drm/i915: Use 64-bit write to optimize writing fence_reg - #19
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On VGPU scenario the read/write operation of fence_reg will be trapped by the GVT-g. Then gvt-g follows the HW spec to program the fence_reg. And the gvt-g takes care of updating the fence reg correctly for any trapped value of fence reg. So it is unnecessary to read/write fence reg several times. It is enough that the fence reg is written only value in 64-bit mode. This will help to reduce the redundant trap of fence_reg mmio operation. V1->V2: Add back the condition judgement of !pipelined Signed-off-by: Zhao Yakui <yakui.zhao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: He Min <min.he@intel.com>
minhe1
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Jul 10, 2018
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[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 projectacrn#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread projectacrn#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ projectacrn#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jul 14, 2018
[ Upstream commit 221b6ec ] Fixes crash seen on arm smp systems (gateworks ventana imx6): Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000014 pgd = 80004000 [00000014] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 17 [projectacrn#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: ip6table_filter nf_conntrack_ipv6 ip6_tables nf_log_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 shortcut_fe ipcomp6 xfrm_ipcomp xfrm6_tunnel xfrm6_mode_tunnel xfrm6_mode_transport xfrm6_mode_ro xfrm6_mode_beet ip6_tunnel tunnel6 mip6 ah6 esp6 xfrm_algo sit ip_tunnel tunnel4 ipv6 ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath9k ath mac80211 cfg80211 compat ath_pci ath_hal(P) caamalg authencesn authenc caamrng caamhash caam_jr caam cdc_ncm usbnet usbcore sky2 imx2_wdt CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: P 4.9.85 projectacrn#19 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) task: bf064980 task.stack: bf07c000 PC is at relay_buf_full+0xc/0x30 LR is at _674+0x740/0xf10 [ath9k] pc : [<8018bce0>] lr : [<7f1aa604>] psr: 80000013 sp : bf07dbf0 ip : bf07dc00 fp : bf07dbfc r10: 0000003f r9 : bf130e00 r8 : 809044b0 r7 : 00000000 r6 : be67a9f0 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 809043e4 r3 : c0864c24 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000004 r0 : 00000000 Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c5387d Table: 4e6a004a DAC: 00000055 Process ksoftirqd/0 (pid: 3, stack limit = 0xbf07c210) Stack: (0xbf07dbf0 to 0xbf07e000) dbe0: bf07dd04 bf07dc00 7f1aa604 8018bce0 dc00: 00004014 be59e010 bf07dc34 bf07dc18 7f1a7084 7f19c07c be59c010 be6470a0 dc20: 0000096c be648954 bf07dc6c bf07dc38 7f1c286c bf07dd90 bf07dc5c bf07dc48 dc40: 8029ea4c 0000003c 00000001 be59c010 00000094 00000000 00000000 00000000 dc60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dc80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dca0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dcc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 8010ef24 00000030 dce0: be94f5e8 be6485a0 bddf0200 be59c010 be6465a0 be6415a0 bf07ddf4 bf07dd08 dd00: 7f1cf800 7f1aa55c 1fc38c4c 00000000 bf07dd58 cccccccd 66666667 be640bc0 dd20: bf07dd54 be6415a0 1fc38c4c 00000000 00000000 be59c038 be67a9c0 be59e010 dd40: be67a9f0 be647170 8090c904 be59c010 00000000 00000001 1fc38e84 00000000 dd60: be640bc0 bddf0200 00000200 00000010 0000003f 00000002 20000013 be59c010 dd80: 8092d940 bf7ca2c0 bf07ddb4 bf07dd98 1fc38c4c 2602003f 0100ff1b 80ff1b00 dda0: 00808080 00000000 00000000 80808080 80808080 80808080 80808080 00008080 ddc0: 00000000 00000000 7f1b62b8 00000002 be6470ec be6470f0 00000000 bf07de98 dde0: 8092d940 be6415a0 bf07de94 bf07ddf8 7f1d1ed8 7f1cf1fc 00000000 00000000 de00: bf7cc4c0 00000400 be6470f0 bf07de18 8015165c be59c010 8090453c 8090453c de20: bf07dec4 be6465a0 8014f614 80148884 0000619a 00000001 bf07c000 00000100 de40: bf07de78 00000001 7f327850 00000002 afb50401 bf064980 bf07de9c bf07de68 de60: bf064a00 803cc668 bf064a00 be6470b4 be6470b8 80844180 00000000 bf07de98 de80: 8092d940 bf07c000 bf07dec4 bf07de98 80124d18 7f1d1c44 80124c94 00000000 dea0: 00000006 80902098 80902080 40000006 00000100 bf07c000 bf07df24 bf07dec8 dec0: 8012501c 80124ca0 bf7cc4c0 bf064980 be95e1c0 04208040 80902d00 000061c7 dee0: 0000000a 80600b54 8092d940 808441f8 80902080 bf07dec8 bf03b200 bf07c000 df00: bf03b200 8090fe54 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 bf07df34 bf07df28 df20: 80125148 80124f28 bf07df5c bf07df38 8013deb4 8012511c 00000000 bf03b240 df40: bf03b200 8013dc90 00000000 00000000 bf07dfac bf07df60 8013ad40 8013dc9c df60: 70448040 00000001 00000000 bf03b200 00000000 00030003 bf07df78 bf07df78 df80: 00000000 00000000 bf07df88 bf07df88 bf03b240 8013ac48 00000000 00000000 dfa0: 00000000 bf07dfb0 80107760 8013ac54 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 8c120004 1190ad04 Backtrace: [<8018bcd4>] (relay_buf_full) from [<7f1aa604>] (_674+0x740/0xf10 [ath9k]) [<7f1aa550>] (_674 [ath9k]) from [<7f1cf800>] (_582+0x14b4/0x3708 [ath9k]) r10:be6415a0 r9:be6465a0 r8:be59c010 r7:bddf0200 r6:be6485a0 r5:be94f5e8 r4:00000030 [<7f1cf1f0>] (_582 [ath9k]) from [<7f1d1ed8>] (_735+0x2a0/0xec4 [ath9k]) r10:be6415a0 r9:8092d940 r8:bf07de98 r7:00000000 r6:be6470f0 r5:be6470ec r4:00000002 [<7f1d1c38>] (_735 [ath9k]) from [<80124d18>] (tasklet_action+0x84/0xf8) r10:bf07c000 r9:8092d940 r8:bf07de98 r7:00000000 r6:80844180 r5:be6470b8 r4:be6470b4 [<80124c94>] (tasklet_action) from [<8012501c>] (__do_softirq+0x100/0x1f4) r10:bf07c000 r9:00000100 r8:40000006 r7:80902080 r6:80902098 r5:00000006 r4:00000000 r3:80124c94 [<80124f1c>] (__do_softirq) from [<80125148>] (run_ksoftirqd+0x38/0x4c) r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:8090fe54 r5:bf03b200 r4:bf07c000 [<80125110>] (run_ksoftirqd) from [<8013deb4>] (smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x260) [<8013dc90>] (smpboot_thread_fn) from [<8013ad40>] (kthread+0xf8/0x100) r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:8013dc90 r6:bf03b200 r5:bf03b240 r4:00000000 [<8013ac48>] (kthread) from [<80107760>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34) r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:8013ac48 r4:bf03b240 Code: e89da800 e1a0c00d e92dd800 e24cb004 (e5901014) ---[ end trace dddf11ac9111b272 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt CPU1: stopping CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: P D 4.9.85 projectacrn#19 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<8010a708>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010a99c>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) r7:bf093f58 r6:20000193 r5:809168e8 r4:00000000 [<8010a984>] (show_stack) from [<802a09c4>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8) [<802a0930>] (dump_stack) from [<8010d184>] (handle_IPI+0xe8/0x180) r7:bf093f58 r6:00000000 r5:00000001 r4:808478c4 [<8010d09c>] (handle_IPI) from [<801013e8>] (gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x7c) r7:f4000100 r6:bf093f58 r5:f400010c r4:8090467c [<80101370>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<8010b378>] (__irq_svc+0x58/0x8c) Exception stack(0xbf093f58 to 0xbf093fa0) 3f40: bf7d62a0 00000000 3f60: 0010a5f4 80113460 bf092000 809043e4 00000002 80904434 bf092008 412fc09a 3f80: 00000000 bf093fb4 bf093fb8 bf093fa8 8010804c 80108050 60000013 ffffffff r9:bf092000 r8:bf092008 r7:bf093f8c r6:ffffffff r5:60000013 r4:80108050 [<80108014>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<80553c2c>] (default_idle_call+0x30/0x34) [<80553bfc>] (default_idle_call) from [<80158394>] (cpu_startup_entry+0xc4/0xfc) [<801582d0>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<8010ce40>] (secondary_start_kernel+0x168/0x174) r7:8092d2f8 r4:80913568 [<8010ccd8>] (secondary_start_kernel) from [<10101488>] (0x10101488) r5:00000055 r4:4f07806a Rebooting in 10 seconds.. Reboot failed -- System halted Signed-off-by: Sebastian Gottschall <s.gottschall@dd-wrt.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
lifeix
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Jul 14, 2018
[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e ] when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely) the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks. PID: 6766 TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 projectacrn#1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49 projectacrn#2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995 projectacrn#3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef projectacrn#4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod] projectacrn#5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50 projectacrn#6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3 projectacrn#7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs] projectacrn#8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570 projectacrn#9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs] projectacrn#10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09 projectacrn#11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f projectacrn#12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee projectacrn#13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6 projectacrn#14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210 RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290 RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000c0ed0001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040 R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380 R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210 R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task was trying to mount the cdrom. It allocated and configured a super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock. PID: 6785 TASK: ffff880078720fb0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "systemd-udevd" #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 projectacrn#1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59 projectacrn#2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605 projectacrn#3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838 projectacrn#4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0 projectacrn#5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7 projectacrn#6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de