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Rotate validator seal pubkey (post-compromise) - #81
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The Jun-23 validator X25519 seal keypair was present on the validator box during the Jun-27 root compromise and must be treated as exfiltrated. The validator has switched to a fresh keypair (clean cutover); this publishes the new public key so miners seal proof bundles to it. ACTION REQUIRED (miners): pull + re-seal submissions to the new pubkey. Bundles sealed to the old pubkey are rejected by the validator until re-sealed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Rotate validator seal pubkey (post-compromise)
The validator's X25519 seal keypair (dated Jun 23, embedded as
DEFAULT_VALIDATOR_PUBKEY) was on the validator box during the Jun-27 root compromise → must be treated as exfiltrated. Because proof bundles sit encrypted on the public HF dataset repo, the leaked key can decrypt every bundle sealed to the old pubkey. Rotating is the fix.Already done on the validator: clean cutover to a fresh keypair. The box now decrypts bundles sealed to the new pubkey only; old-pubkey bundles are rejected.
This PR: publishes the new
DEFAULT_VALIDATOR_PUBKEYso miners seal to it.Pull this change and re-seal your proof bundles to the new pubkey. Submissions sealed to the old pubkey are rejected until re-sealed. (The current king is unaffected.)
🤖 Generated with Claude Code