adjustments by jonas

docs/Polkadot/economics/4-gamification.md → docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/gamification.md

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 title: Non-monetary incentives for collective members
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Stale   | 06.10.2025 | -- |
+
 <!--![](collective-members.png)-->
 
 Behavioral economics has demonstrated that non-monetary incentives can be powerful motivators, offering a viable alternative to financial rewards (see, e.g., [Frey & Gallus, 2015](https://www.bsfrey.ch/articles/C_600_2016.pdf)). This is especially true in environments where intrinsic motivation drives behavior. In such contexts, monetary incentives may even crowd out intrinsic motivation, ultimately reducing engagement ([Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000](https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/115/3/791/1828156)). 

docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+title: Academic Research
+---
+
+import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
+
+<DocCardList />

docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/npos.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+title: Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice
+---
+
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Published as Proceeding of AAAI Conference on AI   | 06.10.2025 | [AAAI](https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28807) / [ARXIV](https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.11408) |
+
+
+We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one thousand candidates and tens of thousands of (weighted) voters each. We conduct an in-depth study of application-relevant questions, including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the outcomes returned by different voting rules. Besides considering proportionality measures that are standard in the multiwinner voting literature, we pay particular attention to less-studied measures of overrepresentation, as these are closely related to the security of the Polkadot network. We also analyze how different design decisions such as the committee size affect the examined measures.

docs/Polkadot/economics/3-parachain-experiment.md → docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/parachain-experiment.md

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 title: Experimental Investigation of Parachain Auctions
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Under Review   | 06.10.2025 | [SSRN Paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5109856) |
+
 <!--![](Combinatorial-candle-auction.png)-->
 
 This entry focuses on experimentally examining the combinatorial candle auction as implemented in the Polkadot and Kusama protocol. Specifically, it compares its outcome with those of more traditional dynamic combinatorial auction formats currently in use. 

docs/Polkadot/economics/2-parachain-theory.md → docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/parachain-theory.md

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 title: Theoretical Analysis of Parachain Auctions
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Under Review   | 06.10.2025 | [SSRN Paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3846363) |
+
 <!--![](parachain-auctions.png)-->
 
 Polkadot uses a [candle auction format](https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/en/learn-auction) to allocate parachain slots. A candle auction is a dynamic auction mechanism characterized by a randomly ending time. Such a random-closing rule affects equilibrium behavior, particularly in scenarios where bidders have front-running opportunities.

docs/Polkadot/economics/5-utilitytokendesign.md → docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/utilitytokendesign.md

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 title: Utility Token Design
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Under Review   | 06.10.2025 | [SSRN Paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3954773) |
+
 <!--![](utility-token.png)-->
 
 

docs/Polkadot/economics/1-validator-selection.md → docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/validator-selection.md

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
 ---
-title: Validator selection
+title: Validator Selection
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Published in Peer-Reviewed Journal   | 06.10.2025 | [Omega](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305048323000336) / [SSRN](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4253515) |
+
 <!--![](validator-selection.jpeg)-->
 
 Validator elections play a critical role in securing the network, placing nominators in charge of selecting the most trustworthy and competent validators. This responsibility is both complex and demanding. The vast amount of validator data, constantly growing, requires significant technical expertise and sustained engagement. As a result, the process can become overly cumbersome, leading many nominators to either avoid staking altogether or refrain from investing the time needed to evaluate the data thoroughly. In this context, effective tools are essential, not only to support nominators in making informed selections, but also to help ensure the network's long-term health and resilience. 

docs/Polkadot/economics/applied-research/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+title: Applied Research
+---
+
+import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
+
+<DocCardList />

docs/Polkadot/economics/applied-research/rfc10.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# RFC-0010: Burn Coretime Revenue (accepted)
+
+|                 |                                                                                             |
+| --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Start Date**  | 19.07.2023                                                                   |
+| **Description** | Revenue from Coretime sales should be burned                                                                   |
+| **Authors**     |                   Jonas Gehrlein                                                                          |
+
+## Summary
+
+The Polkadot UC will generate revenue from the sale of available Coretime. The question then arises: how should we handle these revenues? Broadly, there are two reasonable paths – burning the revenue and thereby removing it from total issuance or divert it to the Treasury. This Request for Comment (RFC) presents arguments favoring burning as the preferred mechanism for handling revenues from Coretime sales.
+
+## Motivation
+
+How to handle the revenue accrued from Coretime sales is an important economic question that influences the value of DOT and should be properly discussed before deciding for either of the options. Now is the best time to start this discussion.
+
+## Stakeholders
+
+Polkadot DOT token holders.
+
+## Explanation
+
+This RFC discusses potential benefits of burning the revenue accrued from Coretime sales instead of diverting them to Treasury. Here are the following arguments for it.
+
+It's in the interest of the Polkadot community to have a consistent and predictable Treasury income, because volatility in the inflow can be damaging, especially in situations when it is insufficient. As such, this RFC operates under the presumption of a steady and sustainable Treasury income flow, which is crucial for the Polkadot community's stability. The assurance of a predictable Treasury income, as outlined in a prior discussion [here](https://forum.polkadot.network/t/adjusting-the-current-inflation-model-to-sustain-treasury-inflow/3301), or through other equally effective measures, serves as a baseline assumption for this argument. 
+
+Consequently, we need not concern ourselves with this particular issue here. This naturally begs the question - why should we introduce additional volatility to the Treasury by aligning it with the variable Coretime sales? It's worth noting that Coretime revenues often exhibit an inverse relationship with periods when Treasury spending should ideally be ramped up. During periods of low Coretime utilization (indicated by lower revenue), Treasury should spend more on projects and endeavours to increase the demand for Coretime. This pattern underscores that Coretime sales, by their very nature, are an inconsistent and unpredictable source of funding for the Treasury. Given the importance of maintaining a steady and predictable inflow, it's unnecessary to rely on another volatile mechanism. Some might argue that we could have both: a steady inflow (from inflation) and some added bonus from Coretime sales, but burning the revenue would offer further benefits as described below.
+
+- **Balancing Inflation:** While DOT as a utility token inherently profits from a (reasonable) net inflation, it also benefits from a deflationary force that functions as a counterbalance to the overall inflation. Right now, the only mechanism on Polkadot that burns fees is the one for underutilized DOT in the Treasury. Finding other, more direct target for burns makes sense and the Coretime market is a good option.
+
+- **Clear incentives:** By burning the revenue accrued on Coretime sales, prices paid by buyers are clearly costs. This removes distortion from the market that might arise when the paid tokens occur on some other places within the network. In that case, some actors might have secondary motives of influencing the price of Coretime sales, because they benefit down the line. For example, actors that actively participate in the Coretime sales are likely to also benefit from a higher Treasury balance, because they might frequently request funds for their projects. While those effects might appear far-fetched, they could accumulate. Burning the revenues makes sure that the prices paid are clearly costs to the actors themselves.
+
+- **Collective Value Accrual:** Following the previous argument, burning the revenue also generates some externality, because it reduces the overall issuance of DOT and thereby increases the value of each remaining token. In contrast to the aforementioned argument, this benefits all token holders collectively and equally. Therefore, I'd consider this as the preferrable option, because burns lets all token holders participate at Polkadot's success as Coretime usage increases.