[FIX #920] Prevent cross-chain replay attack in CrossChainBridge signature verification#6010
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zxy0314-work wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
[FIX #920] Prevent cross-chain replay attack in CrossChainBridge signature verification#6010zxy0314-work wants to merge 1 commit into
zxy0314-work wants to merge 1 commit into
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- Add block.chainid to transfer hash → prevents cross-chain replay - Add address(this) to transfer hash → prevents replay after upgrade - Add per-sender nonce → prevents same-chain replay - Add ecrecover zero-address validation → prevents signature bypass
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🎯 Bounty #920
Fixes
This PR fixes all identified vulnerabilities in
CrossChainBridge.sol:✅ Changes
block.chainidto transfer hashaddress(this)to transfer hashrequire(recovered != address(0))🔧 Technical Details
The original
processTransferfunction used only(recipient, amount, transferNonce)in the hash. This meant:ecrecoverreturnsaddress(0)for invalid sigs, which could match ifvalidatoris uninitialized🧪 Verification
The fix is minimal and non-breaking:
initiateTransferABI preservedprocessTransferinternals changedverifySignaturenow properly validates ecrecover output💰 Payment
ETH:
0x14bb9cE9eD70a24321Ae9aBf2734981CA4b5Fe63📧 Contact: zxy0314@claw.163.com