fix(api): allow authenticated sessions to reach registration-readiness / gittensor-config-recommendation (#8654)

src/api/routes.ts

@@ -6110,6 +6110,13 @@ function canSessionAccessPath(env: Env, identity: Extract<AuthIdentity, { kind:
   if (isRepoAiConfigPath(path)) return true;
   if (isRepoLinearConfigPath(path)) return true;
   if (isRepoCheckBeforeStartPath(path)) return true;
+  // #8654: advisory registration-readiness / gittensor-config-recommendation lookups are intentionally open to
+  // any authenticated session -- the handlers carry no per-repo ownership guard by design (the owner panel takes
+  // a free-text repo name, and the readiness handler already strips owner-private context via
+  // stripOwnerPolicyContext before returning). They were simply omitted from this allowlist, so every real
+  // non-operator browser session got 403 on the owner panel's only two data calls.
+  if (isRepoRegistrationReadinessPath(path)) return true;
+  if (isRepoGittensorConfigRecommendationPath(path)) return true;
   if (isRepoValidateLinkedIssuePath(path)) return true;
   if (isRepoAgentAuditFeedPath(path)) return true; // route's requireRepoMaintainer enforces per-repo authority (contributors → 403)
   if (isRepoDocRefreshPath(path)) return true; // route's requireRepoWriteAccess enforces real per-repo write authority
@@ -6127,6 +6134,14 @@ function isRepoSettingsPath(path: string): boolean {
   return /^\/v1\/repos\/[^/]+\/[^/]+\/settings$/.test(path);
 }
 
+function isRepoRegistrationReadinessPath(path: string): boolean {
+  return /^\/v1\/repos\/[^/]+\/[^/]+\/registration-readiness$/.test(path);
+}
+
+function isRepoGittensorConfigRecommendationPath(path: string): boolean {
+  return /^\/v1\/repos\/[^/]+\/[^/]+\/gittensor-config-recommendation$/.test(path);
+}
+
 function isRepoActivationPath(path: string): boolean {
   return /^\/v1\/repos\/[^/]+\/[^/]+\/activation(?:-preview)?$/.test(path);
 }

src/review/merge-train.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 // acceptable, bounded tradeoff given the 24h staleness cap already prevents an abandoned PR from blocking
 // forever.
 
+import { isLockfile } from "../signals/path-matchers";
+
 /** The subset of a sibling PR's fields this gate actually needs -- kept minimal and independent of
  *  `PullRequestRecord`'s full shape so this module has zero import surface beyond plain data. */
 export type MergeTrainSibling = {
@@ -43,17 +45,19 @@ export const MERGE_TRAIN_MAX_WAIT_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 
 export type MergeTrainDecision = { wait: true; blockingPr: number } | { wait: false };
 
-/** Low-priority path buckets (lockfiles, generated/build output, dist/ artifacts) that overlapping alone
- *  never counts as real conflict risk -- ported from `review-grounding.ts`'s `diffFilePriority` classification
- *  (bucket 4, "least useful to review") so this module stays dependency-free rather than importing a whole
- *  review-pipeline module for one number. Kept as a small, explicit suffix/name list rather than a generic
- *  "some overlap" check: a shared `package-lock.json` or `dist/bundle.js` touch is routine noise, not the
- *  same-area conflict risk this gate exists to catch. */
-const LOW_SIGNAL_FILENAME_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|pnpm-lock\.yaml|Cargo\.lock)$/i;
-const LOW_SIGNAL_DIR_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:dist|build|coverage|node_modules)\//i;
+/** Low-priority path buckets (lockfiles, generated/build output, vendored third-party trees) that overlapping
+ *  alone never counts as real conflict risk. Lockfile-NAME matching delegates to the canonical `isLockfile`
+ *  helper -- a dependency-free leaf utility in path-matchers.ts, the same delegation `review-diff.ts` and
+ *  `review-grounding.ts` already use -- so this classification never drifts behind the 24+ canonical lockfile
+ *  formats the way the hand-rolled 4-name regex did (a shared `poetry.lock`, `go.sum`, or `npm-shrinkwrap.json`
+ *  was wrongly treated as real overlap; #8647). The directory bucket mirrors the same canonical generated/
+ *  vendored set: build output (`dist`/`build`/`out`/`coverage`) and installed/vendored dependency trees
+ *  (`node_modules` and the `vendor`/`third_party` family). A shared `package-lock.json` or `third_party/x`
+ *  touch is routine noise, not the same-area conflict risk this gate exists to catch. */
+const LOW_SIGNAL_DIR_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:dist|build|out|coverage|node_modules|vendor|vendored|third_party|third-party|bower_components|jspm_packages)\//i;
 
 function isMeaningfulPath(path: string): boolean {
-  return !LOW_SIGNAL_FILENAME_RE.test(path) && !LOW_SIGNAL_DIR_RE.test(path);
+  return !isLockfile(path) && !LOW_SIGNAL_DIR_RE.test(path);
 }
 
