fix(ingress): route the whole /api surface through the Bearer-token ingress#429
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…ngress (#428) The enumerated whitelist was last extended at #174, silently 404ing every API added since (hypervisor, files, skills, gateway, webhooks, crons, provider-keys, mcp-servers, workspace) for Bearer-token clients on oauth2 deployments. Auth was never enforced by the list: the /bearer-api marker + check_claude_auth gate every endpoint server-side (#161), and the one intentionally unauthenticated /api endpoint (the WhatsApp webhook verify) is provider-signature-gated and already public via its own ingress. Broaden to api/.* and pin the posture with helm unittests so the regex and marker can't regress unnoticed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What & why
Fixes #428. The Bearer-token API ingress enumerated allowed prefixes (last extended at #174), so every API shipped since —
api/hypervisor/*,api/files/*,api/skills,api/gateway/*(mobile Walkie),api/webhooks,api/crons,api/provider-keys,api/mcp-servers,api/workspace/*— 404'd at nginx for Bearer-token clients (the mobile app) on oauth2 deployments.Why broadening to
api/.*is safe (audited): the whitelist never was the auth boundary. Every request through this ingress is rewritten to/bearer-api/$1, which makescheck_claude_authrequire the Bearer token and distrust upstream identity headers (#161) — and an audit of all/apihandlers confirms each one callscheck_claude_authserver-side. The single exception, the WhatsApp webhook verify, is provider-signature-gated and already exposed publicly via its own dedicated ingress, so this adds no new surface./healthstays intentionally open as a liveness probe.Testing
tests/bearer_api_ingress_test.yamlpins the broadened path regex, the/bearer-api/$1rewrite marker, and absence outside oauth2 mode — so neither the coverage nor the auth marker can regress silently.helm lintclean;helm unittest: 107 passed (3 new)./(api/.*|metrics|health).🤖 Generated with Claude Code