The TeleologyHI project (@teleologyhi-sdk/maic, @teleologyhi-sdk/him, @teleologyhi-sdk/nhe) is alpha software intended for general public use. We take security reports seriously and aim to acknowledge each one within two business days.

From 2026-05-17 each published package follows strict SemVer (see .github/RELEASING.md §8). Only the latest minor of the current major is supported with security patches; older majors receive critical-CVE fixes for 6 months after the next major lands.

Workspaces marked private: true (distill, eval, cloud) are not published to npm and do not have a public security-support window; they are Creator-operated. Vulnerabilities found in them are still in scope of this policy when they affect the canonical Creator deployment.

Please do not file public GitHub issues for security problems. Send reports to davcavalcante@proton.me (Creator, preferred) or say@takk.ag (Takk relay), with the subject line beginning [SECURITY].

Include, at minimum:

• Affected package and version (npm ls @teleologyhi-sdk/...)
• Reproduction steps or a minimal proof-of-concept
• Impact assessment (what an attacker can achieve)
• Any suggested mitigation

If your report involves a vulnerability in a third-party dependency, please also link the upstream advisory (CVE, GHSA, RustSec, etc.) so we can coordinate the disclosure.

PGP / signed reports are welcome but not required. If you need an out-of-band channel, ask in the first message and we will propose one.

1. Acknowledgement within 2 business days.
2. Triage + severity assignment within 7 days.
3. Fix targeted for the next alpha release; critical issues ship as an out-of-band patch on the affected minor.
4. Coordinated disclosure: the reporter is credited in the changelog and advisory unless they request anonymity.

Findings in any of the following are in scope:

• Cryptographic invariants of MAIC: forging a CreatorSignature, replaying a previously valid signed payload, bypassing the SHA-256 hash chain of AuditLog, defeating the Ed25519 verification path, or making ProposalStore.markRatified / HimStore.reincarnate accept an unsigned or attacker-signed request.
• Sealed HIM invariants: minting a HimHandle without a Creator signature; mutating axiomsSnapshot after registration; bypassing the emergent-axiom ratification channel.
• Audit integrity: writing a forged AuditEvent that AuditLog.verify() accepts, or causing query() to omit events that exist on disk.
• Refusal pipeline circumvention: prompts that route an escalate-creator / hard-refuse verdict to a non-refused RespondOutput.kind; prompt-injection that flips a terminated NHE back to active.
• MCP server: tool-call inputs that escape NHE's policy boundary or cause the server to exfiltrate state across NHE instances.
• Storage: path traversal in any storeDir-rooted write (axioms, proposals, HIM records, sleep YAMLs, temporal-lobe memories, interactions).
• Supply chain: tarball contamination, compromised npm scope, unverified provenance.

• The Creator's private-key custody (the operator's responsibility — see maic/SPEC.md §11.2; future iterations may integrate HSM/YubiKey).
• LLM output quality, hallucination, jailbreak prompts against third-party adapters whose policies the NHE simply forwards through.
• Theoretical attacks against the cryptographic primitives themselves (Ed25519, SHA-256) — please report those to upstream.
• Denial of service via unbounded inputs against a self-hosted MAIC; rate limiting is the operator's responsibility.

The names MAIC™, HIM™, NHE™, TeleologyHI™, and Takk™ are trademarks of David C. Cavalcante and are governed separately from the Apache 2.0 code license. See TRADEMARK.md.