docs(prd): add PRD 0007 — Tell SSH compromise apart from SSH background noise - #56
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…nd noise Any internet-facing SSH port sees thousands of failed logins a day from commodity botnets. That is weather, not an attack, and treating it as one is why most SSH monitoring produces noise nobody reads. The rare events that matter are different in kind: a login that SUCCEEDS from somewhere unusual, a new authorized_keys entry (the standard persistence mechanism), tunneling that turns a foothold into lateral movement, and success after a failure burst. fail2ban already blocks brute force, and blocking is the least valuable half — distributed botnets rotate IPs faster than a ban list matters. The valuable half is knowing someone got in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vu1nz Security Review0 finding(s) in PR #? No security issues found. |
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Specification for the
ssh-guardcore module, listed inPRD.mdand not yet specified.Any internet-facing SSH port sees thousands of failed logins a day from commodity botnets. That is weather, not an attack, and treating it as one is why most SSH monitoring produces noise nobody reads.
The rare events that matter are different in kind: a login that SUCCEEDS from somewhere unusual, a new authorized_keys entry (the standard persistence mechanism), tunneling that turns a foothold into lateral movement, and success after a failure burst. fail2ban already blocks brute force, and blocking is the least valuable half — distributed botnets rotate IPs faster than a ban list matters. The valuable half is knowing someone got in.
Spec only — no implementation in this PR.