projectacrn#7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b projectacrn#8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50 projectacrn#9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom] projectacrn#10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod] projectacrn#11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86 projectacrn#12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65 projectacrn#13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b projectacrn#14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7 projectacrn#15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf projectacrn#16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d projectacrn#17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2 projectacrn#18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b projectacrn#19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33 projectacrn#20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e projectacrn#21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007f29438b0c20 RSP: 00007ffc76624b78 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70 RSI: 00000000000a0800 RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70 RBP: 00007f2944a5f540 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000020 R10: 00007f2943614c40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffff811fde4e R13: ffff880078417f78 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007f2944a4b010 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change() then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried to flush any cached data for the device. As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount lock associated with the cdrom device. This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task. The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock; the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock. This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
yakuizhao
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Aug 8, 2018
commit 6f6060a upstream. APM_DO_POP_SEGS does not restore fs/gs which were zeroed by APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS. Trying to access __preempt_count with zeroed fs doesn't really work. Move the ibrs call outside the APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS/APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS invocations so that fs is actually restored before calling preempt_enable(). Fixes the following sort of oopses: [ 0.313581] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 0.313803] Modules linked in: [ 0.314040] CPU: 0 PID: 268 Comm: kapmd Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-triton-bisect-00090-gdd84441a7971 #19 [ 0.316161] EIP: __apm_bios_call_simple+0xc8/0x170 [ 0.316161] EFLAGS: 00210016 CPU: 0 [ 0.316161] EAX: 00000102 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000102 EDX: 00000000 [ 0.316161] ESI: 0000530e EDI: dea95f64 EBP: dea95f18 ESP: dea95ef0 [ 0.316161] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 [ 0.316161] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 015d3000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 0.316161] Call Trace: [ 0.316161] ? cpumask_weight.constprop.15+0x20/0x20 [ 0.316161] on_cpu0+0x44/0x70 [ 0.316161] apm+0x54e/0x720 [ 0.316161] ? __switch_to_asm+0x26/0x40 [ 0.316161] ? __schedule+0x17d/0x590 [ 0.316161] kthread+0xc0/0xf0 [ 0.316161] ? proc_apm_show+0x150/0x150 [ 0.316161] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x20/0x20 [ 0.316161] ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38 [ 0.316161] Code: da 8e c2 8e e2 8e ea 57 55 2e ff 1d e0 bb 5d b1 0f 92 c3 5d 5f 07 1f 89 47 0c 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 90 <64> ff 0d 84 16 5c b1 74 7f 8b 45 dc 8e e0 8b 45 d8 8e e8 8b 45 [ 0.316161] EIP: __apm_bios_call_simple+0xc8/0x170 SS:ESP: 0068:dea95ef0 [ 0.316161] ---[ end trace 656253db2deaa12c ]--- Fixes: dd84441 ("x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware") Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180709133534.5963-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
yakuizhao
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Sep 18, 2018
commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Feb 1, 2019
commit b72c51a upstream. I ended up tracking down some rather nasty issues with f2fs (and other filesystem modules) constantly crashing on my kernel down to a combination of out of bounds memory accesses, one of which was coming from brcmfmac during module load: [ 30.891382] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac4356-sdio for chip BCM4356/2 [ 30.894437] ================================================================== [ 30.901581] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request+0x42c/0x480 [brcmfmac] [ 30.909935] Read of size 1 at addr ffff2000024865df by task kworker/6:2/387 [ 30.916805] [ 30.918261] CPU: 6 PID: 387 Comm: kworker/6:2 Tainted: G O 4.20.