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Security: XwhyZ-WHYLD/universal-cognitive-schema

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Universal Cognitive Schema handles some of the most sensitive personal data that exists — a structured representation of how a person thinks, communicates, and works. This document explains our security commitments, what we expect from implementations, and how to report vulnerabilities.


Our core security commitment

We are architecturally incapable of reading your cognitive profile.

This is not a policy promise. It is a design requirement. Any UCS-compliant implementation must be built so that no central party — including the authors of this standard — ever holds a decrypted cognitive profile without the explicit, per-session consent of the profile owner.

If an implementation cannot make this guarantee, it is not UCS-compliant.


Zero-knowledge architecture requirements

All UCS-compliant tools and platforms must adhere to the following:

Encryption

  • Profiles must be encrypted at rest using AES-256 or equivalent
  • Profiles must be encrypted in transit using TLS 1.3 or higher
  • Encryption and decryption must occur on the user's device, not on a server
  • Encryption keys must never be transmitted to or stored by a third party

Storage

  • No UCS implementation may store a decrypted profile on a server it controls
  • Profile storage must be under the direct control of the profile owner — on their device, in their chosen cloud storage, or in their enterprise vault
  • Implementations act as routing and translation layers only — not data warehouses

Transmission

  • A profile may only be transmitted to a destination platform with explicit, per-dimension user consent
  • Consent must be granted immediately before each transmission — not stored as a blanket permission
  • Implementations must transmit only the dimensions the user has chosen to share, never the full profile by default

Sanitisation

  • Every profile must pass sanitisation before the provenance.sanitised field is set to true
  • Sanitisation must strip: prompt-injection patterns, executable instructions, role-override syntax, and any content designed to manipulate a destination model's behaviour
  • The sanitised_at timestamp must reflect when sanitisation actually occurred
  • Setting sanitised: true without running sanitisation is a critical violation of this standard

Sensitive data classification

Cognitive profiles are classified as highly sensitive personal data — equivalent to biometric or medical data in terms of the potential for harm if compromised.

A cognitive profile breach does not just expose names and email addresses. It exposes:

  • Communication patterns and psychological tendencies
  • Professional expertise and knowledge gaps
  • Project history and business context
  • Decision-making frameworks and risk tolerances
  • Trust boundaries and autonomy preferences

Treat cognitive profile data accordingly in every implementation decision.


Supported versions

Version Supported
0.1.0-alpha ✓ Active

As the standard is in alpha, all security fixes apply to the current version only. Once v1.0.0 is released, a formal long-term support policy will be defined.


Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

If you discover a vulnerability in the UCS schema specification, a reference implementation, or any official tooling in this repository, report it privately so it can be addressed before public disclosure.

How to report

Email: [email protected]

Include in your report:

  • A clear description of the vulnerability
  • The component affected (schema spec, parser, validator, documentation)
  • Steps to reproduce or a proof of concept
  • The potential impact if exploited
  • Your suggested fix, if you have one

What to expect

Timeframe What happens
Within 48 hours Acknowledgement of your report
Within 7 days Initial assessment and severity classification
Within 30 days Fix developed and tested
Within 45 days Fix released and vulnerability disclosed publicly

We will credit you in the security advisory unless you request otherwise.

We will not take legal action against researchers who report vulnerabilities in good faith and follow this policy.


Known threat model

Building on UCS means building on a system that handles sensitive data at scale. The following threats are explicitly part of our threat model — implementations must account for all of them.

Poisoned profile attack

A malicious actor crafts conversations designed to embed prompt-injection payloads into a platform's memory export. When the user migrates this profile, the injected instructions execute on the destination platform.

Mitigation required: Sanitisation layer that detects and strips instruction-like content from all profile fields before storage or transmission.

Profile theft and impersonation

A stolen cognitive profile can be used to impersonate the profile owner with high fidelity — generating communications, making decisions, or manipulating AI agents in their name.

Mitigation required: Biometric or strong second-factor binding at profile creation. Usage anomaly detection. Cryptographic provenance chain on every profile use.

Man-in-the-middle profile manipulation

An attacker intercepts a profile in transit and modifies dimensions before it reaches the destination platform — altering trust boundaries, injecting false expertise, or changing communication preferences to manipulate the AI's behaviour toward the user.

Mitigation required: End-to-end encryption with integrity verification. TLS 1.3 minimum. Profile hash verification at destination before injection.

Centralisation attack

A UCS implementation that centralises decrypted profiles becomes the highest-value target in the AI identity ecosystem. A single breach could expose the cognitive profiles of millions of people simultaneously.

Mitigation required: Federated, user-controlled storage. No central decryption. Zero-knowledge routing architecture.

Scope creep by destination platforms

A destination platform receives a cognitive profile for personalisation but uses it for manipulation, profiling, advertising targeting, or training data without the user's knowledge.

Mitigation required: Binding platform usage agreements as a condition of API access. Selective disclosure so users control which dimensions travel to which platform. Audit logging of profile access at the platform level.


Security requirements for contributors

If you are contributing a parser, validator, or other tooling to this repository:

  • Never log profile content — log only metadata (profile ID, timestamp, dimension names)
  • Never include real user profiles in test fixtures — use synthesised or fully anonymised data only
  • Never store API keys, tokens, or credentials in code — use environment variables and ensure .env is in .gitignore
  • All test profiles in the repository must have provenance.extraction_method set to "synthesised"
  • Any contribution that weakens the sanitisation requirements will not be merged

Disclosure policy

We follow coordinated disclosure. We ask that:

  • You give us 45 days to fix a vulnerability before public disclosure
  • You do not exploit the vulnerability beyond what is necessary to demonstrate it
  • You do not access, modify, or delete data belonging to other users
  • You report in good faith with the intention of improving security

In return, we commit to responding promptly, fixing issues seriously, and crediting researchers publicly.


Security hall of fame

Researchers who responsibly disclose valid security vulnerabilities will be listed here with their permission.

No entries yet — be the first.


Further reading

There aren’t any published security advisories