drm/i915/gvt: don't treat EINVAL if trap pci_command and pci_status t… - #24
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…ogether Previously we only support single pci_command writing trap. While when system suspends, pci_command and pci_status are written together in 32 bits, GVT-g also need trap them in such scenario. Signed-off-by: Fei Jiang <fei.jiang@intel.com>
| if (WARN_ON(bytes > 2)) | ||
| if (WARN_ON(bytes != 2 && bytes != 4)) | ||
| return -EINVAL; | ||
| return emulate_pci_command_write(vgpu, offset, p_data, bytes); |
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Any reason to split a 4 bytes write to 2 2-byte write? Technically they are not equal, and the new logic may be incorrect.
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Thanks for comments. Read/write PCI cfg reg with dword size is legal. Some of the pci driver do access PCI_COMMAND reg via pci_bus_{read,write}_config_dword(). Then for this case, it seems it is more reasonable to ignore higher 16 bits.
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@dongyaozu , the PCI_COMMAND and PCI_STATUS register are two registers. At most cases they are accessed by using pci_read/write_config_word. But as some drivers use the dword to write the two registers, I think that it is safer to split two 2-bytes write. (The pci_cmd word needs to be check whether the memory/IO trap should be enabled. The pci_status register needs to be updated with the high byte).
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What I mean is more for a general situation. In this particular case, since CMD and STATUS are irrelevant, so splitting to 2 separate read/write is likely fine. |
dongyaozu
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You can go with my +1. But leave it to Yakui
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 projectacrn#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread projectacrn#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 projectacrn#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] projectacrn#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ projectacrn#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5cc41e0 upstream. WHen registering a new binfmt_misc handler, it is possible to overflow the offset to get a negative value, which might crash the system, or possibly leak kernel data. Here is a crash log when 2500000000 was used as an offset: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff989cfd6edca0 IP: load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] PGD 1ef3e067 P4D 1ef3e067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [projectacrn#1] SMP NOPTI Modules linked in: binfmt_misc kvm_intel ppdev kvm irqbypass joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid parport_pc qemu_fw_cfg parpy CPU: 0 PID: 2499 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.15.0-22-generic projectacrn#24-Ubuntu Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] Call Trace: search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0 do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x667/0x810 SyS_execve+0x31/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Use kstrtoint instead of simple_strtoul. It will work as the code already set the delimiter byte to '\0' and we only do it when the field is not empty. Tested with offsets -1, 2500000000, UINT_MAX and INT_MAX. Also tested with examples documented at Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst and other registrations from packages on Ubuntu. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180529135648.14254-1-cascardo@canonical.com Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Writing 32 bits for pci_command register is the behavior of UOS, also it was not called from i915 kernel driver, should be in pci command code. In native case, if calling 32 bits for pci_command, pci_status register is also written, then we should emulate the same behavior in trapped case. |
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Let us merge it... |
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I am fine with this patch. |
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Verified+1 |
[ Upstream commit 9970a8e ] GC of set uses call_rcu() to destroy elements. So that elements would be destroyed after destroying sets and chains. But, elements should be destroyed before destroying sets and chains. In order to wait calling call_rcu(), a rcu_barrier() is added. In order to test correctly, below patch should be applied. https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/940883/ test scripts: %cat test.nft table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset [ ... ] table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset Splat looks like: [ 200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363! [ 200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24 [ 200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0 4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff [ 200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90 [ 200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa [ 200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200 [ 200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 200.906354] FS: 00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 200.915533] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 200.930353] Call Trace: [ 200.932351] ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables] [ 200.939525] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables] [ 200.947525] ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables] [ 200.952383] ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables] [ 200.959532] ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230 [ 200.963529] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink] [ 200.968384] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink] [ 200.975525] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.980363] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.986356] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 200.990352] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0 [ 200.994355] ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130 [ 200.999531] ? memset+0x1f/0x40 Fixes: 9d09829 ("netfilter: nft_hash: add support for timeouts") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 30d65e0 ] Fix crash caused by NULL pointer dereference when debugfs functions le_max_key_read, le_max_key_size_write, le_min_key_size_read or le_min_key_size_write and Bluetooth adapter was powered off. Fix is to move max_key_size and min_key_size from smp_dev to hci_dev. At the same time they were renamed to le_max_key_size and le_min_key_size. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002e8 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#24] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 6255 Comm: cat Tainted: G D OE 4.18.9-200.fc28.