π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection vulnerability#67
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection vulnerability#67
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: The Rust compile worker directly passed user-controlled
req.mainFiletolatexmk. An attacker could pass a filename starting with-(e.g.,-shell-escape) to inject arguments during array-based argument passing (spawn).π― Impact: Attackers could execute arbitrary commands by escaping into the shell via latexmk flags.
π§ Fix: Updated
backend/src/services/compileQueue.tsto explicitly reject anymainFilethat begins with a hyphen (-) before enqueuing the job, mitigating the option injection.β Verification: Tested against the vitest test suite (
npx vitest run) to ensure valid configurations still work as intended and that no side effects were introduced.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4108359020817757289 started by @dttdrv