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #19 [ 30.927251] Hardware name: amlogic khadas-vim2/khadas-vim2, BIOS 2018.07-rc2-armbian 09/11/2018 [ 30.935964] Workqueue: events brcmf_driver_register [brcmfmac] [ 30.941641] Call trace: [ 30.944058] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e8 [ 30.947676] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [ 30.950968] dump_stack+0x130/0x1c4 [ 30.954406] print_address_description+0x60/0x25c [ 30.959066] kasan_report+0x1b4/0x368 [ 30.962683] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x18/0x20 [ 30.967547] brcmf_fw_alloc_request+0x42c/0x480 [brcmfmac] [ 30.967639] brcmf_sdio_probe+0x163c/0x2050 [brcmfmac] [ 30.978035] brcmf_ops_sdio_probe+0x598/0xa08 [brcmfmac] [ 30.983254] sdio_bus_probe+0x190/0x398 [ 30.983270] really_probe+0x2a0/0xa70 [ 30.983296] driver_probe_device+0x1b4/0x2d8 [ 30.994901] __driver_attach+0x200/0x280 [ 30.994914] bus_for_each_dev+0x10c/0x1a8 [ 30.994925] driver_attach+0x38/0x50 [ 30.994935] bus_add_driver+0x330/0x608 [ 30.994953] driver_register+0x140/0x388 [ 31.013965] sdio_register_driver+0x74/0xa0 [ 31.014076] brcmf_sdio_register+0x14/0x60 [brcmfmac] [ 31.023177] brcmf_driver_register+0xc/0x18 [brcmfmac] [ 31.023209] process_one_work+0x654/0x1080 [ 31.032266] worker_thread+0x4f0/0x1308 [ 31.032286] kthread+0x2a8/0x320 [ 31.039254] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c [ 31.039269] [ 31.044226] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 31.044351] brcmf_firmware_path+0x11f/0xfffffffffffd3b40 [brcmfmac] [ 31.055601] [ 31.057031] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 31.061800] ffff200002486480: 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 31.068983] ffff200002486500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 31.068993] >ffff200002486580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 [ 31.068999] ^ [ 31.069017] ffff200002486600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 31.096521] ffff200002486680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa [ 31.096528] ================================================================== [ 31.096533] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint It appears that when trying to determine the length of the string in the alternate firmware path, we make the mistake of not handling the case where the firmware path is empty correctly. Since strlen(mp_path) can return 0, we'll end up accessing mp_path[-1] when the firmware_path isn't provided through the module arguments. So, fix this by just setting the end char to '\0' by default, and only changing it if we have a non-zero length. Additionally, use strnlen() with BRCMF_FW_ALTPATH_LEN instead of strlen() just to be extra safe. Fixes: 2baa3aa ("brcmfmac: introduce brcmf_fw_alloc_request() function") Cc: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com> Cc: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com> Cc: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com> Cc: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Arend Van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com> Cc: Himanshu Jha <himanshujha199640@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Haab <dhaab@luxul.com> Cc: Jia-Shyr Chuang <saint.chuang@cypress.com> Cc: Ian Molton <ian@mnementh.co.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
yakuizhao
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Sep 5, 2019
commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mingqiangchi
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Nov 6, 2019
commit 41ba17f upstream. Commit <684d984038aa> ('powerpc/powernv: Add debugfs interface for imc-mode and imc') added debugfs interface for the nest imc pmu devices to support changing of different ucode modes. Primarily adding this capability for debug. But when doing so, the code did not consider the case of cpu-less nodes. So when reading the _cmd_ or _mode_ file of a cpu-less node will create this crash. Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000d0d58 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... CPU: 67 PID: 5301 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-next-20190627+ #19 NIP: c0000000000d0d58 LR: c00000000049aa18 CTR:c0000000000d0d50 REGS: c00020194548f9e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.2.0-rc6-next-20190627+) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR:28022822 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000049aa14 DAR: 000000000003fc08 DSISR:40000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP imc_mem_get+0x8/0x20 LR simple_attr_read+0x118/0x170 Call Trace: simple_attr_read+0x70/0x170 (unreliable) debugfs_attr_read+0x6c/0xb0 __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 vfs_read+0xbc/0x1a0 ksys_read+0x7c/0x140 system_call+0x5c/0x70 Patch fixes the issue with a more robust check for vbase to NULL. Before patch, ls output for the debugfs imc directory # ls /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/ imc_cmd_0 imc_cmd_251 imc_cmd_253 imc_cmd_255 imc_mode_0 imc_mode_251 imc_mode_253 imc_mode_255 imc_cmd_250 imc_cmd_252 imc_cmd_254 imc_cmd_8 imc_mode_250 imc_mode_252 imc_mode_254 imc_mode_8 After patch, ls output for the debugfs imc directory # ls /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/ imc_cmd_0 imc_cmd_8 imc_mode_0 imc_mode_8 Actual bug here is that, we have two loops with potentially different loop counts. That is, in imc_get_mem_addr_nest(), loop count is obtained from the dt entries. But in case of export_imc_mode_and_cmd(), loop was based on for_each_nid() count. Patch fixes the loop count in latter based on the struct mem_info. Ideally it would be better to have array size in struct imc_pmu. Fixes: 684d984 ('powerpc/powernv: Add debugfs interface for imc-mode and imc') Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827101635.6942-1-maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mingqiangchi