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: LENOVO 4286CTO/4286CTO, BIOS 8DET76WW (1.46 ) 06/21/2018 RIP: 0010:le_max_key_size_read+0x45/0xb0 [bluetooth] Code: 00 00 00 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 48 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 8d 7c 24 04 48 8b 80 48 0a 00 00 <48> 8b 80 e8 02 00 00 0f b6 48 52 e8 fb b6 b3 ed be 04 00 00 00 48 RSP: 0018:ffffab23c3ff3df0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0b4ca2e000 RCX: ffffab23c3ff3f08 RDX: ffffffffc0ddb033 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffab23c3ff3df4 RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffab23c3ff3ed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffab23c3ff3f08 R13: 00007f0b4ca2e000 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: ffffab23c3ff3f08 FS: 00007f0b4ca0f540(0000) GS:ffff91bd5e280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000002e8 CR3: 00000000629fa006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Call Trace: full_proxy_read+0x53/0x80 __vfs_read+0x36/0x180 vfs_read+0x8a/0x140 ksys_read+0x4f/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa <matias.karhumaa@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e88439d ] [BUG] Lockdep will report the following circular locking dependency: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.2.0-rc2-custom #24 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/8631 is trying to acquire lock: 000000002536438c (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}, at: btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x475/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_super+0x71/0x80 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2bd/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110 kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x16/0xa0 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x80 deactivate_super+0x51/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x80 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x94/0xb0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd8/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x210/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x2da/0x730 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2691/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xa7/0x190 __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshot+0x9d7/0xe60 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshots+0x94/0xb0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x415/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x496/0x4e0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xa90/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2 --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &fs_info->tree_log_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by btrfs/8631: #0: 00000000ed8f23f6 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x28/0x60 #1: 000000009fb1597a (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10/1){+.+.}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x70/0x4e0 [btrfs] #2: 0000000088c5ad88 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x128/0x4e0 [btrfs] #3: 000000009606fc3e (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x37a/0x520 [btrfs] #4: 00000000f82bbdf5 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] #5: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] [CAUSE] Due to the delayed subvolume creation, we need to call btrfs_qgroup_inherit() inside commit transaction code, with a lot of other mutex hold. This hell of lock chain can lead to above problem. [FIX] On the other hand, we don't really need to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock if we're in the context of create_pending_snapshot(). As in that context, we're the only one being able to modify qgroup. All other qgroup functions which needs qgroup_ioctl_lock are either holding a transaction handle, or will start a new transaction: Functions will start a new transaction(): * btrfs_quota_enable() * btrfs_quota_disable() Functions hold a transaction handler: * btrfs_add_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_del_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_create_qgroup() * btrfs_remove_qgroup() * btrfs_limit_qgroup() * btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call inside create_subvol() So we have a higher level protection provided by transaction, thus we don't need to always hold qgroup_ioctl_lock in btrfs_qgroup_inherit(). Only the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_subvol() needs to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock, while the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_pending_snapshot() is already protected by transaction. So the fix is to detect the context by checking trans->transaction->state. If we're at TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING, then we're in commit transaction context and no need to get the mutex. Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c09b21 upstream. syzbot found the following crash on: HEAD commit: e96407b4 usb-fuzzer: main usb gadget fuzzer driver git tree: https://github.com/google/kasan.git usb-fuzzer console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=147ac20c600000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=792eb47789f57810 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881cf591a08 by task syz-executor.1/26260 CPU: 1 PID: 26260 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc2+ #24 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 __lock_acquire+0x302a/0x3b50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 lock_acquire+0x127/0x320 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4412 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 hiddev_release+0x82/0x520 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:221 __fput+0x2d7/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x13f/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x8ef/0x2c50 kernel/exit.c:878 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:982 get_signal+0x466/0x23d0 kernel/signal.c:2728 do_signal+0x88/0x14e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:815 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/common.c:159 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:274 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45f/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:299 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x459829 Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f75b2a6ccf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 000000000075c078 RCX: 0000000000459829 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 000000000075c078 RBP: 000000000075c070 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000075c07c R13: 00007ffcdfe1023f R14: 00007f75b2a6d9c0 R15: 000000000075c07c Allocated by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:487 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:460 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:748 [inline] hiddev_connect+0x242/0x5b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:900 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Freed by task 104: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:449 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1423 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1470 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3012 [inline] kfree+0xe4/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3953 hiddev_connect.cold+0x45/0x5c drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:914 hid_connect+0x239/0xbb0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1882 hid_hw_start drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1981 [inline] hid_hw_start+0xa2/0x130 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1972 