π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix command option injection#82
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix command option injection#82
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL/HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The
mainFileparameter inCompileQueueServicewas passed directly as a positional argument tolatexmkwithin the Rust compile worker. A user could supply a file name starting with a hyphen (e.g.,-shell-escapeor-output-directory=...), whichlatexmkwould interpret as an executable flag instead of a file name.π― Impact: Unsanitized file names could allow an attacker to inject arbitrary flags into
latexmk, leading to remote code execution (via-shell-escape) or arbitrary file operations (via-output-directory).π§ Fix: Added a validation check in
backend/src/services/compileQueue.tsto reject anyrequest.mainFilethat starts with a hyphen (-).β Verification: Ran
npx vitest runto ensure tests passed. The validation throws a standard 400 HttpError when a hyphen is provided.PR created automatically by Jules for task 11608252281840772252 started by @dttdrv