 /** True when `thisPr` and `sibling` overlap enough to carry real conflict/duplicate-effort risk: a shared

test/unit/access-boundary.test.ts

@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ describe("access boundary: per-repo maintainer data is repo-scoped", () => {
     expect((await app.request(SETTINGS_A, { headers: { cookie } }, env)).status).toBe(200);
     expect((await app.request(SETTINGS_B, { headers: { cookie } }, env)).status).toBe(403);
   });
+
+  it("any authenticated session reaches registration-readiness / gittensor-config-recommendation for any repo (#8654)", async () => {
+    // These two advisory routes are intentionally open to any logged-in user (no per-repo ownership scope), but
+    // were omitted from the session allowlist, so every real non-operator browser session got 403 on the owner
+    // panel's only two data calls. charlie maintains nothing here, yet must reach both for an arbitrary repo.
+    const { app, env } = await setup();
+    const { token } = await createSessionForGitHubUser(env, { login: "charlie", id: 999 });
+    const cookie = `loopover_session=${token}`;
+    expect((await app.request("/v1/repos/alice/repo-a/registration-readiness", { headers: { cookie } }, env)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await app.request("/v1/repos/alice/repo-a/gittensor-config-recommendation", { headers: { cookie } }, env)).status).toBe(200);
+  });
 });
 
 describe("access boundary: contributor (miner) data is self-scoped", () => {

test/unit/merge-train.test.ts

@@ -132,6 +132,18 @@ describe("shouldWaitForOlderSiblings (#selfhost-merge-train)", () => {
       expect(decide(110, "2026-07-07T11:00:00.000Z", siblings, NOW, { thisPrLinkedIssues: [1], thisPrChangedFiles: ["package-lock.json", "dist/bundle.js"] })).toEqual({ wait: false });
     });
 
+    it("does NOT treat a shared non-npm canonical lockfile (poetry.lock/go.sum) as meaningful overlap (#8647)", () => {
+      // The hand-rolled 4-name regex only knew package-lock/yarn/pnpm/Cargo, so these forced a spurious wait;
+      // delegating to the canonical isLockfile covers all 24+ formats.
+      const siblings: MergeTrainSibling[] = [{ number: 105, createdAt: "2026-07-07T10:00:00.000Z", linkedIssues: [99], changedFiles: ["poetry.lock", "backend/go.sum"] }];
+      expect(decide(110, "2026-07-07T11:00:00.000Z", siblings, NOW, { thisPrLinkedIssues: [1], thisPrChangedFiles: ["poetry.lock", "backend/go.sum"] })).toEqual({ wait: false });
+    });
+
+    it("does NOT treat a shared vendored-directory path (vendor/third_party) as meaningful overlap (#8647)", () => {
+      const siblings: MergeTrainSibling[] = [{ number: 105, createdAt: "2026-07-07T10:00:00.000Z", linkedIssues: [99], changedFiles: ["vendor/lib/x.go", "third_party/pkg/y.js"] }];
+      expect(decide(110, "2026-07-07T11:00:00.000Z", siblings, NOW, { thisPrLinkedIssues: [1], thisPrChangedFiles: ["vendor/lib/x.go", "third_party/pkg/y.js"] })).toEqual({ wait: false });
+    });
+
     it("a sibling with no linkedIssues field at all (undefined) can still match via a shared changed file", () => {
       const siblings: MergeTrainSibling[] = [{ number: 105, createdAt: "2026-07-07T10:00:00.000Z", changedFiles: ["src/a.ts"] }];
       expect(decide(110, "2026-07-07T11:00:00.000Z", siblings, NOW, { thisPrLinkedIssues: [1], thisPrChangedFiles: ["src/a.ts"] })).toEqual({ wait: true, blockingPr: 105 });