appleir_probe+0x13e/0x1a0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:308 hid_device_probe+0x2be/0x3f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2209 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 hid_add_device+0x33c/0x990 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2365 usbhid_probe+0xa81/0xfa0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1386 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x650 drivers/base/dd.c:548 driver_probe_device+0x101/0x1b0 drivers/base/dd.c:709 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:816 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:882 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2114 usb_new_device.cold+0x6a4/0xe79 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2536 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5098 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x1b5c/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881cf591900 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff8881cf591900, ffff8881cf591b00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00073d6400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da002500 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0200000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff8881da002500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881cf591900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff8881cf591a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881cf591a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881cf591b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== In order to avoid opening a disconnected device, we need to check exist again after acquiring the existance lock, and bail out if necessary. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+62a1e04fd3ec2abf099e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ] According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state. The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change. === Before === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ...... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 #32 L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6 Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #33 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... === After === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ..... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #32 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #33 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #34 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #35 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 859d510 ] If the specified/hinted sink is not reachable from a subset of the CPUs, we could end up unable to trace the event on those CPUs. This is the best effort we could do until we support 1:1 configurations. Fail gracefully in such cases avoiding a WARN_ON, which can be easily triggered by the user on certain platforms (Arm N1SDP), with the following trace paths : CPU0 \ -- Funnel0 --> ETF0 --> / \ CPU1 \ MainFunnel CPU2 / \ / -- Funnel1 --> ETF1 --> / CPU1 $ perf record --per-thread -e cs_etm/@ETF0/u -- <app> could trigger the following WARNING, when the event is scheduled on CPU2. [10919.513250] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [10919.517861] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 24021 at drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm-perf.c:316 etm_event_start+0xf8/0x100 ... [10919.564403] CPU: 2 PID: 24021 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.8.0+ #24 [10919.570308] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [10919.575865] pc : etm_event_start+0xf8/0x100 [10919.580034] lr : etm_event_start+0x80/0x100 [10919.584202] sp : fffffe001932f940 [10919.587502] x29: fffffe001932f940 x28: fffffc834995f800 [10919.592799] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: fffffe0011f3ced0 [10919.598095] x25: fffffc837fce244c x24: fffffc837fce2448 [10919.603391] x23: 0000000000000002 x22: fffffc8353529c00 [10919.608688] x21: fffffc835bb31000 x20: 0000000000000000 [10919.613984] x19: fffffc837fcdcc70 x18: 0000000000000000 [10919.619281] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [10919.624577] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 00000000000009f8 [10919.629874] x13: 00000000000009f8 x12: 0000000000000018 [10919.635170] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 [10919.640467] x9 : fffffe00108cd168 x8 : 0000000000000000 [10919.645763] x7 : 0000000000000020 x6 : 0000000000000001 [10919.651059] x5 : 0000000000000002 x4 : 0000000000000001 [10919.656356] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [10919.661652] x1 : fffffe836eb40000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [10919.666949] Call trace: [10919.669382] etm_event_start+0xf8/0x100 [10919.673203] etm_event_add+0x40/0x60 [10919.676765] event_sched_in.isra.134+0xcc/0x210 [10919.681281] merge_sched_in+0xb0/0x2a8 [10919.685017] visit_groups_merge.constprop.140+0x15c/0x4b8 [10919.690400] ctx_sched_in+0x15c/0x170 [10919.694048] perf_event_sched_in+0x6c/0xa0 [10919.698130] ctx_resched+0x60/0xa0 [10919.701517] perf_event_exec+0x288/0x2f0 [10919.705425] begin_new_exec+0x4c8/0xf58 [10919.709247] load_elf_binary+0x66c/0xf30 [10919.713155] exec_binprm+0x15c/0x450 [10919.716716] __do_execve_file+0x508/0x748 [10919.720711] __arm64_sys_execve+0x40/0x50 [10919.724707] do_el0_svc+0xf4/0x1b8 [10919.728095] el0_sync_handler+0xf8/0x124 [10919.732003] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 Even though we don't support using separate sinks for the ETMs yet (e.g, for 1:1 configurations), we should at least honor the user's choice and handle the limitations gracefully, by simply skipping the tracing on ETMs which can't reach the requested sink. Fixes: f9d81a6 ("coresight: perf: Allow tracing on hotplugged CPUs") Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Cc: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Reported-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916191737.4001561-11-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d412137 ] The perf_buffer fails on system with offline cpus: # test_progs -t perf_buffer test_perf_buffer:PASS:nr_cpus 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:PASS:nr_on_cpus 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:PASS:attach_kprobe 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:PASS:perf_buf__new 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:PASS:epoll_fd 0 nsec skipping offline CPU #24 skipping offline CPU #25 skipping offline CPU #26 skipping offline CPU #27 skipping offline CPU #28 skipping offline CPU #29 skipping offline CPU #30 skipping offline CPU #31 test_perf_buffer:PASS:perf_buffer__poll 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:PASS:seen_cpu_cnt 0 nsec test_perf_buffer:FAIL:buf_cnt got 24, expected 32 Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED Changing the test to check online cpus instead of possible. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211021114132.8196-2-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
…ogether
Previously we only support single pci_command writing trap. While when
system suspends, pci_command and pci_status are written together in 32
bits, GVT-g also need trap them in such scenario.
Signed-off-by: Fei Jiang fei.jiang@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Min He min.he@intel.com