fix: remove early length exit from timingSafeEqStr#81
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Dshamir
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…email - downloadTokens: pad buffers to equal length before timingSafeEqual to eliminate length-oracle side channel (PR willchen96#81) - keyRotation: add HKDF key derivation with random 16-byte per-row salt; existing rows without salt decrypt via legacy SHA-256 path; all new encryptions use HKDF (PR willchen96#76) - projects: use case-insensitive comparison for shared_with email in GET /projects/:projectId, matching access.ts pattern (PR willchen96#79) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dshamir
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…tegration - CHANGELOG: add security hardening and feature entries for PRs willchen96#158, willchen96#81, willchen96#76, willchen96#79, willchen96#145, willchen96#112, willchen96#111, willchen96#110, willchen96#155, willchen96#157, willchen96#59 - ROADMAP: mark 12 new items as completed - CLAUDE.md: add sanitize.ts, streamTimeout.ts, credits.ts to lib index, update test count to 40 - README: update API endpoints table (chat pagination, workflow export), security row (HKDF, RLS, prompt defense), encryption row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
amal66
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May 25, 2026
Chapter: 04 - Runtime safety basics. Plain-English map: Validate required environment variables at startup, reuse Supabase and storage clients instead of recreating them per request, and remove a timing leak from download-token comparison. Why it matters: Bad configuration should be caught before users hit the app. Shared clients avoid needless connection churn. Secret checks should not reveal clues through response timing. Principle: Fail fast, reuse expensive resources, and compare secrets in constant time. Precedent borrowed: Upstream PRs willchen96#81, willchen96#106, and willchen96#109, which independently targeted timing-safe comparison, env validation, and singleton client reuse. Upstream base: willchen96/mike@d39f580. Original local commit: c2d2a9a.
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Summary
timingSafeEqStrreturnedfalseimmediately when string lengths differed, before callingcrypto.timingSafeEqual— violating the constant-time contract and creating a theoretical timing oracleCloses #72
Changes
backend/src/lib/downloadTokens.ts— early length check removed;timingSafeEqStrnow pads the shorter buffer and runstimingSafeEqualunconditionally before length verification; exported for testabilitybackend/src/lib/__tests__/timingSafeEq.test.ts— 5 unit testsTest plan