🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix XSS vulnerability in markdown rendering#1251
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix XSS vulnerability in markdown rendering#1251khangnghiem wants to merge 1 commit into
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In `site/app.js`, markdown is parsed with `marked.parse` and rendered directly to `innerHTML`. `marked` does not sanitize HTML tags by default. This commit adds defensive conditional sanitization using `DOMPurify` (with a secure fallback) before assigning to `innerHTML`. Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability:
site/app.jsrenders markdown notes usingmarked.parse(), which allows raw HTML by default. The resulting output was being directly assigned toinnerHTMLwithout any sanitization, creating a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability if the markdown source contained malicious payload.🎯 Impact: An attacker could embed malicious HTML/JS within a note's markdown. When a user opens the specs panel and the note is rendered, the payload would execute in their browser session, potentially stealing data or hijacking the session.
🔧 Fix: Implemented conditional sanitization using
window.DOMPurify.sanitize()aftermarked.parse(). IfDOMPurifyis unavailable, it securely degrades to the pre-existing, safe inline regex replacement (<and>). Included{ ADD_ATTR: ['data-note-node', 'data-node'] }configuration to ensure required custom UI attributes are preserved by the sanitizer.✅ Verification: Ran
node --check site/app.jsto confirm valid syntax. Verified the source code visually to ensure the fix was properly applied to theinnerHTMLassignment and that the safe fallback string was preserved exactly as it existed before. Updated the.jules/sentinel.mdjournal with this learning.PR created automatically by Jules for task 9044137575033458410 started by @khangnghiem