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Nov 6, 2019
commit f9c6456 upstream. Masoud Sharbiani noticed that commit 29ef680 ("memcg, oom: move out_of_memory back to the charge path") broke memcg OOM called from __xfs_filemap_fault() path. It turned out that try_charge() is retrying forever without making forward progress because mem_cgroup_oom(GFP_NOFS) cannot invoke the OOM killer due to commit 3da88fb ("mm, oom: move GFP_NOFS check to out_of_memory"). Allowing forced charge due to being unable to invoke memcg OOM killer will lead to global OOM situation. Also, just returning -ENOMEM will be risky because OOM path is lost and some paths (e.g. get_user_pages()) will leak -ENOMEM. Therefore, invoking memcg OOM killer (despite GFP_NOFS) will be the only choice we can choose for now. Until 29ef680, we were able to invoke memcg OOM killer when GFP_KERNEL reclaim failed [1]. But since 29ef680, we need to invoke memcg OOM killer when GFP_NOFS reclaim failed [2]. Although in the past we did invoke memcg OOM killer for GFP_NOFS [3], we might get pre-mature memcg OOM reports due to this patch. [1] leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x6200ca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE), nodemask=(null), order=0, oom_score_adj=0 CPU: 0 PID: 2746 Comm: leaker Not tainted 4.18.0+ #19 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x63/0x88 dump_header+0x67/0x27a ? mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x91/0xf0 oom_kill_process+0x210/0x410 out_of_memory+0x10a/0x2c0 mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x46/0x80 mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x2e4/0x310 ? high_work_func+0x20/0x20 pagefault_out_of_memory+0x31/0x76 mm_fault_error+0x55/0x115 ? handle_mm_fault+0xfd/0x220 __do_page_fault+0x433/0x4e0 do_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x4009f0 Code: 03 00 00 00 e8 71 fd ff ff 48 83 f8 ff 49 89 c6 74 74 48 89 c6 bf c0 0c 40 00 31 c0 e8 69 fd ff ff 45 85 ff 7e 21 31 c9 66 90 <41> 0f be 14 0e 01 d3 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 05 41 c6 04 0e 2a 48 83 RSP: 002b:00007ffe29ae96f0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000001b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001ce1000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007fffffe5 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f94be09220d R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000186a0 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f949d845000 R15: 0000000002800000 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 158965 memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 kmem: usage 2016kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:844KB rss:521136KB rss_huge:0KB shmem:0KB mapped_file:0KB dirty:132KB writeback:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:521224KB inactive_file:1012KB active_file:8KB unevictable:0KB Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2746 (leaker) score 998 or sacrifice child Killed process 2746 (leaker) total-vm:536704kB, anon-rss:521176kB, file-rss:1208kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 2746 (leaker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB [2] leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x600040(GFP_NOFS), nodemask=(null), order=0, oom_score_adj=0 CPU: 1 PID: 2746 Comm: leaker Not tainted 4.18.0+ #20 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x63/0x88 dump_header+0x67/0x27a ? mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x91/0xf0 oom_kill_process+0x210/0x410 out_of_memory+0x109/0x2d0 mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x46/0x80 try_charge+0x58d/0x650 ? __radix_tree_replace+0x81/0x100 mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x7a/0x100 __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x92/0x180 add_to_page_cache_lru+0x4d/0xf0 iomap_readpages_actor+0xde/0x1b0 ? iomap_zero_range_actor+0x1d0/0x1d0 iomap_apply+0xaf/0x130 iomap_readpages+0x9f/0x150 ? iomap_zero_range_actor+0x1d0/0x1d0 xfs_vm_readpages+0x18/0x20 [xfs] read_pages+0x60/0x140 __do_page_cache_readahead+0x193/0x1b0 ondemand_readahead+0x16d/0x2c0 page_cache_async_readahead+0x9a/0xd0 filemap_fault+0x403/0x620 ? alloc_set_pte+0x12c/0x540 ? _cond_resched+0x14/0x30 __xfs_filemap_fault+0x66/0x180 [xfs] xfs_filemap_fault+0x27/0x30 [xfs] __do_fault+0x19/0x40 __handle_mm_fault+0x8e8/0xb60 handle_mm_fault+0xfd/0x220 __do_page_fault+0x238/0x4e0 do_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x4009f0 Code: 03 00 00 00 e8 71 fd ff ff 48 83 f8 ff 49 89 c6 74 74 48 89 c6 bf c0 0c 40 00 31 c0 e8 69 fd ff ff 45 85 ff 7e 21 31 c9 66 90 <41> 0f be 14 0e 01 d3 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 05 41 c6 04 0e 2a 48 83 RSP: 002b:00007ffda45c9290 