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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix privilege escalation vulnerability in updateRole #232

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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix privilege escalation vulnerability in updateRole #232

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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -15,3 +15,7 @@
**Vulnerability:** Internal system error messages (`error.originalError.message`) were leaked in API 500 error responses in `apps/data-service/src/hono/routes/demo.ts`.
**Learning:** Returning unhandled database or internal system errors directly to the client can leak sensitive information about the backend architecture.
**Prevention:** Always sanitize error messages returned in JSON responses. Log detailed errors on the server, but return generic messages (e.g. `error.message` of a custom domain error rather than the original system error) to the client.
## 2025-03-18 - [Fix Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in updateRole]
**Vulnerability:** Tenants can modify system roles because `updateRole` lacks an `isSystemRole` check.
**Learning:** System roles (roles with `isSystemRole: true`) must be protected from modification by individual tenants to prevent privilege escalation.
**Prevention:** Always check `isSystemRole` and throw a validation error before updating or deleting a role.
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@coderabbitai coderabbitai bot Apr 1, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

Verify the entry date.

The date 2025-03-18 appears inconsistent with the PR creation date (April 2026). If this is a historical record of when the vulnerability was discovered, consider clarifying. Otherwise, update to the current date.

The documentation content itself accurately describes the vulnerability, learning, and prevention measures.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.jules/sentinel.md around lines 18 - 21, The header line "## 2025-03-18 -
[Fix Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in updateRole]" has an inconsistent
date; either update that date to the PR/current date (April 2026) or clarify it
as the original discovery date (e.g., append "(discovered 2025-03-18)") so
readers aren’t confused; edit the header string to reflect the correct date or
add the parenthetical clarification while leaving the rest of the entry (the
vulnerability, learning, and prevention text) unchanged.

6 changes: 6 additions & 0 deletions packages/data-ops/src/queries/school-admin/roles.ts
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Expand Up @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ export function updateRole(
throw new DatabaseError('NOT_FOUND', SCHOOL_ERRORS.ROLE_NOT_FOUND)
}

const role = roleResult.value

if (role.isSystemRole) {
throw new DatabaseError('VALIDATION_ERROR', 'Cannot modify system roles')
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@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector bot Apr 1, 2026

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P1 Badge Allow privileged updates to system roles

This unconditional guard blocks all updates to isSystemRole records, including the core admin flow that calls updateRole for platform role management (apps/core/src/core/functions/roles.ts:65-70). Because updateRole has no caller-context check, core users now get VALIDATION_ERROR when editing built-in system roles, which is a regression from prior behavior and broader than the stated tenant-only restriction.

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}

const [updated] = await db
.update(roles)
.set({
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