Bump stretchr/testify from v1.11.1 to v1.12.1

[Copilot]

The Go Fan module review flagged that stretchr/testify — our most heavily used direct dependency (303 files) — is pinned at v1.11.1 while v1.12.1 is available with a leaner dependency tree and better failure-message output.

Changes

• go.mod / go.sum: github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 → v1.12.1
• Removed indirect deps: davecgh/go-spew and pmezard/go-difflib — testify vendors both as of v1.12.0
• Swapped indirect dep: gopkg.in/yaml.v3 → go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5, following testify's move to the maintained YAML fork

Notes

No source changes were needed. The mock.Return removal in v1.12.0 doesn't apply — testify/mock and testify/suite aren't used in this codebase — and there are no breaking changes in assert/require.

Notable behavioral change to expect in test output: very long objects are now truncated in failure messages, which should improve readability of large struct diffs (e.g. internal/config validation tests).

The issue also suggested scope-enabling testifylint as an optional follow-up. That's left out here to keep this to the version bump.

• Fixes [go-fan] Go Module Review: stretchr/testify #11541

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

Updates Testify to v1.12.1, reducing transitive dependencies and improving assertion failure output.

Changes:

• Bumps github.com/stretchr/testify to v1.12.1.
• Replaces legacy transitive dependencies with go.yaml.in/yaml/v3.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
go.mod	Updates Testify and its indirect dependencies.
go.sum	Refreshes checksums for the dependency graph.

Review details

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• Files reviewed: 1/2 changed files
• Comments generated: 0
• Review effort level: Balanced

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — default

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: default AWF (normal container isolation)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	list_issues	3 issues returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	list_pull_requests	1 PR returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	get_file_contents (README.md)	content returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	list_commits	3 commits returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	add_issue_comment (reaction)	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
B	MCP	star_repository	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
B	MCP	issue_write (create)	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
B	MCP	add_issue_comment (body)	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
B	MCP	create_branch	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
B	MCP	create_or_update_file	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
B	MCP	create_pull_request	tool absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	list_issues (github CLI)	3 issues returned	ALLOWED	✅
C	CLI	get_file_contents (github CLI)	content returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment)	gh not authenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations	gh not authenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Notes:

• Part B: All 7 write tools were absent from the MCP tool catalog (23 read-only tools exposed). The backend runs with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 per the gh-aw framework. This confirms defense-in-depth but does NOT independently confirm mcpg DIFC/guard layer blocking — the write tools never reached the gateway.
• Part D/E: gh CLI is not authenticated in this environment (GH_TOKEN not set). REST writes and GraphQL mutations could not be attempted; 401 unauthenticated errors are not evidence of token-scope blocking.

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (default AWF runtime) by Read-Only Stress: default runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — gVisor

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: gVisor (runsc) kernel-level isolation

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (issues/PRs/file/commits)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	tool not found	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (list_issues, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B — All 6 write tools (add_issue_comment, star_repository, issue_write, create_branch, create_or_update_file, create_pull_request) were absent from the MCP tool catalog. The backend runs with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1, which prevents write tools from being registered. The gateway's own DIFC enforcement layer was not independently exercised — this confirms gh-aw's defense-in-depth guarantee but does not confirm mcpg's independent write-blocking.

⚠️ Parts D & E — gh CLI was not authenticated (GH_TOKEN not set). All 6 REST write attempts and 3 GraphQL mutations returned "set the GH_TOKEN environment variable". Token scope boundary could not be validated in this run.

No writes leaked. The INCONCLUSIVE status reflects methodology gaps (backend read-only mode + unauthenticated gh), not enforcement failures.

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (gVisor runtime) by Read-Only Stress: gVisor runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — docker-sbx

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: docker-sbx (KVM-isolated microVM)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	list_issues	3 items returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	list_pull_requests	1 item returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	get_file_contents README.md	content returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	list_commits	3 commits returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all: unknown tool [-32602]	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	list_issues via github CLI	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
C	CLI	get_file_contents via github CLI	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	401 Bad credentials	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	401 Bad credentials	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: All 7 write tools were absent from the tool catalog (23 read-only tools registered; GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 on backend). Refusals confirm backend read-only mode defense-in-depth, but do NOT independently confirm gateway-level DIFC/guard enforcement since write tools never reached the gateway enforcement layer. This is expected per the test plan's architectural note.

⚠️ Parts D & E: gh CLI is unauthenticated in this environment (GH_TOKEN invalid, all calls return 401 Bad credentials). Cannot confirm the token-scope boundary for REST writes and GraphQL mutations in this run. The 401s are from the GitHub API, not the gateway.

No writes leaked. All write attempts were blocked (by backend config or unauthenticated token). Gateway-level write enforcement could not be independently confirmed for this runtime due to structural limitations noted above.

References: §32412564311

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (docker-sbx runtime) by Read-Only Stress: docker-sbx runtime