Fix: add 1MB size limit on request body to prevent DoS#65
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The POST /post endpoint buffered the entire request body with no size limit, allowing an attacker to exhaust server memory. Now rejects requests larger than 1MB with HTTP 413. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
The POST
/postendpoint buffered the entire request body with no size limit. An attacker could send an arbitrarily large payload to exhaust server memory.Now rejects requests larger than 1MB with HTTP 413 (Payload Too Large) and destroys the connection.
Test plan
🤖 Generated with Claude Code