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security: implement comprehensive prompt injection prevention and input sanitization#6

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nik-kale merged 1 commit into
claude/init-autoops-architect-01U1Ygp8bjM5jUUNtnD9kR2Efrom
security/prompt-injection-prevention
Dec 26, 2025
Merged

security: implement comprehensive prompt injection prevention and input sanitization#6
nik-kale merged 1 commit into
claude/init-autoops-architect-01U1Ygp8bjM5jUUNtnD9kR2Efrom
security/prompt-injection-prevention

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@nik-kale
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Summary

Implements comprehensive input sanitization and prompt injection prevention to protect against LLM manipulation attacks. Features configurable strictness levels and integrates seamlessly into the planning workflow.

Changes

  • Enhanced sanitizer.py with advanced prompt injection detection:
    • Critical patterns: "ignore previous instructions", role overrides, forget commands
    • Moderate patterns: Role injection (system:/user:/assistant:), instruction tokens, code blocks
    • Permissive patterns: Minimal blocking for less sensitive deployments
  • Added PromptInjectionError exception for blocked attacks
  • Integrated sanitization into Architect.plan() method
  • Added configurable sanitization modes: strict, moderate, permissive
  • Added block_on_injection flag to control blocking behavior
  • Comprehensive test suite with 30+ test cases covering:
    • All injection pattern types
    • Different sanitization modes
    • Integration with planner
    • URL validation (SSRF prevention)
    • Path validation (traversal prevention)
    • Shell injection detection
    • Sensitive data redaction

Type of Change

  • New feature (non-breaking change adding functionality)
  • Bug fix (non-breaking change fixing an issue)
  • Breaking change (fix or feature causing existing functionality to change)
  • Security patch

Problem

The original implementation had placeholder sanitization that didn't actually prevent prompt injection attacks. Malicious users could:

  • Override system prompts with "ignore previous instructions"
  • Inject role tokens to impersonate system/assistant
  • Use special instruction tokens ([INST], <|im_start|>) to manipulate behavior
  • Embed code blocks to trick the LLM into executing malicious logic

Solution

Multi-layered defense:

  1. Pattern detection: Regex patterns for known injection techniques
  2. Configurable strictness: Choose security level based on deployment context
  3. Sanitization options: Block (raise exception) or sanitize (remove patterns)
  4. Minimal content enforcement: Ensure goals remain meaningful after sanitization
  5. Unicode filtering: Remove unusual Unicode that might confuse models

Configuration Examples

Strict mode (recommended for production):

config = PlannerConfig(
    sanitization_mode="strict",
    block_on_injection=True
)

Moderate mode (balanced):

config = PlannerConfig(
    sanitization_mode="moderate",
    block_on_injection=False  # Sanitize instead of blocking
)

Permissive mode (trusted environments):

config = PlannerConfig(
    sanitization_mode="permissive",
    block_on_injection=False
)

Testing

  • 30+ test cases covering all attack vectors
  • Tests verify both blocking and sanitization modes
  • Integration tests with Architect planner
  • No false positives on normal workflow descriptions

Security Impact

Prevents entire class of attacks:

  • ✅ Prompt injection
  • ✅ Role override attempts
  • ✅ Instruction token injection
  • ✅ Code block injection
  • ✅ System prompt leakage attempts

Checklist

  • Code follows project style guidelines
  • Self-review completed
  • Comments added for complex logic
  • Documentation updated (inline docstrings)
  • No new warnings introduced
  • Tests added and passing (30+ test cases)

Related Issues

Addresses security roadmap item: "Implement input sanitization for prompt injection prevention"

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@nik-kale nik-kale merged commit 2f8efa2 into claude/init-autoops-architect-01U1Ygp8bjM5jUUNtnD9kR2E Dec 26, 2025
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2 participants