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000001b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001a1e000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007fffffe5 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f6d061ff20d R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000186a0 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f6ce59b2000 R15: 0000000002800000 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 7221 memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 kmem: usage 1944kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:3632KB rss:518232KB rss_huge:0KB shmem:0KB mapped_file:0KB dirty:0KB writeback:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:518408KB inactive_file:3908KB active_file:12KB unevictable:0KB Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2746 (leaker) score 992 or sacrifice child Killed process 2746 (leaker) total-vm:536704kB, anon-rss:518264kB, file-rss:1188kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 2746 (leaker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB [3] leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x50, order=0, oom_score_adj=0 leaker cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0 CPU: 1 PID: 3206 Comm: leaker Not tainted 3.10.0-957.27.2.el7.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018 Call Trace: [<ffffffffaf364147>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffffaf35eb6a>] dump_header+0x90/0x229 [<ffffffffaedbb456>] ? find_lock_task_mm+0x56/0xc0 [<ffffffffaee32a38>] ? try_get_mem_cgroup_from_mm+0x28/0x60 [<ffffffffaedbb904>] oom_kill_process+0x254/0x3d0 [<ffffffffaee36c36>] mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x546/0x570 [<ffffffffaee360b0>] ? mem_cgroup_charge_common+0xc0/0xc0 [<ffffffffaedbc194>] pagefault_out_of_memory+0x14/0x90 [<ffffffffaf35d072>] mm_fault_error+0x6a/0x157 [<ffffffffaf3717c8>] __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0x4f0 [<ffffffffaf371925>] do_page_fault+0x35/0x90 [<ffffffffaf36d768>] page_fault+0x28/0x30 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 20628 memory+swap: usage 524288kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 kmem: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:840KB rss:523448KB rss_huge:0KB mapped_file:0KB swap:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:523448KB inactive_file:464KB active_file:376KB unevictable:0KB Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 3206 (leaker) score 970 or sacrifice child Killed process 3206 (leaker) total-vm:536692kB, anon-rss:523304kB, file-rss:412kB, shmem-rss:0kB Bisected by Masoud Sharbiani. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cbe54ed1-b6ba-a056-8899-2dc42526371d@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Fixes: 3da88fb ("mm, oom: move GFP_NOFS check to out_of_memory") [necessary after 29ef680] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: Masoud Sharbiani <msharbiani@apple.com> Tested-by: Masoud Sharbiani <msharbiani@apple.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.19+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shuox
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May 14, 2020
[ Upstream commit 1bc7896 ] When experimenting with bpf_send_signal() helper in our production environment (5.2 based), we experienced a deadlock in NMI mode: #5 [ffffc9002219f770] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8110be24 #6 [ffffc9002219f770] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff81a43012 #7 [ffffc9002219f780] try_to_wake_up at ffffffff810e7ecd #8 [ffffc9002219f7e0] signal_wake_up_state at ffffffff810c7b55 #9 [ffffc9002219f7f0] __send_signal at ffffffff810c8602 #10 [ffffc9002219f830] do_send_sig_info at ffffffff810ca31a #11 [ffffc9002219f868] bpf_send_signal at ffffffff8119d227 #12 [ffffc9002219f988] bpf_overflow_handler at ffffffff811d4140 #13 [ffffc9002219f9e0] __perf_event_overflow at ffffffff811d68cf #14 [ffffc9002219fa10] perf_swevent_overflow at ffffffff811d6a09 #15 [ffffc9002219fa38] ___perf_sw_event at ffffffff811e0f47 #16 [ffffc9002219fc30] __schedule at ffffffff81a3e04d #17 [ffffc9002219fc90] schedule at ffffffff81a3e219 #18 [ffffc9002219fca0] futex_wait_queue_me at ffffffff8113d1b9 #19 [ffffc9002219fcd8] futex_wait at ffffffff8113e529 #20 [ffffc9002219fdf0] do_futex at ffffffff8113ffbc #21 [ffffc9002219fec0] __x64_sys_futex at ffffffff81140d1c #22 [ffffc9002219ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002602 #23 [ffffc9002219ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81c00068 The above call stack is actually very similar to an issue reported by Commit eac9153 ("bpf/stackmap: Fix deadlock with rq_lock in bpf_get_stack()") by Song Liu. The only difference is bpf_send_signal() helper instead of bpf_get_stack() helper. The above deadlock is triggered with a perf_sw_event. Similar to Commit eac9153, the below almost identical reproducer used tracepoint point sched/sched_switch so the issue can be easily caught. /* stress_test.