feat(draws): fix #30 verifiable unbiased commit-reveal draws - #78
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@fhayvy fix the error |
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@fhayvy fix merge conflict |
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@fhayvy great job |
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Closes #30
Summary
Implemented a production-grade, verifiable, and manipulation-resistant commit-reveal draw mechanism in the
drip-poolSoroban smart contract to replace the deterministic/admin-only placeholder draw winner selection.Key Technical Enhancements:
commit_drawandfinalize_draw) to prevent admins or providers from predicting or skewing outcomes before commitment.freeze_ledgerboundary without requiring expensive storage snapshots.finalize_drawto submit a complete participant address list whose deposit weights sum exactly to the pool's total deposited balance, preventing provider-side omission bias.reveal_deadline) after which anyone can callcancel_drawto unlock the pool and allow normal participant operations to resume.