docs(prd): add PRD 0012 — A decoy nobody legitimate touches - #61
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Every other detection module fights the same war: separating attack from noise, paying for it in false positives, baselines and tuning. A honeypot INVERTS the problem. A service that exists for no reason, that nothing legitimate is configured to contact, has exactly one class of visitor — so any interaction is unauthorized by construction, with no baseline, no warmup and no tuning. That makes it the highest-precision signal available on a host, and the natural corroborating detector for firewall-rules, where the open question is whether blocking should require two signals. The catch is that it is a service deliberately inviting attackers on a customer's production host. So emulation is structural — no decoy ever executes anything or holds anything real — and captured payloads are hostile input that every downstream consumer must treat as such, since rendering them in an alert is a stored-XSS vector aimed at the defender. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vu1nz Security Review0 finding(s) in PR #? No security issues found. |
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Specification for the
honeypotcore module, listed inPRD.mdand not yet specified.Every other detection module fights the same war: separating attack from noise, paying for it in false positives, baselines and tuning. A honeypot INVERTS the problem. A service that exists for no reason, that nothing legitimate is configured to contact, has exactly one class of visitor — so any interaction is unauthorized by construction, with no baseline, no warmup and no tuning.
That makes it the highest-precision signal available on a host, and the natural corroborating detector for firewall-rules, where the open question is whether blocking should require two signals.
The catch is that it is a service deliberately inviting attackers on a customer's production host. So emulation is structural — no decoy ever executes anything or holds anything real — and captured payloads are hostile input that every downstream consumer must treat as such, since rendering them in an alert is a stored-XSS vector aimed at the defender.
Spec only — no implementation in this PR.