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define THREAD_COUNT 1000 char *filename; void *worker(void *p) { void *ptr; int fd; char *pptr; fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return NULL; while (1) { struct timespec ts = {0, 1000 + rand() % 2000}; ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096 * 64, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); usleep(1); if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) { printf("failed to mmap\n"); break; } munmap(ptr, 4096 * 64); usleep(1); pptr = malloc(1); usleep(1); pptr[0] = 1; usleep(1); free(pptr); usleep(1); nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } close(fd); return NULL; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { void *ptr; int i; pthread_t threads[THREAD_COUNT]; if (argc < 2) return 0; filename = argv[1]; for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) { if (pthread_create(threads + i, NULL, worker, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error creating thread\n"); return 0; } } for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) pthread_join(threads[i], NULL); return 0; } and the following command: 1. run `stress_test /bin/ls` in one windown 2. hack bcc trace.py with the following change: # --- a/tools/trace.py # +++ b/tools/trace.py @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(%s); __data.tgid = __tgid; __data.pid = __pid; bpf_get_current_comm(&__data.comm, sizeof(__data.comm)); + bpf_send_signal(10); %s %s %s.perf_submit(%s, &__data, sizeof(__data)); 3. in a different window run ./trace.py -p $(pidof stress_test) t:sched:sched_switch The deadlock can be reproduced in our production system. Similar to Song's fix, the fix is to delay sending signal if irqs is disabled to avoid deadlocks involving with rq_lock. With this change, my above stress-test in our production system won't cause deadlock any more. I also implemented a scale-down version of reproducer in the selftest (a subsequent commit). With latest bpf-next, it complains for the following potential deadlock. [ 32.832450] -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}: [ 32.833100] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.833696] task_rq_lock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 32.834182] task_sched_runtime+0x59/0xd0 [ 32.834721] thread_group_cputime+0x250/0x270 [ 32.835304] thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x2e/0x70 [ 32.835959] do_task_stat+0x8a7/0xb80 [ 32.836461] proc_single_show+0x51/0xb0 ... [ 32.839512] -> #0 (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){....}: [ 32.840275] __lock_acquire+0x1358/0x1a20 [ 32.840826] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x1d0 [ 32.841309] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.841916] __lock_task_sighand+0x79/0x160 [ 32.842465] do_send_sig_info+0x35/0x90 [ 32.842977] bpf_send_signal+0xa/0x10 [ 32.843464] bpf_prog_bc13ed9e4d3163e3_send_signal_tp_sched+0x465/0x1000 [ 32.844301] trace_call_bpf+0x115/0x270 [ 32.844809] perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4a/0xc0 [ 32.845411] perf_trace_sched_switch+0x10f/0x180 [ 32.846014] __schedule+0x45d/0x880 [ 32.846483] schedule+0x5f/0xd0 ... [ 32.853148] Chain exists of: [ 32.853148] &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock [ 32.853148] [ 32.854451] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 32.854451] [ 32.855173] CPU0 CPU1 [ 32.855745] ---- ---- [ 32.856278] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.856671] lock(&p->pi_lock); [ 32.857332] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.857999] lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock); Deadlock happens on CPU0 when it tries to acquire &sighand->siglock but it has been held by CPU1 and CPU1 tries to grab &rq->lock and cannot get it. This is not exactly the callstack in our production environment, but sympotom is similar and both locks are using spin_lock_irqsave() to acquire the lock, and both involves rq_lock. The fix to delay sending signal when irq is disabled also fixed this issue. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200304191104.2796501-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b88bf6c upstream. The following was observed by Kar Hin Ong with RT patchset: Backtrace: irq 19: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) CPU: 0 PID: 3329 Comm: irq/34-nipalk Tainted:4.14.87-rt49 #1 Hardware name: National Instruments NI PXIe-8880/NI PXIe-8880, BIOS 2.1.5f1 01/09/2020 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? dump_stack+0x46/0x5e ? __report_bad_irq+0x2e/0xb0 ? note_interrupt+0x242/0x290 ? nNIKAL100_memoryRead16+0x8/0x10 [nikal] ? handle_irq_event_percpu+0x55/0x70 ? handle_irq_event+0x4f/0x80 ? handle_fasteoi_irq+0x81/0x180 ? handle_irq+0x1c/0x30 ? do_IRQ+0x41/0xd0 ? common_interrupt+0x84/0x84 </IRQ> ... handlers: [<ffffffffb3297200>] irq_default_primary_handler threaded [<ffffffffb3669180>] usb_hcd_irq Disabling IRQ #19 The problem being that this device is triggering boot interrupts due to threaded interrupt handling and masking of the IO-APIC. These boot interrupts are then forwarded on to the legacy PCH's PIRQ lines where there is no handler present for the device. Whenever a PCI device fires interrupt (INTx) to Pin 20 of IOAPIC 2 (GSI 44), the kernel receives two interrupts: 1. Interrupt from Pin 20 of IOAPIC 2 -> Expected 2. Interrupt from Pin 19 of IOAPIC 1 -> UNEXPECTED Quirks for disabling boot interrupts (preferred) or rerouting the handler exist but do not address these Xeon chipsets' mechanism: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/12131949181903-git-send-email-sassmann@suse.de/ Add a new mechanism via PCI CFG for those chipsets supporting CIPINTRC register's dis_intx_rout2ich bit. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200220192930.64820-2-sean.v.kelley@linux.intel.com Reported-by: Kar Hin Ong <kar.hin.ong@ni.com> Tested-by: Kar Hin Ong <kar.hin.ong@ni.com> Signed-off-by: Sean V Kelley <sean.v.kelley@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b88bf6c upstream. The following was observed by Kar Hin Ong with RT patchset: Backtrace: irq 19: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) CPU: 0 PID: 3329 Comm: irq/34-nipalk Tainted:4.14.87-rt49 #1 Hardware name: National Instruments NI PXIe-8880/NI PXIe-8880, BIOS 2.1.5f1 01/09/2020 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? dump_stack+0x46/0x5e ? __report_bad_irq+0x2e/0xb0 ? note_interrupt+0x242/0x290 ? nNIKAL100_memoryRead16+0x8/0x10 [nikal] ? handle_irq_event_percpu+0x55/0x70 ? handle_irq_event+0x4f/0x80 ? handle_fasteoi_irq+0x81/0x180 ? handle_irq+0x1c/0x30 ? do_IRQ+0x41/0xd0 ? common_interrupt+0x84/0x84 </IRQ> ... handlers: [<ffffffffb3297200>] irq_default_primary_handler threaded [<ffffffffb3669180>] usb_hcd_irq Disabling IRQ #19 The problem being that this device is triggering boot interrupts due to threaded interrupt handling and masking of the IO-APIC. These boot interrupts are then forwarded on to the legacy PCH's PIRQ lines where there is no handler present for the device. Whenever a PCI device fires interrupt (INTx) to Pin 20 of IOAPIC 2 (GSI 44), the kernel receives two interrupts: 1. Interrupt from Pin 20 of IOAPIC 2 -> Expected 2. Interrupt from Pin 19 of IOAPIC 1 -> UNEXPECTED Quirks for disabling boot interrupts (preferred) or rerouting the handler exist but do not address these Xeon chipsets' mechanism: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/12131949181903-git-send-email-sassmann@suse.de/ Add a new mechanism via PCI CFG for those chipsets supporting CIPINTRC register's dis_intx_rout2ich bit. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200220192930.64820-2-sean.v.kelley@linux.intel.com Reported-by: Kar Hin Ong <kar.hin.ong@ni.com> Tested-by: Kar Hin Ong <kar.hin.ong@ni.com> Signed-off-by: Sean V Kelley <sean.v.kelley@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aa4e460 upstream. Commit 4d00409 ("lockdep: Fix lockdep recursion") uncovered the following issue in lib/crc32test reported on s390: BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1 caller is lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x48/0x270 CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.9.0-next-20201015-15164-g03d992bd2de6 #19 Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (LPAR) Call Trace: lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x48/0x270 trace_hardirqs_on+0x9c/0x1b8 crc32_test.isra.0+0x170/0x1c0 crc32test_init+0x1c/0x40 do_one_initcall+0x40/0x130 do_initcalls+0x126/0x150 kernel_init_freeable+0x1f6/0x230 kernel_init+0x22/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x2c no locks held by swapper/0/1. Remove extra local_irq_disable/local_irq_enable helpers calls. Fixes: 5fb7f87 ("lib: add module support to crc32 tests") Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/patch.git-4369da00c06e.your-ad-here.call-01602859837-ext-1679@work.hours Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dec 28, 2021
[ Upstream commit 515e718 ] When fail to init coex module, free 'common' and 'adapter' directly, but common->tx_thread which will access 'common' and 'adapter' is running at the same time. That will trigger the UAF bug. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rsi_tx_scheduler_thread+0x50f/0x520 [rsi_91x] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880076dc000 by task Tx-Thread/124777 CPU: 0 PID: 124777 Comm: Tx-Thread Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5+ #19 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xe2/0x152 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140 ? rsi_tx_scheduler_thread+0x50f/0x520 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ? rsi_tx_scheduler_thread+0x50f/0x520 rsi_tx_scheduler_thread+0x50f/0x520 ... Freed by task 111873: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x140 kfree+0x117/0x4c0 rsi_91x_init+0x741/0x8a0 [rsi_91x] rsi_probe+0x9f/0x1750 [rsi_usb] Stop thread before free 'common' and 'adapter' to fix it. Fixes: 2108df3 ("rsi: add coex support") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211015040335.1021546-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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On VGPU scenario the read/write operation of fence_reg will be trapped
by the GVT-g. Then gvt-g follows the HW spec to program the fence_reg.
And the gvt-g takes care of updating the fence reg correctly for any trapped
value of fence reg.
So it is unnecessary to read/write fence reg several times. It is enough that
the fence reg is written only value in 64-bit mode. This will help
to reduce the redundant trap of fence_reg mmio operation.
V1->V2: Add back the condition judgement of !pipelined
Signed-off-by: Zhao Yakui yakui.zhao@intel.com
Reviewed-by: He Min min.he@intel.com