the deta to the evil user.

Fix: When telephony service gets the intent result, it checks if the uri is from the current user or not.

Bug: b/256591023 , b/256819787

Test: The malicious behaviour was not being reproduced. Unable to import contact from other users data.
Test2: Able to import contact from the primary user or uri with no user id
(These settings are not available for secondary users)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:36e10a6d0d7b9efc543f8004729fa85751f4f70d)
Merged-In: I1e3a643f17948153aecc1d0df9ffd9619ad678c1
Change-Id: I1e3a643f17948153aecc1d0df9ffd9619ad678c1
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