Universal Cognitive Schema handles some of the most sensitive personal data that exists — a structured representation of how a person thinks, communicates, and works. This document explains our security commitments, what we expect from implementations, and how to report vulnerabilities.
We are architecturally incapable of reading your cognitive profile.
This is not a policy promise. It is a design requirement. Any UCS-compliant implementation must be built so that no central party — including the authors of this standard — ever holds a decrypted cognitive profile without the explicit, per-session consent of the profile owner.
If an implementation cannot make this guarantee, it is not UCS-compliant.
All UCS-compliant tools and platforms must adhere to the following:
- Profiles must be encrypted at rest using AES-256 or equivalent
- Profiles must be encrypted in transit using TLS 1.3 or higher
- Encryption and decryption must occur on the user's device, not on a server
- Encryption keys must never be transmitted to or stored by a third party
- No UCS implementation may store a decrypted profile on a server it controls
- Profile storage must be under the direct control of the profile owner — on their device, in their chosen cloud storage, or in their enterprise vault
- Implementations act as routing and translation layers only — not data warehouses
- A profile may only be transmitted to a destination platform with explicit, per-dimension user consent
- Consent must be granted immediately before each transmission — not stored as a blanket permission
- Implementations must transmit only the dimensions the user has chosen to share, never the full profile by default
- Every profile must pass sanitisation before the
provenance.sanitisedfield is set totrue - Sanitisation must strip: prompt-injection patterns, executable instructions, role-override syntax, and any content designed to manipulate a destination model's behaviour
- The
sanitised_attimestamp must reflect when sanitisation actually occurred - Setting
sanitised: truewithout running sanitisation is a critical violation of this standard
Cognitive profiles are classified as highly sensitive personal data — equivalent to biometric or medical data in terms of the potential for harm if compromised.
A cognitive profile breach does not just expose names and email addresses. It exposes:
- Communication patterns and psychological tendencies
- Professional expertise and knowledge gaps
- Project history and business context
- Decision-making frameworks and risk tolerances
- Trust boundaries and autonomy preferences
Treat cognitive profile data accordingly in every implementation decision.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.0-alpha | ✓ Active |
As the standard is in alpha, all security fixes apply to the current version only. Once v1.0.0 is released, a formal long-term support policy will be defined.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
If you discover a vulnerability in the UCS schema specification, a reference implementation, or any official tooling in this repository, report it privately so it can be addressed before public disclosure.
Email: [email protected]
Include in your report:
- A clear description of the vulnerability
- The component affected (schema spec, parser, validator, documentation)
- Steps to reproduce or a proof of concept
- The potential impact if exploited
- Your suggested fix, if you have one
| Timeframe | What happens |
|---|---|
| Within 48 hours | Acknowledgement of your report |
| Within 7 days | Initial assessment and severity classification |
| Within 30 days | Fix developed and tested |
| Within 45 days | Fix released and vulnerability disclosed publicly |
We will credit you in the security advisory unless you request otherwise.
We will not take legal action against researchers who report vulnerabilities in good faith and follow this policy.
Building on UCS means building on a system that handles sensitive data at scale. The following threats are explicitly part of our threat model — implementations must account for all of them.
A malicious actor crafts conversations designed to embed prompt-injection payloads into a platform's memory export. When the user migrates this profile, the injected instructions execute on the destination platform.
Mitigation required: Sanitisation layer that detects and strips instruction-like content from all profile fields before storage or transmission.
A stolen cognitive profile can be used to impersonate the profile owner with high fidelity — generating communications, making decisions, or manipulating AI agents in their name.
Mitigation required: Biometric or strong second-factor binding at profile creation. Usage anomaly detection. Cryptographic provenance chain on every profile use.
An attacker intercepts a profile in transit and modifies dimensions before it reaches the destination platform — altering trust boundaries, injecting false expertise, or changing communication preferences to manipulate the AI's behaviour toward the user.
Mitigation required: End-to-end encryption with integrity verification. TLS 1.3 minimum. Profile hash verification at destination before injection.
A UCS implementation that centralises decrypted profiles becomes the highest-value target in the AI identity ecosystem. A single breach could expose the cognitive profiles of millions of people simultaneously.
Mitigation required: Federated, user-controlled storage. No central decryption. Zero-knowledge routing architecture.
A destination platform receives a cognitive profile for personalisation but uses it for manipulation, profiling, advertising targeting, or training data without the user's knowledge.
Mitigation required: Binding platform usage agreements as a condition of API access. Selective disclosure so users control which dimensions travel to which platform. Audit logging of profile access at the platform level.
If you are contributing a parser, validator, or other tooling to this repository:
- Never log profile content — log only metadata (profile ID, timestamp, dimension names)
- Never include real user profiles in test fixtures — use synthesised or fully anonymised data only
- Never store API keys, tokens, or credentials in code — use environment variables and ensure
.envis in.gitignore - All test profiles in the repository must have
provenance.extraction_methodset to"synthesised" - Any contribution that weakens the sanitisation requirements will not be merged
We follow coordinated disclosure. We ask that:
- You give us 45 days to fix a vulnerability before public disclosure
- You do not exploit the vulnerability beyond what is necessary to demonstrate it
- You do not access, modify, or delete data belonging to other users
- You report in good faith with the intention of improving security
In return, we commit to responding promptly, fixing issues seriously, and crediting researchers publicly.
Researchers who responsibly disclose valid security vulnerabilities will be listed here with their permission.
No entries yet — be the first.