goz has the same trust model as Everything. Stated plainly:

• The daemon runs elevated and builds its index from a raw NTFS MFT read, which bypasses per-file NTFS ACLs. The index therefore contains the name, size, and timestamps of every file on every tracked volume, regardless of who can normally read them.
• The query pipe (\\.\pipe\goz-v1) grants Authenticated Users read/write, so any authenticated local user can query the index. It exposes only that metadata, never file contents. On a shared machine, treat filenames as visible to all local users.
• Conversely, the client verifies the pipe server's owner SID is Local System or the built-in Administrators group before sending anything, and fails closed. A non-elevated process cannot squat the pipe name and impersonate the daemon. The --insecure-no-server-check flag opts out of that check and is a development escape hatch only.

Please report security issues privately rather than opening a public issue, using GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (the "Report a vulnerability" button under the repository's Security tab). You will get an acknowledgement, and a fix or mitigation plan once the report is confirmed.