[Aikido] Fix security issue in starlette via minor version upgrade from 1.0.1 to 1.3.1

[aikido-autofix]

Upgrade Starlette to fix form parsing DoS, SSRF credential exposure on Windows, URL hostname spoofing, and unintended HTTP method handler invocation vulnerabilities.

✅ 4 CVEs resolved by this upgrade

This PR will resolve the following CVEs:

Issue	Severity	Description
CVE-2026-54283	HIGH	[starlette] Request parsing fails to enforce configured limits on field count and size for URL-encoded form data, allowing attackers to bypass resource consumption protections and potentially cause denial of service through unbounded form submissions.
CVE-2026-48818	HIGH	[starlette] StaticFiles on Windows is vulnerable to SSRF through UNC paths, which can trigger outbound SMB connections and expose NTLMv2 credentials for offline cracking or relay attacks before returning a 404 response. This affects default deployments on Windows systems regardless of the HTTP response.
CVE-2026-54282	MEDIUM	[starlette] The HTTP request path is not validated before reconstructing request.url, allowing an attacker to manipulate the path (e.g., @google.com) to shift the authority boundary and control request.url.hostname. This enables host validation bypass for code relying on request.url.hostname instead of the Host header.
CVE-2026-48817	MEDIUM	[starlette] HTTPEndpoint improperly dispatches requests by lowercasing HTTP methods and using getattr without restricting to standard verbs, allowing attackers to invoke unintended internal methods as handlers and bypass authorization checks. This affects applications using HTTPEndpoint subclasses via Route without explicit methods constraints.

[aikido-autofix]

Closed by Aikido: the vulnerabilities are already resolved.