docs(prd): add PRD 0010 — Block attackers without locking out the operator - #59
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…rator The first module that CHANGES the system rather than observing it, and that fact dominates the design. Every other module's worst failure is a missed detection. This one's worst failure is locking the operator out of their own server at 3am from a false positive. Three hazards: self-lockout (the operator's own IP, the CI runner, the load balancer all look like traffic); shared addresses (blocking a CGNAT or corporate NAT range blocks everyone behind it); and rules that outlive their reason, accreting into an unreviewable ban list. So: dry-run is the install default, the protected set is enforced at the point of WRITING a rule rather than deciding one — so no detector, however wrong, can produce a lockout — every rule carries a mandatory TTL, and everything lives in a dedicated chain so flush removes exactly what this module added and nothing else. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vu1nz Security Review0 finding(s) in PR #? No security issues found. |
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Specification for the
firewall-rulescore module, listed inPRD.mdand not yet specified.The first module that CHANGES the system rather than observing it, and that fact dominates the design. Every other module's worst failure is a missed detection. This one's worst failure is locking the operator out of their own server at 3am from a false positive.
Three hazards: self-lockout (the operator's own IP, the CI runner, the load balancer all look like traffic); shared addresses (blocking a CGNAT or corporate NAT range blocks everyone behind it); and rules that outlive their reason, accreting into an unreviewable ban list.
So: dry-run is the install default, the protected set is enforced at the point of WRITING a rule rather than deciding one — so no detector, however wrong, can produce a lockout — every rule carries a mandatory TTL, and everything lives in a dedicated chain so flush removes exactly what this module added and nothing else.
Spec only — no implementation in this PR.